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Abstract
To date, very little research has focused specifically on exploring clinicians’ 
understanding and treatment o f self-injury. My study was an attempt to address this 
gap in the literature and to fill in perspectives and voices not previously articulated.
In this study I explored clinicians’ understanding of self-injury, their discourses about 
their treatment models and their perceptions o f their clinical effectiveness and failures 
in their work with self-injuring clients. I also examined the sources o f knowledge that 
contributed to clinicians’ understanding o f self-injury and o f those who engage in this 
behaviour. Eight participants were selected using snowball and criterion sampling 
methods. These participants were all mental health clinicians from a variety of 
professional disciplines and who practiced a range o f different treatment modalities 
with self-injuring patients. Qualitative in-depth interviewing was the primary method 
o f generating data and discourse analysis was the mode o f analysing the data in this 
research study. The findings of my study suggested that the majority o f the clinicians 
did not have a distinct model for considering self-injury and treatment approaches for 
working with self-injuring clients. Rather, they created discourse communities of “an 
other” to formulate their beliefs about self-injury and its treatment. They also relied 
predominantly on their clinical practice with self-injuring patients for comprehending 
and treating self-injury. In relation to their current treatment practice effectiveness 
and failures the clinicians seemed to draw on two distinct discourses, an “expert 
discourse” and an “inquiry discourse” and appeared to have little or no systematic 
way o f thinking or conceptualising “progress” with regard to self-injury. Implications 
for the education and training o f clinicians about the phenomenon and treatment of 
self-injury are discussed, with particular reference to the application o f an inquirer’s 
discursive approach. In addition, recommendations are made for future research and
ix
directions in this field, in terms of replicating this study in other countries beyond 
Ireland and also including the narratives o f self-injuring patients’ discourses about 
their experience o f various treatment modalities.
x
Chapter One 
Context for My Research Study
Inspiration for this Dissertation
The phenomenon of self-injury first came to my attention as a graduate 
psychology student via an enlightening and informative lecture, “Writing on their 
bodies: Understanding self-mutilation with adolescent girls through creative writing 
in psychotherapy” by a visiting academic to my university, Professor Annie G. Rogers 
(1996). During this period of my professional life, I was training as a counselling 
psychologist, and I was at the beginning o f my final clinical placement which was 
based within a psychiatric service.
Prior to taking up my placement in an outpatient service, I was required to 
spend my first week shadowing one of the psychiatrists working there. 1 attended 
client case conferences and patient consultations with the psychiatrist. It was at one 
of these case conferences that I encountered an individual who self-injured. This was 
not the first time I had been exposed to self-injury. My first encounter was as a young 
graduate student, fresh out of college, when I worked with a young autistic boy, Josh 
(pseudonym). So I did not experience shock, repulsion, disgust or any other negative 
feelings articulated in the self-injury literature, toward the young woman, Fiona 
(pseudonym), who had cut her arm, and was in attendance at a case conference in the 
psychiatric hospital. What horrified me was the judgmental response from the 
psychiatrist and the two members of the nursing staff, who were present at the 
meeting. They told Fiona that her behaviour “was attention seeking”. Much to my 
surprise, they did not explore her reasons for engaging in self-injury and what had 
precipitated this recent episode of self-cutting.
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Reflecting on Professor Rogers’ lecture, and this reaction of the mental health 
professionals to Fiona, I became intrigued by self-injury, and wanted to know more 
about clinicians working with self-injuring patients, particularly in the Irish context. I 
therefore selected self-injury as my research topic for my Master’s thesis. During the 
late 1990s, when I conducted my Master’s research study, the published literature 
pertaining to the treatment o f self-injury predominantly relied on single case reports. 
In an attempt to shift away from this over reliance in the literature on single case 
reports, I decided to conduct a postal survey to explore therapists’ approaches to and 
experiences o f  working with self-injuring clients in Ireland. I randomly selected 60 
participants from two databases of counselling psychologists, counsellors and 
psychotherapists working in Ireland. Fifty therapists returned my questionnaire. The 
findings o f this study suggested that therapists working in Ireland might have had 
limited exposure to self-injuring patients, since only 19 participants indicated that 
they had experience of working with self-injuring clients. These participants 
indicated that they employed a variety o f treatment modalities with self-injuring 
patients, that appeared to reflect the original model they had trained in, such as client­
centred therapy, reality therapy, cognitive-behavioural therapy, gestalt therapy, gestalt 
systems therapy, humanistic/integrative therapy, narrative therapy and solution 
focussed therapy.
Since completing my Master’s research, I have retained my clinical interest in 
the subject o f self-injury. Reading the literature as a clinician, I became more 
intrigued by the unresolved debates and controversies, and the missing discourses of 
clinicians. In addition, I wanted to interview clinicians, who had experience of 
working with self-injuring patients, and to gather more in-depth information about 
their treatment approaches, than my earlier research had uncovered.
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As a clinician-researcher with a keen interest and curiosity about the 
phenomenon o f  self-injuiy and its treatment, I bring my own assumptions and 
expectations to this research study. For instance, my education and training as a 
counselling psychologist and my exposure to other modalities (e.g. sensorimotor 
psychotherapy) beyond my initial training have influenced the way I approach self- 
injuiy and its treatment. In contrast to the clinicians that I interviewed in my research 
study, I approached self-injury from a very different starting position to the clinicians 
that I interviewed. I began with a conceptual framework for understanding and 
treating self-injury before I worked with my first self-injuring client.
In terms o f my expectations, I began this research process with hopes of 
finding experienced clinicians who would provide me with knowledge about self­
injury and its treatment that has not been previously reported in the literature. Indeed,
I wanted to leam new and creative ways o f conceptualising and treating self-injuring 
patients that I had not known. Therefore, I decided to interview clinicians from 
diverse mental health disciplines and who employed a variety o f  treatment approaches 
to self-injuiy, some o f which are not documented approaches in the literature.
Background to the Study
A number of factors have influenced the focus o f my research study in relation 
to clinicians’ conceptualisation and treatment o f self-injury. These relate to the Irish 
context and the literature in relation to the treatment o f self-injury.
Irish C ontext Unlike the international literature on self-injury from countries 
such as America, Canada and Britain, research on the phenomenon o f self-injury is 
severely limited in Ireland. There is a lack o f published material on self-injury in the 
Irish context. A comprehensive search o f the published literature revealed only two
published studies (Hilary & Mulcahy, 1997; O ’Donovan & Gijbels, 2006). Hilary 
and M ulcahy’s (1997) study focused on self-injurious behaviour in a sample of Irish 
people with a “mental handicap”. They specified, “A need for Irish data on this 
p roblem ...” (Hilary & Mulcahy, 1997, p. 12) as the objective o f  their study. 
O’Donovan and Gijbels’ (2006) study explored “ ...the practices o f psychiatric nurses 
with nonsuicidal self-harming patients in the acute psychiatric admission setting...” 
(p. 186).
In addition to Hilary and Mulcahy’s (1997), and O ’Donovan and Gijbels’ 
(2006) studies, a handful o f scholarly masters and doctoral dissertations (e.g., Duffy, 
1998; Keane, 1997; Mulhem, 1999; Rashleigh, 2003; S. Shaw, 2002) have explored 
self-injury in the Irish context. However, it is difficult to access these, because the 
authors have not published their findings, and Irish university libraries do not tend to 
publish graduate dissertation titles and abstracts, in Dissertation Abstracts 
International. Therefore, there is a need for more published Irish research studies on 
the phenomenon o f self-injury. In light o f this absence o f Irish discourses on self­
injury, I wanted to conduct an exploratory study of how clinicians in Ireland are 
navigating this terrain, in terms of understanding self-injury, treatment approaches 
and effectiveness.
Another reason for this study is the widespread acknowledgement that 
“deliberate self-harm” is a significant problem in Ireland (National Registry of 
Deliberate Self Harm Ireland Annual Report 2009). In relation to the incidence of 
self-injury in Ireland, Tighe (as cited in Ingle, 2007) noted, “Incredibly, there is 
currently no statistical evidence around self-harm in this country” (p. 6). Yet, media
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reports, anecdotal evidence from clinicians and my own study Keane (1997) suggests 
that self-injury is prevalent in Ireland.
This lack o f statistical data in relation to self-injury in the Irish context is 
related to a number o f factors. Annual statistics are published in the National Registry 
o f  Deliberate S e lf Harm Ireland Annual Report by the Irish Association of 
Suicidology. These statistics cannot be interpreted as reflective o f the incidence of 
self-injury in Ireland for a number o f reasons. The data reported are “based on persons 
presenting to hospital emergency departments as a result o f deliberate self harm in 
2009 in the Republic o f Ireland” (National Registry o f Deliberate Self Harm Ireland 
Annual Report, 2009: p. I). The international literature suggests that self-injury is 
prevalent among clinical and non-clinical populations (Himber, 1994). It is especially 
common in psychiatric units (Hawton, 1990), prisons (Haines Williams, & Brain, 
1995; Wilkins & Coid, 1991), adolescent facilities including juvenile detention 
centres (Ross & McKay, 1979; Chowanec, Josephson, Coleman, & Davis, 1991) and 
residential treatment units (Walsh & Rosen, 1988). Self-injury has also been reported 
among third level college students (Favazza, DeRosear, & Conterio, 1989; Gratz, 
Conrad, & Roemer, 2002) and post-primary students (Ross & Heath, 2002). However, 
it is difficult to ascertain the number of people who engage in self-injury in the 
population at large or in specific clinical populations because there is considerable 
under-reporting o f this behaviour.
Another problematic feature with the statistics published by the National 
Registry o f  Deliberate S e lf Harm Ireland Annual Report 2009 is the employment o f a 
broad definition of deliberate self-harm which does not distinguish between “self­
cutting” acts that are suicidal in intent and those that are not. In addition, the inclusion
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and the exclusion o f deliberate self harm behaviours in this report is interesting. The 
report includes statistics on overdose, alcohol, poisoning, hanging, drowning, cutting 
and does not mention other categories listed in the self-injury literature such as 
burning, self-hitting and interference with wound healing. 1 return to these issues of 
defining, categorising and distinguishing self-injury from suicide in Chapter Two 
under the subheadings “Definition” and “Classification” .
This study is timely in light o f the establishment o f a new treatment centre 
Pieta House CPSOS (Centre for the Prevention o f Self-harm or Suicide) in 2006. This 
is a privately funded charity and is based in Leixlip, Co. Kildare. Pieta House 
provides therapy for individuals who have attempted suicide and those who engage in 
self-injury. Treatment consists o f four to six weeks o f “intensive therapy” (Ingle, 
2007, p. 16) and is described as “holistic” (Ingle, 2007, p. 16) involving the client’s 
family and friends. To date, there are no studies o f the clinical effectiveness o f this 
particular treatment model. This is consistent with the absence o f studies in the 
international literature exploring clinical outcomes o f treatment models with self- 
injuring clients. While the present study does not investigate treatment outcomes or 
the efficacy o f programmes in relation to self-injury, it does explore clinicians’ 
understanding and discourses in relation to effectiveness, failures and partial failures 
o f their treatment modalities.
Finally, recent developments in the field o f psychotherapy have provided 
increased opportunities for clinicians to receive specialist training in Ireland in new 
forms o f treatment such as Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT), Eye Movement 
Desensitisation and Reprocessing Therapy (EMDR), Mindful Based Cognitive 
Therapy (MBCT), and Sensorimotor Psychotherapy. These diverse treatment models
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may be employed by clinicians treating clients who self-injure. This diversity may 
lead to confusing ways o f thinking about self-injury and the employment of 
incompatible and conflictual treatment strategies. For instance, EMDR and 
Sensorimotor Psychotherapy are usually used with clients who have a trauma history 
(Wilson, Becker, & Tinker, 1997; Ogden, Minton, & Pain, 2006) and not all self- 
injuring clients have such a history. DBT is a treatment for borderline personality 
disorder (BPD) and may be an incompatible and an inappropriate model o f treatment 
for individuals who self-injure but who does not have such a diagnosis. While this 
study does not directly address issues o f incompatibility, it does examine how 
clinicians do and do not consider the issue of compatibility and incompatibility of 
various treatment techniques.
Treatment Approaches. There are a number of interesting points in relation to 
the range o f treatment approaches documented in the literature for working with self- 
injuring patients. There is a lack of empirical studies investigating the clinical 
effectiveness of these various treatment models. These treatment options have been 
mainly developed in the U.S.A. and to a lesser extent in Canada and in the U.K. In 
addition, treatments have evolved mainly from clinicians’ work with white American 
females and often in clinical settings. Finally, there is a lack of studies exploring the 
extent to which clinicians use any of these treatment approaches in their work with 
self-injuring clients. Furthermore, it seems that clinicians who have written books 
about working with self-injuring patients have developed these frameworks from 
years o f clinical practice. Examples of such works include Levenkron (1998), 
Connors (2000), Selekman (2002) and Walsh (2006). However, it is not clear what 
factors other than their clinical training and experience have influenced the 
development o f these clinicians’ current treatment practice and their current
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conceptual frameworks for understanding self-injury and their clients who engage in 
this behaviour.
In relation to treatment effectiveness and failures it is not apparent from the 
treatment literature which explanations or models clinicians use to understand these 
outcomes and how they measure or gauge such outcomes. These issues are to date 
unanswered by the current literature. Therefore, they warrant attention and are the 
focus o f this research study which examines clinicians’ conceptualisation o f self­
injury, their discourses about their treatment practice and their perceptions o f  their 
clinical effectiveness. I review the literature in relation to these issues in Chapter Two.
Researcher-Clinician Gap
Many authors have referred to the chasm between research and clinical 
practice (Ogilvie, Abreu, & Safran, 2005). Indeed, Kazdin (2008) contends that, “A 
central issue is the extent to which findings from research can be applied to clinical 
practice” (p. 146). As a researcher-practitioner, I am attempting to bridge this gap 
between clinical research and practice, with particular reference to self-injury. 
Komfield and Feldman (1996) stated that, “Listening to the stories o f others, learning 
from them, brings a ray o f light to our understanding” (p. 2). I hope that my research 
study, with its focus on listening to clinicians’ discourses in an Irish context, will 
bring a “ray o f light” to other practitioners who are searching to broaden their 
frameworks for understanding self-injury and who wish to enhance their treatment 
practice with self-injuring patients.
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Purpose of this Research Study
In this study, I attempt to map the uncharted territory o f clinicians’ discourses, 
that relate to their understanding and treatment o f self-injury within the Irish context. 
The contours of this landscape, that I am interested in, centred around clinicians’ 
thinking about self-injury, what discourses they drew on to articulate their ideas about 
this phenomenon, and the clients who engage in this behaviour. In addition, I intend 
to focus on how they spoke o f their treatment approaches with self-injuring patients, 
and the sources o f knowledge that influenced their thoughts and ideas in relation to 
self-injury. The final area that I examine is the clinicians’ perceptions o f their success 
and failures with self-injuring clients and how they gauged this in their clinical 
practice.
Terminology
Throughout this dissertation, I use the terms “counselling” and 
“psychotherapy” interchangeably, because I subscribe to the discursive position 
articulated by Spinelli (1998). He argued that:
.. .it is not possible to make a generally accepted differentiation between 
counselling and psychotherapy and that it is clear that, regardless of the many 
and varied distinctions that some have sought to impose on them, the terms 
may be employed interchangeably. (Spinelli, 1998, p. 39)
He further contended that:
.. .it may well be the case that the desire to impose or avoid distinctions has 
more to say about the allegiance o f  the institution in which a practitioner has 
trained, the setting in which he or she might typically work, and the
10
personalities involved, than about specific distinctive features o f practice.
(Spinelli, 1998, p. 39)
Consequently, I use the term “treatment” in my interview schedule with the 
clinicians that I interviewed, regardless o f  the mental health discipline they belonged 
to, the theoretical orientation they trained in or practice and the setting they worked 
in. I did this because I wanted to explore how the clinicians would respond to my 
discursive term “treatment”.
I also use the terms “client” and “patient” interchangeably throughout this 
dissertation, because these are discursive phraseology that clinicians use to refer to the 
individuals that seek their help. Traditionally, these discursive terms tend to be 
associated with particular professional disciplines, and theoretical orientations. For 
instance, psychiatrists and psychoanalysts tend to use the word “patient”, while 
psychologists and psychotherapists are more likely to say “client”.
For clarification purposes, I have distinguished four authors (A. G. Rogers; C. 
R. Rogers; S. Shaw; S. N. Shaw) by their initials when referring to them. I have 
chosen to do this to eliminate confusion over authors, who share the same-surname 
and in two instances, also share the same year o f publication. This practice is in 
keeping with the recommended guidelines o f the Publication Manual o f  the American 
Psychological Association (6th ed.).
Significance of this Research Study
My research study is unique in terms o f its specific focus on clinicians’ 
discourses, which to date, have not received attention in previous studies. Another 
important feature o f this study is the exploration o f clinicians’ understanding and
11
treatment o f self-injury, which to a large extent has been neglected by researchers, 
with the exception o f a few unpublished scholarly dissertations. The fact that this 
study specifically centres on clinicians working in an Irish context is also significant 
due to the lack o f published studies on self-injury in Ireland. Finally, this exploration 
o f clinicians’ discourses about their conceptualisation and treatment o f self-injury is 
noteworthy, because it has potential implications for the education and training of 
psychologists, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts and psychotherapists. I will discuss these 
points further in the forthcoming chapters.
Overview o f this Dissertation
This dissertation consists of eight chapters. In this chapter, I provide an 
introduction, offering a brief context for my research study. In particular, I outline the 
influences that led to my research inquiry into the phenomenon and treatment of self­
injury, the Irish context in relation to self-injury, the chasm between the researcher 
and the clinician, and finally, the purpose and importance o f my research study.
In Chapter Two, I examine the available literature where it has relevance to 
my exploration o f clinicians’ discourses in relation to understanding and treating self­
injury. I specifically examine the discourses o f debates and controversies in the 
literature with respect to conceptualising self-injury. I also mark out the discourses in 
the literature in relation to the various self-injury treatment options, treatment success, 
failure and partial failure, responsibility for outcome o f treatment and sources of 
knowledge, that relate to my research study.
In Chapter Three, I sketch the mode and experience of my inquiry. In
particular, I describe the qualitative design and give a rationale for the employment of
this method. I also provide details o f the selection procedures and sample size o f the
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participants, the interview process, the pilot study, and the method o f data analysis 
used. In addition, I review the ethical considerations that pertain to this research 
study.
In Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven, I present the major findings o f my 
research study. Specifically, I mark out and discuss the clinicians’ discourse patterns, 
that emerge from their narratives, with respect to the research questions. In Chapter 
Four, I explore the clinicians’ discourse patterns in relation to the research questions: 
“What conceptual frameworks do clinicians draw on to understand self-injury and 
their current treatment practice with self-injuring patients?”, and “What sources of 
knowledge, including both personal experience and professional training have 
influenced/shaped the development of clinicians’ explanation(s), or working model(s), 
of treating self-injuring clients?” My examination in Chapter Five centres around a 
pattern that emerged across the clinicians’ narratives, where they tended to create 
discourse communities o f  “an other”, to formulate their beliefs about self-injury and 
its treatment, rather than articulating particular theoretical or conceptual models. In 
Chapter Six, I discuss the research question that relates to the explanations or models, 
that the clinicians drew on to understand their current treatment practice effectiveness 
and failures, with self-injuring clients. I conclude with a deliberation in Chapter 
Seven o f the clinicians’ discourses that pertain to the ways in which they gauged or 
measured their clinical effectiveness in their current treatment practice with self- 
injuring patients.
In Chapter Eight, I draw this dissertation to a conclusion, with a discussion o f 
the five major findings o f my research study, and interpret them in the context of the 
literature. In addition, I consider the co-construction o f the discourses o f the
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participating clinicians in the wider context o f Irish society. I also examine the 
limitations o f my research study and I explore the potential implications that the 
findings o f this study have, for the education and training o f clinicians, in the 
disciplines of psychology, psychoanalysis, psychotherapy and psychiatry where they 
deal with conceptualising, and treating self-injury. Finally, I conclude by making 
recommendations for future research, and directions in this field.
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review
In this study, I attempt to map the landscape o f a small group of clinicians’ 
discourses, which pertain to their conceptualisation and treatment of self-injury within 
the Irish context. In particular, my study addresses clinicians’ understanding o f self­
injury, their discourses about their treatment models, and their perceptions o f their 
clinical effectiveness and failures, in their work with self-injuring clients. A further 
purpose of this study was to identify the sources o f knowledge that contribute to 
clinicians’ understanding of self-injury, and o f those who engage in this behaviour.
Self-injury is a multi-faceted phenomenon. To date, the research has 
predominantly focused on investigating its epidemiology and phenomenology. These 
research studies have largely focused on self-injury in female clinical populations. A 
small number of studies have employed in-depth interview methods to explore the 
experiences o f those who engage in self-injury (Himber, 1994; Hyman, 1999; 
Lindgen, Wilstrand, Gilje, & Olofsson, 2004; Reece, 2005; Rissanen, 2008; S. N. 
Shaw, 2006). However, relatively few studies have paid attention to clinicians who 
work with self-injuring patients. A comprehensive search o f the literature revealed 
five such studies (Huerta, 2006; Keane, 1997; Roberts-Dobie & Donatelle, 2007; 
Suyemoto & MacDonald, 1995; Williams, 2005). Three o f these five studies used a 
survey method (Keane 1997; Roberts-Dobie & Donatelle, 2007; Suyemoto & 
MacDonald, 1995), thus highlighting the lack o f research studies, employing 
qualitative in-depth interviewing methodology, to explore clinicians’ experiences of 
treating self-injuring clients. Huerta’s (2006) and Williams’ (2005), unpublished 
scholarly dissertations were exceptions. Surprisingly, no study has examined
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clinicians’ discourses about self-injury with respect to their understanding, treatment 
approaches and/or their gauging o f their success and failure with self-injuring 
patients. This is remarkable considering the proliferation o f books and journal articles 
on self-injury and the amount o f controversy surrounding this phenomenon in the 
literature. These controversial issues primarily relate to conceptualising and treating 
self-injury. While tracing the historical context o f the study o f self-injury, S. N. Shaw 
(2002) noted, “ ...a  series o f perplexing shifts in how this behavior has been 
conceptualized and treated” (p. 192). In light of these historical shifts and 
controversies in the literature, we cannot take for granted that clinicians working in 
practice are clear in their conceptualisation and treatment o f  self-injury. In the 
remainder o f this Chapter, I mark out and discuss these discourses o f  debate and 
controversy that centre around understanding and treating self-injury and how they are 
o f particular relevance to my research study. In addition, I also explore the literature 
in relation to treatment success and failure, as it relates to my exploration of 
clinicians’ discourses about their perceptions of their clinical effectiveness and 
failures, in their work with self-injuring clients. To conclude my discussion o f the 
literature, I review work concerning how clinicians locate responsibility for the 
treatment outcome, and their sources o f  knowledge about conceptualising and treating 
self-injury.
Conceptualising Self-Injury
The literature focusing on understanding self-injury is predominantly marked 
by discourses o f debate and controversy, in particular, issues related to terminology, 
definition, classification, functionality, causation and gender. These unanswered 
debates and lack of consensus on significant features in relation to conceptualising the
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phenomenon of self-injury are relevant to clinicians’ understanding, and have 
implications for their treatment approaches. Indeed, Briere and Gil (1998) argued that 
self-injury . .is one of the more perplexing o f clinical phenomena” (p. 609). A 
British psychotherapist, Turp (2002) contended that self-injury “ ...is  not, as is 
sometimes assumed, a phenomenon that can be readily identified and circumscribed” 
(p. 197). Therefore, it is essential to explore how clinicians’ understand self-injury 
and those who engage in this behaviour, and to begin contextualising the debates in 
the literature. I will now elaborate on these discourses of controversy and debate 
under the following subheadings: terminology, definition, classification, functionality, 
causation and gender.
Terminology. The discourses of controversy in the literature concerning 
problems with respect to terminology, centre around the range o f terms employed, as 
well as points o f ambiguity and confusion. Some terms, such as self-mutilation, self­
harm, and self-injury are used interchangeably, while others can be conflated with 
suicide. In addition, there appears to be little consensus in relation to an agreed term 
in the literature to refer to self-injuring behaviours.
This difficulty in naming self-injury has plagued the field for many years.
Since its first appearance in the literature with the publication of Emerson’s case study 
in 1913, a myriad o f terms have been employed to refer to self-injury. In 1979, Ross 
and McKay cited 33 different names for self-injury (see Appendix A) in the literature 
which probably accounts for W oldorf s (2005) comment that self-injury “ ...may hold 
the record within mental health for the most names for a single phenom enon.. .” (p. 
196). Sample terms from the literature include “self-cutting” (Greenspan & Samuel, 
1989; Himber, 1994; Suyemoto & MacDonald, 1995), “self-wounding” (Tantam &
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Whittaker, 1992), “deliberate self-harm” (Morgan et al., 1976; Pattison & Kahan, 
1983), “self-destructive behaviour” (van der Kolk, Perry, & Herman, 1991), “self­
mutilation” (Favazza & Conterio, 1989; Favazza, 1996; Ross & Heath, 2002; Ross & 
McKay, 1979; Walsh & Rosen, 1988), “self-inflicted violence” (Alderman, 1997), 
“self-injury” (Connors, 2000; Conterio & Lader, 1998; Hyman, 1999; Walsh, 2006), 
“self-harm” (Farber, 2000; Selekman, 2002; Turp, 2003), “non-suicidal self-harm” 
(Muehlenkamp, 2006, O ’Donovan & Gijbels, 2006) and “non-suicidal self-injury” 
(Heath, Toste, Nedecheva, & Charlebois, 2008).
Indeed, many researchers and clinicians have articulated the need for global 
consensus and adoption of the use of an agreed term (Nock, 2009; Rodham &
Hawton, 2009). Some contend that the term self-cutting is too narrow as it only refers 
to one form o f self-injury. Others argue that another difficulty is the use of multiple 
terms used interchangeably to refer to self-injury. For example, self-mutilation, self­
injury and self-harm appear to be the terms employed most frequently in the current 
literature, and are often used interchangeably to mean the same thing. Many authors 
argue that self-harm is a broader construct than self-injury (Heath, et al., 2008). They 
contend that self-injury is a definite subcategory o f self-harm (Connors, 2000; 
McAllister, 2003; Sebree & Popkees-Vawter, 1991). In contrast, others make no clear 
distinction and employ self-harm as a broad and inclusive term (Bohn & Holz, 1996; 
Middleton & Butler, 1998; Turp, 2003). However, McAllister (2003) argued that 
when the term self-harm is used synonymously with self-injury, confusion arises 
because one is unclear whether a reference is being made to self-injury, and/or 
parasuicide and/or a broad range o f other self-destructive behaviours (such as eating 
disorders, alcohol abuse, substance abuse, risk taking behaviour, failure to engage in 
self-care and/or medical care, and so on). Deliberate self-harm (DSH) is another term
that also tends to cause some confusion because it is often used to refer to suicide- 
related behaviours such as self-poisoning, or self-cutting, irrespective of the intention 
to die (Hawton & James, 2005).
A number of clinicians (e.g., Connors, 2000; Hyman, 1999; Simeon &
Favazza, 2001) have argued that self-mutilation “ ...is too extreme and pejorative a 
te rm ...” (Walsh, 2006, p. 3). In addition, they have noted that in most cases the 
injuries inflicted range from mild to moderate in terms o f level of severity and rarely 
result in mutilation of a body part except in cases of psychosis or organic disorders. 
Proponents o f the term “self-injury” such as Connors (2000) contended that, “It is the 
most descriptive and least pejorative of the common phrases” (p. 7). Recently, the 
term “non-suicidal self-injury” (NSSI) has been proposed in the literature as an 
attempt to distinguish between suicidal and non-suicidal acts o f self-injury. This 
term, NSSI lends itself to less confusion and more clarity than previously proposed 
terms.
In conclusion, there is no generally agreed terminology in the literature to refer 
to behaviours that constitute self-injury. As stated previously, the literature is awash 
with a variety o f terms, some o f which can be conflated with suicide related 
behaviours. Indeed, Connors (1996) argued that, “The lack o f  clear terminology has 
added to the confusion and frequent misconceptions about” (p. 198) self-injury. With 
respect to the Irish context, we don’t know what names clinicians give to self-injury 
and whether they use terms interchangeably. Indeed, it is not clear how aware or not 
clinicians working in Ireland are of the numerous terms that occupy the literature and 
if they are, does this multitude o f names that are assigned to self-injury cause them 
confusion in their attempts to understand this phenomenon. Therefore, I believe it is
19
important to explore what terminology clinicians use in their daily practice with self- 
injuring patients as it has significance for their conceptualisation o f  self-injury.
Throughout this dissertation I use the term “self-injury” because I believe it is 
a suitable term for my study since I wished to avoid influencing the clinicians’ 
discourses in a particular direction. It is a specific term, yet at the same time it is 
vague about the relationship between suicide, self-injury, and other self-harm 
behaviours. Other terms are employed in this research study to refer to self-injury in 
such instances they appear in quotations, as used by specific authors in the literature 
or appear in the extracts from the participating clinicians’ interview transcripts.
Definition. There is no standard universally agreed definition o f self-injury in 
the literature. Defining the scope o f self-injury has posed challenges and invited some 
disagreement from both researchers and clinicians. Commenting on this very issue 
regarding non-suicidal self-injury, Heath et al. (2008) noted, “Defining the exact 
parameters o f NSSI behavior has not been straightforward and interpreting the 
research in the field can be challenging due to differences in the operationalization o f 
the definition” (pp. 137-138). Since self-injury first emerged in the literature 
numerous definitions have been proposed (Favazza, 1987; Menninger 1938/66; Walsh 
and Rosen, 1988). Indeed, these “Definitions have changed markedly over tim e...” 
(Deiter & Pearlman, 1998, p. 235).
In 1987, Armando Favazza defined self-injury “ ...as the direct, deliberate 
destruction or alteration o f one’s own body without conscious suicidal intent” 
(Favazza, 1996, p. 225). In contrast, other definitions proposed in the deliberate self­
harm literature appear to be broader, all-inclusive, and sometimes do not make a 
distinction in terms o f suicidal intention. This blurring between suicide and
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nonsuicidal self-injury seems to be a controversial issue in the literature in relation to 
defining and classifying self-injury. For instance, in Ireland the National Registry o f  
Deliberate S e lf Harm Ireland Annual Report 2009 (the most recent available), 
employed a broad definition o f deliberate self-harm developed by the WHO/Euro 
Multicentre Study Working Group. They defined deliberate self-harm as:
...an  act with non-fatal outcome in which an individual deliberately initiates a 
non-habitual behaviour, that without intervention from others will cause self­
harm, or deliberately ingests a substance in excess of the prescribed or 
generally recognised therapeutic dosage, and which is aimed at realising 
changes that the person desires via the actual or expected physical 
consequences. (National Registry o f Deliberate Self Harm Ireland Annual 
Report 2009, p. v)
This definition of DSH does not make any attempt to distinguish between 
suicidal and non-suicidal acts o f self-injury in terms of intent and therefore creates 
ambiguity. In contrast, Mangnall and Yurkovich’s (2008) definition is more specific 
in terms o f the parameters o f DSH which are very similar to those o f Favazza (1987) 
with respect to the physicality o f the act and the absence o f suicidal intent. They 
defined DSH as, “ ...a  direct behaviour that causes minor to moderate physical injury, 
that is undertaken without conscious suicidal intent, and that occurs in the absence of 
psychoses and/or organic intellectual impairment” (Mangnall & Yurkovich, 2008, p. 
176).
To conclude, there is no agreed definition in the literature and self-injury is not 
always distinguished from suicide with regard to intent. In an attempt to address this 
problem a group o f leading researchers in the field o f  self-injury established the
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International Network for the Study of Self-Injury (ISSS) in 2006 (Heath et al., 2008). 
They agreed upon the following definition o f self-injury:
The deliberate, self-inflicted destruction of body tissue resulting in immediate 
damage, without suicidal intent and for purposes not socially sanctioned. As 
such, this behavior is distinguished from: suicidal behaviors involving an 
intent to die, drug overdoses, and other forms o f self-injurious behaviors, 
including culturally-sanctioned behaviors performed for display or aesthetic 
purposes; repetitive, stereotypical forms found among individuals with 
developmental disorders and cognitive disabilities, and severe forms (e.g., 
self-immolation and auto-castration) found among individuals with psychosis. 
(ISSS, 2007, as cited in Heath et al., 2008, p. 138)
This definition appears to be the most recent and comprehensive offered in the 
literature to date. It goes a long way to addressing some of the shortcomings of 
previous definitions. Since this is a recently proposed definition, it is not possible to 
establish whether it has been widely accepted internationally, as enough time has not 
elapsed since its proposal and the writing of this dissertation.
Therefore, the current controversies and debates about definitions in the 
literature that I have highlighted, are still current issues and they introduce a 
complication that may hamper a clinician’s attempt to understand self-injury. This in 
turn may have implications for choice o f treatment model and clinical effectiveness. 
Due to the absence of research in the Irish context, it is not known whether clinicians 
employ broad definitions such as that of the WHO/Euro Multicentre Study Working 
Group or more specific definitions o f self-injury like Favazza’s (1987). This is an
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important area to explore because the way clinicians define self-injury has 
implications for their understanding of and treatment approaches to self-injury.
Classification. The discourses of disagreement in the literature in relation to 
self-injury revolve around differentiating self-injury from suicide, what behaviours 
should be considered, and the issue of whether to classify it as a separate syndrome. 
There appears to be some consensus in the literature that self-injury and suicidality 
“ . ..are clinically distinct classes of behavior” (Pattison & Kahan, 1983, p. 871). 
Proponents o f this distinction argue that suicide and self-injury differ in regard to 
intent (Brausch & Gutierrez, 2010; Deiter & Pearlman, 1998; Favazza, 1996; Kahan 
& Pattison, 1984; Muehlenkamp & Kerr, 2010; Nock & Kessler, 2006; Ross & 
Mekay, 1979; Simpson, 1976; Walsh, 2006; Walsh & Rosen, 1988). Allen (1996) 
elaborated on this point, noting self-injury “ .. .is an attempt to alter consciousness by 
seeking relief from tension and pain, suicide is often aimed at eliminating 
consciousness, escaping pain once and for all, achieving a state o f nothingness” (p. 
141). In addition, Babiker and Arnold (1997) argued that, “Self-injury continues [sic] 
the discourse o f a person’s life, whereas a suicide attempt separates [sic] the person 
from that discourse, removing the individual from their awareness or from being” (p. 
2). Indeed, Simeon and Favazza (2001) noted that even those who engage in self­
injury make this distinction between suicide and self-injury.
Clinicians may have difficulty differentiating self-injury from suicide as this 
distinction is not always made in clinical practice (Allen, 1995; Calof, 1995). For 
instance, Calof (1995) stated, “Clinicians and others often mistake acts o f self-injury 
for suicidal or self-destructive behavior” (p. 11). This may be due to clinicians’ lack 
of understanding o f self-injury, and/or a failure to make a distinction in relation to
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intent. Indeed, Mangnall and Yurkovich (2008) argued that, “ ...many healthcare 
professionals are not aware of this distinction” (p. 177). If clinicians experience 
difficulty distinguishing self-injury from other forms o f self-destructive behaviour and 
suicidal intent, it is highly likely that this will have implications for decisions about 
treatment approaches and/or interventions. Therefore, it is important to explore how 
and if clinicians working in the Irish context distinguish between suicide and self­
injury.
Classifying self-injuring behaviours is another issue that attracts some 
controversy. While it is widely reported that individuals engage in a broad spectrum 
o f self-injuring behaviours (Favazza, 1996; Favazza&  Conterio, 1989; Walsh, 2006), 
the problem seems to revolve around what behaviours to include as self-injury and 
what to exclude. Most researchers and clinicians writing in the literature consider 
cutting, burning, self-hitting, interference with wound healing (also known as 
excoriation of wounds), severe skin scratching, hair pulling and bone breaking 
(Arnold, 1995; Briere & Gil, 1998; Favazza & Conterio, 1989; Klonsky, 2007; 
Muehlenkamp, 2005) as self-injury. Some authors challenge this view and argue that 
additional behaviours such as, self-poisoning (Hawton & Fagg, 1992), insertion of 
dangerous objects into body orifices (Connors, 1996), “harmful enemas and douches” 
(Connors, 1996, p. 2000), “ingesting sharp objects” (Connors, 1996; p. 2000) should 
also be included. In the Irish context, the National Registry o f  Deliberate S e lf  Harm 
Ireland Annual Report 2009, included the broad categories o f overdose, alcohol, 
poisoning, hanging, drowning, cutting and other as forms o f  deliberate self-harm. To 
complicate matters further, a British psychotherapist, Turp (2002) contended that the 
current classification of self-injury in the literature is too narrow and proposed the 
inclusion o f a category o f hidden self-harm which she calls “cashas” (“culturally
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accepted self-harming acts/activities”) (p. 204). She included such activities as 
“ ...body-piercing...” (Turp, 2002, p. 207), “ ...self-flagellation or pilgrimages that 
involve covering long distances over stony ground barefoot or on bended knee” (Turp, 
2002, p. 207), “ ...everyday, low-key activities and behaviours which are nevertheless 
associated with injury or ill-health...” such as “ ...sm oking...” (Turp, 2002, p. 207) 
and “ ...chronic overwork...” (Turp, 2002, p. 207).
Numerous classification schemas (e.g., Favazza, 1987; Favazza, 1998;
Favazza & Rosenthall, 1993; Menninger, 1935/1966; Pattison & Kahan, 1983; Ross 
& McKay, 1979; Simeon & Favazza, 2001; Turp, 2007; Walsh & Rosen, 1988) have 
been proposed in the literature. However, to date none o f these categorisation 
schemes have been widely accepted, although many authors favour that o f  Favazza’s. 
This lack o f consensus with regard to classifying self-injury as a broad or narrow set 
of behaviours has implications for clinicians’ understanding o f and choice of 
treatment for this behaviour.
Another area o f controversy surrounds the location o f self-inj ury within 
psychopathological categorisation systems such as, the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f  M ental Disorders (4th ed; Text 
Rev; DSM-IV-TR) and the World Health Organisation’s International Statistical 
Classification o f  Diseases and Related Health Problems ( l( /h Re; Ver fo r  2007; ICD- 
10). Historically, the literature commonly associated self-injury with a diagnosis of 
borderline disorder (BPD) (Bohus, Haaf, Stiglmayr, Pohl, Böhme, & Linehan, 2000; 
Klonsky, Oltmanns, & Turkheimer, 2003; Leibenluft, Gardner, & Cowdy, 1987; 
Schaffer, Carroll, & Abramowitz, 1982; Simeon et al., 1992; van der Kolk, et al.,
1991; Walsh & Rosen, 1988; Zlotnick, Mattia, & Zimmerman, 1999), even though it
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is one of nine diagnostic criteria. This location o f self-injury within a psychiatric 
discourse has been criticised by some authors (Burstow 1992; Johnstone, 1997; 
Pembroke, 1998). Indeed, Farber (2000) noted that, “It has been suggested that 
clinicians incorrectly tend to use self-mutilation alone as a sufficient criterion to 
diagnose BPD” (pp. 80-81). A contrasting critical discourse comes from Pattison and 
Kahan (1983) who contended that there is no direct association between this 
behaviour and a specific personality disorder.
Several authors have proposed and called for the adoption of a separate 
clinical syndrome of self-injury (Favazza, 1996; Muehlenkamp, 2005; Tantam & 
Whittaker, 1992). To date, none of these have been accepted by researchers, clinical 
communities, ICD-10 or DSM-IV-TR classification systems.
These different discourses highlight the disagreements, with regard to setting 
the boundaries and parameters in relation to the inclusion and exclusion o f the 
numerous classes o f self-injuring behaviours, noted in the literature. How clinicians 
construct their patients’ self-injury behaviours (either within or outside o f diagnostic 
systems) has implications for their conceptualisation and treatment choices. For 
instance, BPD may become “ ...the all-encompassing and circular explanation for 
every w ay...” (Neimeyer & Raskin, 2000, p. 31) that clients behave, and this has 
implications for treatment approach and effectiveness. Considering how clinicians 
working in the Irish context pathologise or view self-injuring patients is a relevant 
area for exploration in this study, and particularly the degree to which they may or 
may not pathologise self-injury patients as it relates to the research questions posed by 
this study. Another key area to explore in relation to clinicians’ discourses about their 
understanding o f self-injury is whether or not they distinguish between suicide and
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self-injury, as this also has implications for their conceptualisation and treatment of 
this phenomenon.
Functionality. The discourse about the functionality o f self-injury in the 
literature speaks of the complex and multi-determined aspects o f this behaviour. 
However, as Suyemoto (1998) noted, “.. .we continue to lack a clear understanding of 
the psychological functions...” (p. 531) that self-injury serves. Therefore, this is 
another aspect o f the phenomenon of self-injury that evokes some debate in the 
literature.
To date, researchers and clinicians have proposed a range of possible functions 
for self-injury (Allen 1996; Briere & Gil, 1998; Favazza 1996; Favazza & Rosenthal, 
1993; Prinstein, Gueny, Browne, & Rancourts, 2009; Sakheim, 1996; Walsh &
Rosen, 1988). Examples o f these multiple functions reported in the literature include, 
affect regulation (Davies & Frawley, 1994; Wise 1990), self-punishment (Allen,
1996; Arnold, 1995), re-enactment of trauma (Calof, 1995; Miller, 1994), managing 
dissociative states (Favazza, 1996), expressing anger (Sakheim, 1996), self-soothing 
(Allen, 1996), forms o f communication (Favazza, 1996) and other personal meanings 
(Sakheim, 1996). Indeed, Zila and Kiselica (2001) remarked that, “Hypotheses 
regarding the motivations for self-mutilation are as varied as the acts themselves” (p. 
47). Many authors have attempted to organise these functions o f self-injury into 
theoretical models (Bennun, 1984; Connors, 1996; Nock & Prinstein, 2004;
Suyemoto, 1998). However, none of these models have been widely accepted and the 
literature reflects some disagreement about the many and varied functions o f self­
injury.
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There is an absence of literature exploring clinicians’ discourses about the 
functions o f self-injury. Currently, we do not know whether they conceptualise self­
injury in terms of intrapsychic, interpersonal, biological or other functions. Therefore, 
clinicians’ conceptualisations about the functions of self-injury are an important 
feature of clinicians’ discourses to explore in this study, because they have 
implications for their choice of treatment focus, approach, and effectiveness.
C ausation. The linking of trauma with self-injury is a long and established 
discourse in the literature. Some authors have noted the relationship between adult 
experiences of trauma such as rape and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 
self-injury (Greenspan & Samuel, 1989; Lyons, 1991; Pitman 1990). Many studies 
and clinicians have reported a correlation between childhood trauma (especially child 
sexual abuse) and self-injury (Briere, 1992; Darche, 1990; Gil, 1990; Gratz, 2006; 
Klonsky et al., 2003; Miller, 1994; Shapiro, 1987; van der Kolk et a]., 1991; Zlotnick 
et al., 1996). Indeed, many authors writing on the subject o f sexual abuse note self­
injury as a symptom found among survivors o f child sexual abuse (e.g., Bass & Davis, 
1988; Briere, 1992; Courtois, 1988; Dolan, 1991; Gil, 1988; Hunter, 1995; Salter, 
1995; Simonds, 1994). However, some authors dispute this discourse and argue that 
there is an over emphasis in the literature linking trauma and self-injury. A recent 
study by Klonsky and Moyer (2008) argued that childhood sexual abuse is only 
“ ...modestly related...” (p. 166) to self-injury “ ...because they are correlated with the 
same psychiatric risk factors” (p. 166). Two studies o f college students found no 
relationship between self-injury and childhood trauma or abuse (Heath et al., 2008; 
Heath, Schaub, & Toste, 2007 as cited in Klonsky & Glenn, 2009).
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In light o f the controversy and debate about the role o f trauma in the aetiology 
o f self-injury, and as an over emphasised discourse in the literature, it is important to 
explore what clinicians, working in the Irish context, think about trauma and self­
injury and the consequential implications for their conceptualisation and treatment of 
self-injury. For instance, do they assume a trauma history in clients who engage in 
self-injury? If  so, this emphasis on trauma may be a feature o f their clinical model in 
working with self-injuring patients, and indeed, may not be appropriate where there is 
no history o f trauma, and may possibly contribute to partial or total failures in 
treatment. Therefore, clinicians’ discourses about the aetiology o f  self-injury are of 
interest in this study.
Gender. There is some debate as to the prevalence o f self-injury among the 
genders. Some data and clinical reports suggest a higher incidence o f self-injury 
among women and girls (Carmen, Rieker, & Mills, 1984; Miller, 1994; Walsh & 
Rosen, 1988). These findings have given rise to a discourse in the literature that 
portrays self-injury as a predominantly gendered phenomenon (A. G. Rogers, 1996; S. 
N. Shaw, 2002). In contrast, other studies report no significant differences in the rates 
o f self-injury between males and females (Briere & Gil, 1998; DiClemente, Ponton, & 
Hartley, 1991).
1 believe that it is important to explore clinicians’ discourses about gender and 
self-injury for a number o f reasons. First, there is an unresolved debate about gender 
and self-injury in the literature. Second, there is an absence o f  knowledge about 
clinicians’ discourses and thinking about this issue in the Irish context. Third, this is 
an important feature o f clinicians’ conceptualisation o f self-injury because it has 
implications for their treatment practices. For instance, if clinicians believe that self­
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injury is a gender specific phenomenon, that only affects females, they may not 
consider, raise or explore this issue with male clients. On the other hand, this 
gendered conceptualisation of self-injury could lead clinicians to locate their 
understanding within a feminist framework, and adopt a completely feminist oriented 
treatment approach. Alternatively, it could lead clinicians to positioning self-injury 
within a pathological discourse of BPD, since this is a psychiatric disorder that is 
commonly associated with females in the literature (Nehls, 1999).
In the preceding paragraphs, I discussed discourses o f controversy surrounding 
the conceptualisation of self-injury that predominantly relate to issues o f debate and 
the lack o f consensus pertaining to the naming of self-injury, defining this 
phenomenon, classifying it as distinct or not from suicide and other self-destructive 
behaviours, positioning it within or outside discourses o f psychiatric disorder 
classification systems, functional models, the role o f trauma in the aetiology of self­
injury, and whether or not it is a gendered phenomenon.
Treating Self-Injury
I will now mark out and discuss the various self-injury treatment discourses in 
the literature that relates to my research study. These include single model discourse, 
pathological discourse, feminist discourses, multi-modal discourse, distress discourse, 
relational discourse and affect regulation discourse. To conclude this section on 
treating self-injury, I will also examine studies that are particularly relevant to this 
study.
The literature contains a multitude o f diverse treatment approaches to working
with self-injuring patients. Writing about the treatment o f self-injurers, Silver (1985)
noted, “The heterogeneity o f this patient population is perhaps exceeded only by the
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heterogeneity o f the therapist population that treats or writes about them” (p. 359). 
Indeed, the literature can appear quite daunting to the novice clinician attempting to 
seek guidance on the best form o f treatment for self-injury because there are multiple 
and diverse modalities. In addition, there is a lack o f empirical research to support the 
best models to use. In fact, a significant proportion o f the treatment literature consists 
of accounts o f clinicians describing their own particular approaches to working with 
self-injuring clients.
In my review o f the literature, I have noticed a number o f discursive shifts in 
relation to treating self-injury. Historically, the initial discourses about treatment 
approaches centred on the application of established singular models of 
psychotherapy to the treatment o f self-injury. Psychoanalytically oriented treatment 
modalities were the first discourses to emerge in the 1930s with the publication of 
M enninger’s (1938/1966) general treatment recommendations (S. N. Shaw, 2002). 
Menninger advocated, “ ...for a holistic approach, involving psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy and attention to family dynamics and the social environment. 
Psychotherapy centers on the physician-patient relationship and seeks to ‘reduce the 
self-destructive trend, and increase the capacity for living and loving’ (1938: 446)” (S. 
N. Shaw, 2002, p. 195).
Interestingly, S. N. Shaw (2002) pointed out that there is an absence of 
publications on the phenomenon o f self-injury in the clinical literature from 1938 to 
the mid 1960s. Self-injury re-entered the clinical literature in the mid-1960s (S. N. 
Shaw, 2002). During the period o f the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the treatment 
literature emphasised individual psychodynamic therapy “ . . . ‘directed at fostering 
more mature methods o f giving and receiving love’ (Graff and Mallin, 1967: 36)”
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(Shaw 2002, p. 197) and the clinician’s role is constructed as facilitating . .meaning 
making as ‘slashing contains a message not recognised by others in the patient’s life’ 
(G raff and Mallin, 1967: 36)” (Shaw 2002, p. 197).
Single model discourse. From the 1980s to the present, a variety of 
discourses entered the literature probably due to the surge in publications on the 
phenomenon of self-injury. During this period, discourses about the application of 
single models o f psychotherapy, other than psychoanalytic oriented modalities, to the 
treatment o f self-injury emerged. These included cognitive-behavioural therapy 
(Kaminer & Shahar, 1987; Rosen & Thomas, 1984), cognitive therapy (Newman, 
2009), hypnosis and relaxation techniques (Malon & Berardi, 1987), art therapy 
(Milia, 1996; 2000), and emotion-focused therapy (Kimball, 2009). Indeed, the 
discourses about these treatment approaches are primarily based on the writings of 
individual clinician’s single case studies, (e.g., Malon & Berardi, 1987; Milia, 1996; 
Kimball, 2009). As a result, there is a paucity o f research investigating the 
effectiveness o f the application o f these modalities to the treatment of self-injury. 
However, Johnstone (1997) contended that psychological treatments are “ .. .not 
always experienced as helpful” (p. 424). Indeed, she strongly criticised a CBT 
approach to the treatment o f self-injury. She argued that this modality “ .. .has a firm 
foothold in psychiatry, where it sits comfortably alongside the positivistic model of 
medical science” (Johnstone, 1997, p. 424). Therefore, she is locating CBT within a 
medical discourse. Johnstone further pointed out a missing discourse o f explanation 
for self-injury within a cognitive-behavioural approach. She noted that as an 
approach on its own it “ ...has no explanation for why the behaviour emerged in the 
first place, as opposed to what maintains it; it denies the complexity o f  the problem
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and ignores the complex personal meanings that self-injury carries” (Johnstone, 1997, 
p. 425).
Pathological discourse. Another discourse that gathered momentum in the 
1980s and continues today is a pathological discourse. This discourse locates self­
injury within a psychiatric classification system o f mental disorders DSM-IV-TR and 
LCD-10, noting it as an associated symptom of borderline personality disorder (BPD). 
Indeed, some authors continue with this pathologising discourse advocating for the 
classification of self-injury as a separate clinical syndrome (Favazza, 1996; Kahan & 
Pattison, 1984; Muehlenkamp, 2005; Tantam & Whittaker, 1992).
The treatment models associated with this pathological discourse have been 
specifically developed as a form o f treatment for individuals with a diagnosis o f BPD 
who engage in self-injury. These treatments are known as dialectical behaviour 
therapy orD B T  (Linehan, 1987; Linehan 1993), mentalisation based therapy 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; 2006), the conversational model (Meares, 2004), and 
transference-focused psychotherapy (Clarkin et al., 1999; Clarkin, Yeomans, & 
Kemberg, 2006; Yeomans, Clarkin, & Kemberg, 2002). The following research 
studies have provided some support for the validity and effectiveness o f these 
treatments of BPD: the conversational model (Meares, Stevenson, & Comerford, 
1999; Stevenson & Meares, 1992; Stevenson, Meares, & D’Angelo, 2005), 
mentalization-based therapy (Bateman & Fonagy, 1999; 2001; 2008), transference- 
focused psychotherapy (Clarkin, et al., 2001; Kemberg, Yeomans, Clarkin, & Levy, 
2008), and DBT (Linehan et al., 1999; Linehan et al., 2006).
There are issues in applying these approaches to the treatment o f self-injury. 
All o f these approaches locate self-injury within a psychopathological framework,
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conceptualising it “ ...as occurring in the context o f  personality dysfunction...” (Levy, 
Yeomans, & Diamond, 2007, p. 1106). As such, these models have not been 
specifically designed to treat self-injury in those clients who do not fit the criteria for 
a diagnosis o f  BPD. Indeed, these models have been criticised because they situate 
“.. .self-injury within the psychology of BPD, locating it within a particular 
psychiatric paradigm and ignoring its traumatic roots. To locate it thus, is to miss the 
complexity and symbolic quality o f this form o f expression” (Motz, 2001, p. 184).
Brown and Bryan (2007) noted that clinicians offering a DBT approach to 
self-injuring patients are working from the assumption that these individuals are ready 
to give up their self-injury at the point o f entering treatment. Indeed, these 
researchers argued that many people who self-injure . .are at best ambivalent and 
more frequently quite reluctant to stop, and are often unable to make the necessary 
commitments required for DBT” (Brown & Bryan, 2007, p. 1125). Therefore, DBT 
may not be a suitable treatment modality for some self-injuring individuals depending 
on their motivation to stop this behaviour. Indeed, it will be interesting to see if  any 
of these issues about the application of a DBT model to the treatment o f self-injury 
emerge in any o f the participating clinicians’ discourses.
Feminist discourses. A number o f feminist discourses have emerged in the 
literature in relation to the treatment of self-injury. Some feminist authors such as, 
Brown and Bryan (2007), Crowe and Bunclark (2002), McAllister (20030 and S. N. 
Shaw (2002), have been highly critical o f  discourses that position self-injury within a 
pathological framework. This illness model o f  self-injury regards it as a symptom of 
mental illness, most frequently BPD. Crowe (1996) and A. G. Rogers (1996) have
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offered a different feminist discourse. They have proposed new ways to explore 
women’s self-injury within feminist frameworks.
Crowe and Bunclark (2002) argued that a diagnosis o f BDP is often given to 
individuals who self-injure even though they may not exhibit any other signs or 
symptoms o f  BPD. S. N. Shaw (2006) noted that this pathological discourse o f self­
injury . .often portrays women who self-injure in pejorative terms such as 
‘manipulative’ and frames self-injury through a pathologizing lens o f borderline 
personality disorder” (p. 155). McAllister (2003) contended that treatment 
approaches that position self-injury within a medical illness discourse o f BPD tend 
towards managing the individual’s actions “ ...w ith behavioural techniques rather than 
the person’s reasoning and compulsions understood (Haswell & Graham 1996; Miller 
1994; Tantam & Whittaker 1992)” (p. 179). McAllister (2003) further maintained 
that this response to self-injury “ ...professionalizes the problem which tends to 
position the service provider as the expert when the client is the one who needs to 
develop expertise; it individualizes the problem and glosses over or ignores social 
reasons for self-harm ...” (p. 179).
In contrast, a feminist discourse o f self-injury “ ...locates pathology in the 
realm o f the larger patriarchal social structure— outside o f the individual, not within 
— the concept o f psychopathology is generally eschewed” (Brown & Bryan, 2007, p.
1123). This feminist discourse offers a different perspective or lens to conceptualise 
and treat self-injury. Feminist therapists invite self-injuring clients .to participate 
in a collaborative process in which the therapist’s expertise at creating the conditions 
under which change is possible joins with the client’s expertise at knowing what is 
best for her or his own life” (Brown & Bryan, 2007, p. 1123).
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Crowe (1996) proposed applying a feminist framework to exploring women’s 
self-injury. She viewed self-injury as . .signifying the unspeakable” (Crowe, 1996, 
p. 103) and “ .. .as a response to physical or sexual abuse” (Crowe, 1996, p. 103). 
Locating her understanding within this framework, Crowe “ ...regards the body as an 
inscriptive surface that provides an interface between subject/object and explores how 
women may lack a means by which to signify to others what their experience means 
to them” (p. 103). Crowe argued that the “ ...language available to women does not 
always provide an adequate means of self-expression” (p. 103) and “ ...often leaves 
women with no option but the use of non-verbal corporeal inscription” (p. 103).
Thus, she constructed women’s self-injury as “ .. .a means o f establishing a sense of 
self while perpetuating a sense of the body as a site for abuse” (p. 103). Positioning 
her understanding o f  self-injury within this feminist framework, she suggested a 
treatment approach that, “ ...acknowledges the women’s needs, while at the same time 
offering the opportunity to signify distress in a manner that does not perpetuate the 
body’s role as an object o f abuse” (Crowe, 1996, p. 103).
A. G. Rogers (1996) offered a feminist-relational model for working with self­
injury. She located her understanding o f how girls and women come to engage in 
self-injury within “ ...the complex, internal, interpersonal and cultural contexts in 
w hich ...”(A. G. Rogers, 1996, p. 4) they “ ...com e to be self destructive” (A. G. 
Rogers, 1996, p. 4). Her framework was based on research on girls’ relational 
development (Brown and Gilligan, 1992; Gilligan, Brown and Rogers, 1990; Rogers, 
Brown and Tappan, 1993, as cited in A. G. Rogers, 1996, p. 5) and “ ...grounded in a 
‘feminist poetics o f psychotherapy’ (A. G. Rogers, 1991)” (as cited in A. G, Rogers, 
1996, p. 8). She highlighted that adolescent girls and young women who engage in 
self-injury report similar feelings and experiences. A. G. Rogers (1996) noted how
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they “ ...speak about their sense of disconnection from their real thoughts and 
feelings; o f doubting their feelings and knowledge; of painful experiences that have 
not been voiced in relationships— or have been, but were not recognized...” (A. G. 
Rogers, 1996, p. 6).
A. G. Rogers’ (1996) therapeutic approach for working with adolescent girls 
who engage in self-injury involved the “ ...translation and amplification of girls’ 
symptoms through dialogue, as well as creative writing.. .” (p. 2). She based her 
therapeutic model on the premise “ ...that what cannot be known or named in girls’ 
experience finds a new language— a knowledge written on her body” (A. G. Rogers, 
1996, p. 7). She believed that each therapeutic relationship is “ ...unique and real, and 
that all ‘boundaries’ can be negotiated” (A. G. Rogers, 1996, p. 8). She was unique in 
inviting her young clients to set the time, pace and location o f their sessions.
McAllister (2003) contended that, “ .. .feminist discourse remains on the 
margins o f conventional mental health care and empathy and engagement continue, in 
the main, to be reduced to rhetoric” (p. 181). In light o f McAllister’s comments, it 
wiLl be instructive to note whether the participating clinicians draw on a feminist 
discourse when articulating their ideas and practices in relation to their work with 
self-injuring patients in an Irish context. In particular, will they draw on feminist 
discourses to criticise the pathologising o f  self-injury and to support a relational, 
collaborative and empowering oriented treatment approach to self-injury?
Multi-modal discourses. In 1988, Walsh and Rosen noting the difficulty in 
treating self-injury declared, “ ...w e have consistently found it necessary to use a 
multimodal approach” (p. 230). Silver (1985) concurred arguing:
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We have to be flexible and eclectic enough not only to implement the 
individual treatments that we are best at, but also to add other modalities of 
treatment where indicated such as group therapy (Beliak, 1980; Leszcz, 1985), 
family therapy (Shapiro, Shapiro, Zinner, e ta l., 1977), and medications (Cole, 
Salomon, Gunderson et al., 1984; Silver, 1983). (p. 365)
Despite these advocates of a new multi-modal approach to treating self-injury, 
this discourse disappeared from the literature until 2002 with the publication of 
Selekman’s book, Living on the Razor’s Edge: Solution-Oriented B rief Family 
Therapy with Self-Harming Adolescents.
Since 2002, a number of other multi-modal approaches to treating self-injury 
have been proposed in the literature. These include Stone and Sias’ (2003) bi-modal 
approach, W alsh’s (2006) bio-cognitive-behavioral model, and Farber’s (2008) 
attachment-based multi-phased approach. This contemporary discourse about multi­
modal approaches to self-injury marks a shift away from previous uni-model 
treatment discourses. In addition, these multi-model discursive treatment approaches 
conceptualise self-injury within a number o f different theoretical frameworks. These 
include attachment theory, affect regulation and trauma. Indeed, S. N. Shaw (2002) 
noted that, “ ...m any authors understand self-injury in terms o f more than one model” 
(p. 199). For instance, an American clinical social worker, Walsh (2006) 
conceptualised self-injury within a multiple biopsychosocial framework.
Despite this shift towards multi-model approaches a common discourse 
emerges where individual therapy and family systems modalities are combined 
(Selekman, 2002; Stone & Sias, 2003; Walsh & Rosen, 1988). Sometimes medication 
is used as an adjunct to therapy (Stone & Sias, 2003; Favazza, 1996). An interesting
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feature of this multi-modal treatment discourse is the consistent reference to cognitive 
behavioural interventions as one of the core components of individual therapy. For 
instance, Stone and Sias (2003) proposed a bi-modal approach to treating self-injury. 
Their model is a combination of individual and family systems treatment modalities. 
The individual component uses cognitive behavioural strategies and behaviour 
modification to deal with the self-injury behaviour and the associated cognitive 
distortions. The family systems aspect “ .. .is used to identify the client’s 
interpersonal, internal, and external dynamics that impact the complex situation” 
(Stone & Sias, 2003, p. 120).
In contrast, Farber (2008) offered an alternative approach that is grounded in a 
range of theoretical perspectives. She proposed an attachment-based multi-phrased 
approach to the treatment of self-injury. Her various theoretical frameworks included 
attachment theory integrated “ ...with concepts from psychoanalysis, the 
neurosciences, evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, the psychobiology of 
trauma, and chaos theory” (Farber, 2008, p. 63). She argued that self-injury 
“ .. .develops when the child who has become attached to those who have inflicted 
pain and suffering maintains that attachment by inflicting pain on h im self’ (Farber, 
2008, p. 63). Here we see a marked return to a relational treatment discourse o f self­
injury as Farber contended that treatment success:
.. .depends upon the development of a secure attachment to the therapist, 
which supports the re-acquisition and re-integration of projected parts of the 
self, necessary for self- and mutual affect regulation and the resolution of 
trauma and intrapsychic conflict (Bromberg, 1998; Farber, 2000; Howell 
2005; Steiner, 1996). (p. 66)
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Farber (2008) proposed a phased oriented approach to self-injury that in some 
respects has commonalities with the sensorimotor psychotherapy (Odgen, Minton, & 
Pain, 2006) approach to trauma treatment. There are “ .. .three phrases with 
considerable overlap...” (Farber, 2008, p. 67) to her attachment-based multi-phrased 
approach to the treatment of self-injury: stabilising the client and the reduction of the 
lethality is the focus o f stage one. During this phase she noted that, “The therapist 
must be firm but flexible about boundaries, inviting the patient to use him as a secure 
base and transitional object (Winnicott 1953) as needed, for phone contact in off 
hours and vacations” (Farber, 2008, p. 67). The reduction of dissociation via the 
desensitisation o f traumatic memories, the integration o f dissociated parts o f the self, 
and the building o f ego functions occurs at stage two (Farber, 2008). During the third 
and final phase o f treatment the clinician and client engage in . .the intrapsychic 
work o f mourning, resolution, reconsolidation, and reconnection” (Farber, 2008, p. 
67).
Despite the numerous and divergent treatment options documented in the 
literature, (psychoanalytic oriented, cognitive-behavioural therapy, cognitive therapy, 
hypnosis and relaxation techniques, art therapy, emotion-focused therapy, dialectical 
behaviour therapy, mentalisation based therapy, conversational model transference- 
focused psychotherapy, feminist-relational model and multi-model approaches), it is 
not clear which ones are particularly successful in treating self-injury. We do not 
know what treatment modalities clinicians adopt in their treatment of self-injury, 
whether they use singular or multi-modal approaches. S. N. Shaw (2002) argued that 
symptom removal, cognitive-behavioural techniques, medications and contracts are 
the predominant focus o f current treatment models for working with self-injuring 
patients. Again, we do not know if this trend in the literature reflects the practice of
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clinicians working with self-injuring clients in the Irish context, due to the absence of 
research studies. We also do not know if participating clinicians’ discourses will 
reflect the earlier documented treatment approaches that emphasised working .in a 
holistic and engaged fashion with a focus on intrapsychic dynamics, interpersonal and 
environmental relations, the clinician-patient relationship, and meaning making” (S.
N. Shaw, 2002, p. 199). Therefore, discourses about the treatment models that 
clinicians use in their current practice with self-injuring clients is central to this study. 
Furthermore, it will be instructive to see if participating clinicians’ treatment models 
reflect any o f these trends noted in the literature.
There are a number o f other discourses that emerge in the treatment literature 
that are important to highlight here, as they may emerge in the discourses o f the 
clinicians participating in my research study. These include a distress discourse, and a 
relational discourse about treating self-injuring patients.
Distress discourse. There is a prevailing discourse in the literature that 
portrays the treatment o f self-injury as complex, challenging and distressing for the 
clinician. Indeed, Crabtree (1967) was the first clinician to articulate this discourse, 
describing self-injury as a “most distressing, challenging, psychotherapeutic problem” 
(p. 91). Within this discourse self-injury is portrayed as evoking powerful responses 
from the clinicians who work with individuals who engage in self-injury. Emotive 
responses experienced by clinicians reported in the literature include shock, horror, 
revulsion (Ross & McKay, 1979); helplessness, disgust, fury, guilt, betrayal, sadness 
(Frances, 1987); fear (Simonds, 1994); and feeling “ineffective and overwhelmed” 
(Himber, 1994, p. 620). A study o f psychologists in the U.S.A. by Gamble, Pearlman, 
Lucca and Allen (1994, as cited in Deiter & Pearlman, 1998) revealed that they
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experienced self-injury as “ ...the most distressing and stressful client behaviour...”
(p. 251) that they encountered professionally. In the Irish context, we do not know 
whether this distress discourse reflects the thinking and experiences o f clinicians 
working with individuals who self-injure. Therefore, it will be informative to note 
whether it emerges as a discourse in the participating clinicians’ narratives.
Relational discourse. The general psychotherapy literature suggests that the 
quality o f the therapeutic relationship can be a significant factor in determining 
beneficial outcomes across therapy approaches (Bachelor & Horvath, 2001). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the primacy o f the therapeutic relationship in the 
treatment o f individuals who self-injure has been noted by many authors (Connors, 
2000; Farber, 2000; Levenkron, 1998; Malon & Berardi, 1987; Nelson & Grunebaum, 
1971; A. G. Rogers, 1996; S. N. Shaw, 2002; Silver, 1985). Indeed, Malon and 
Berardi (1987) argued that, “ .. .the key to effective treatment is a strong yet flexible 
relationship (Nelson& Grunebaum 1971; Doran, Roy & W olkowitz 1985; Silver, 
1985)” (p. 533). D ’Onofrio (2007) echoed this discourse noting that clinicians such 
as Bateman and Fonagy (2004), Connors (2000), Farber (2000), Ivanoff, Linehan, and 
Brown (2001), and Linehan (1993) “ ...contend that the quality o f the relationship is 
perhaps the [sic] most important single component that allows for the engagement of 
the self-injurer in the often difficult, long-term healing process...” (p. 97).
What is unique about this relational discourse is the number o f multiple 
theoretical frameworks that authors draw on in support o f this perspective. These 
include attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969), neurobiological research (Shore, 2003), 
trauma (van der Kolk et al., 1991), and feminist frameworks (A. G. Rogers, 1996; S. 
N. Shaw, 2002), all advocating and supporting a relationally oriented approach to the
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treatment of individuals who engage in self-injury. Interestingly, a central feature of 
the discourse about treating self-injurers with a trauma history is the notion of, “What 
has been wounded in a relationship must be, after all, healed in a relationship” (A. G. 
Rogers, 1995, p. 256), highlighting the therapeutic relationship as a key component in 
facilitating change and healing in the individual patient.
Commenting on treating self-injury, Norton (2010) calls for the need to 
“ ...shift towards a more relational perspective that can deal with the deep crises of 
meaning, isolation and anxiety that often lead adolescent females to self-injure” (p. 2). 
This “shift” acknowledges that perhaps a relationally oriented approach to the 
treatment of self-injury is not a fundamental perspective o f all those writing about this 
phenomenon. Indeed, it will be informative to know if clinicians working in the Irish 
context will draw on relational discourses in their narratives about their treatment 
approach with self-injuring clients.
Affect regulation discourse. Many authors have suggested that affect 
regulation is the primary function of self-injury (Favazza, 1996; Kimbell, 2009; 
Klonsky, 2007; Nixon, Cloutier, & Aggarwal 2002; Suyemoto & MacDonald, 1995). 
They construct individuals who self-injure as experiencing emotion dysregulation and 
as being unable to tolerate or regulate distressing negative emotional states without 
resorting to acts o f self-injury. They argue that these individuals use self-injury to 
interrupt or terminate intolerable affect states. Nixon et al. (2002) contended that self­
injury can “ ...express, validate, or regulate dysphoric feelings such as depression, 
tension, pain, or anger, or it may have a role in ending dissociative symptoms” (p. 
1334). Therefore, this affect regulation discourse constructs self-injury as “...a
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strategy to alleviate acute negative affect or affective arousal (Favazza, 1992; Gratz, 
2003; Haines, Williams, Brain, & Wilson, 1995)” (Klonsky, 2007, p. 229).
Gratz and Roemer (2004) proposed that affect regulation:
.. .is a multifaceted construct involving a) the awareness, understanding, and 
acceptance of emotions; b) ability to engage in goal-directed behaviours, and 
inhibit impulsive behaviours, when experiencing negative emotions; c) the 
flexible use o f situationally appropriate strategies to modulate the intensity 
and/or duration of emotional responses rather than to eliminate emotions 
entirely; and d) willingness to experience negative emotions as part o f 
pursuing meaningful activities in life... . (as cited in Gratz 2007, p. 1091)
In relation to the treatment of self-injury, this affect regulation discourse is 
premised on the notion that if clinicians focus on helping clients develop affect 
regulation skills to deal positively and effectively with distressing emotions, it will 
lead to a decrease and possible elimination o f self-injury. I wonder if participating 
clinicians’ will draw on these notions about self-injury and affect regulation, in their 
discourses about their particular treatment modality with self-injuring patients?
R elevant studies. There is a lack o f research studies exploring the treatment
approaches clinicians use when working with self-injuring clients. However, a few
scholarly dissertations have shed some light on clinicians’ treatment preferences in
relation to self-injury. Clinicians in my survey study (Keane, 1997) indicated that
they predominately used single modal approaches consisting o f client-centred therapy,
reality therapy, cognitive-behavioural therapy, gestalt therapy, gestalt systems,
humanistic/integrative therapy and solution focused therapy. Similarly, the clinicians
that Williams (2005) interviewed reported employing a single model approach
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including: psychoanalytic, developmental, eclectic, holistic and client-centred. In 
contrast, Huerta (2006) reported that the clinicians she interviewed favoured using a 
combination o f treatment approaches. What is interesting about W illiams’ and 
Huerta’s clinicians is the reference to cognitive-behaviour therapy (CBT). For 
instance, all five of the clinicians in Williams’ study acknowledged that they “ .. .used 
some form o f cognitive behavioural interventions...” (2005, p. 199) with their self- 
injuring patients, regardless of their treatment orientation. Huerta (2006) revealed a 
similar finding, noting that nine out o f the twelve clinicians she interviewed used CBT 
in conjunction with another modality.
Huerta (2006), Keane (1997), and Williams (2005) did not include 
psychiatrists as participating clinicians in their studies. This is interesting considering 
the usually high exposure o f psychiatrists to self-injuring clients in their clinical 
practice. In addition, traditionally the practice o f clinical psychiatry has featured the 
prescribing of medications and the provision o f psychotherapy to patients. However, 
a discursive shift seems to be emerging in relation to psychiatrists use o f a combined 
treatment approach. Mojtabai and Olfson (2008) reported a recent changing trend in 
the USA, specifically a decline in the provision o f psychotherapy by psychiatrists. 
Unfortunately, there is a lack of corresponding research focusing on the practices of 
psychiatrists working in the Irish context. Therefore, it will be informative to observe 
if practice style variations emerge in the clinicians’ discourses in this study and in 
particular whether or not psychiatrists working with self-injuring clients in the Irish 
context only use a pharmacotherapy approach.
To date, no research study has explored clinicians’ discourses in relation to 
their treatment modalities o f self-injury. In light o f  this gap, and the various
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discourses and trends that I have discussed with respect to the treatment o f self-injury, 
it will be most interesting to see where the participating clinicians will locate 
themselves and how this will play out in their discourses. Indeed, it will be 
instructive to see what discourses will emerge in relation to their models o f treatment, 
and whether they will reflect any or all o f the treatment trends I have just outlined. 
Will these clinicians refer to singular or multiple modalities o f  treatment in their 
discourses? What discourses will clinicians working, in the Irish context, draw on 
when describing their treatment approach to self-injury? For instance, will they draw 
on relational discourses in their discursive explanations o f their treatment approach to 
working with self-injuring patients? Indeed, clinicians’ in this study may introduce 
new discourses with respect to treatment modalities for working with self-injuring 
clients.
Treatment Success, Failure and Partial Failure
Considering the range o f treatment options I have just discussed in the 
previous section and the lack o f research exploring their effectiveness, it is clear that 
there is no one pathway to successful treatment o f self-injury documented in the 
literature. While this research study does not purport to explore the effectiveness of 
clinicians’ treatment approaches, I am interested in what they think about success, 
failure and partial failure in relation to their work with self-injuring patients. A 
further purpose o f this study is to explore participating clinicians’ discourses about 
how they gauge or measure treatment success, failure and partial failure with self- 
injuring clients. Participating clinicians’ discourses about whom they consider 
responsible for the outcome o f treatment, and their sources o f  knowledge for 
understanding and treating self-injury, are also part o f  the exploration in this research
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study. Therefore, I will now discuss the literature in terms o f discourses o f  success, 
failure and partial failure, discourse markers o f success, failure and partial failure, and 
discourse o f responsibility for treatment outcome, as it pertains to my study.
Discourses of success, failure and partial failure. Research studies have 
provided empirical evidence that psychotherapy is effective (Asay & Lambert, 2001; 
Hubble, Duncan, & Miller 2001; Weissmark & Giacomo, 1998). However, the 
psychotherapy literature also reports incidences o f failure in psychotherapy; some 
clients experience no change or improvement, while others get worse. Bergin (1971) 
reported that data, relating to failures in psychotherapy “ .. .suggest a failure rate that 
approaches one third and a rate o f deterioration that is close to 10% ...” (as cited in 
Strieker, 1995, p. 91). Indeed, Hansen, Lambert, & Forman (2002) reported similar 
results. They declared that, “ .. .about 35% to 40% of patients experience no benefit 
and a small group o f patients, perhaps between 5% and 10% deteriorate...” (Hansen 
et al., 2002, as cited in Lambert, 2007, p. 1). While I am not exploring the 
effectiveness o f psychotherapy, or tiying to identify the most effective treatment 
approach for working with self-injuring clients, I am, however, interested to see how 
the participating clinicians will construct the concepts o f success, failure and partial 
failure in their discourses, and what other discourses they will draw on in their 
narratives about treatment success, failure and partial failure.
Weissmark and Giacomo (1998) proposed that, “Beyond this global testimony 
to the effectiveness of therapy...” (p. 18), we know very little about what makes 
therapy work. In the contemporary literature, an evidence-based treatment research 
has emerged, in an attempt to identify the most effective psychotherapeutic modality. 
It appears that this has led to a discourse o f competition among practitioners o f the
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various psychotherapeutic approaches. Hubble, Duncan, and M iller (2001) have 
noted that, “ ...behavior, psychoanalytic, client-centered or humanistic, rational­
emotive, cognitive, time-limited, time-unlimited, and other therapies were pitted 
against each other in a great battle of the brands” (p. 5). While evidence-based 
treatment modalities are not the focus of my research study, I am however interested 
to see if  and how this discourse o f competition about the most effective treatment 
approach will play out in the participating clinicians’ discourses about their 
experiences o f success, failure and partial failure with self-injuring patients. Indeed, 
Kottler and Carlson (2005) reported an interesting finding about clinicians’ narratives 
o f their “greatest success stories” (p. 1). They interviewed 27 eminent clinicians 
about their “finest hours” (Kottler & Carlson, 2005, p. 1). They found that, “The 
cases presented by several therapists (Brown, Cummings, Doherty, Gray, Keeney, 
Love, Madigan, Mahrer, Neimeyer, Pittman, & Wheeler) resonate with their 
commitment to their theoretical frameworks and emphasize how these are applied 
successfully in the counseling room” (Kottler & Carlson, 2005, p. 273). In light of 
Kottler and Carlson’s finding, it will be instructive to see if  and how any or all o f the 
participating clinicians’ will use their discourses to espouse the merits and virtues of 
their particular treatment approach to working with self-injuring clients in response to 
my questions about their experiences of success and markers o f progress. Indeed, it 
will also be illuminating to note if any o f the clinicians will pit their specific treatment 
modality against another in their discourse as a way o f validating and verifying their 
particular modality.
It appears that clinicians may experience more difficulty selecting and 
speaking about their experiences of success rather than failure with patients. Kottler 
and Carlson (2003) documented an interesting finding in relation to clinicians’
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narratives o f success and failure. Having interviewed a number o f eminent clinicians 
about their best (2005) and worst (2003) cases, they reported that these clinicians 
experienced greater difficulty choosing a case that exemplified their finest work,
. .yet they could easily identify numerous examples o f their worst!” (Kohler & 
Carlson 2005, p. 269). Two o f the interviewed clinicians proposed different 
explanations for this finding. Keeney (2005, as cited in Kottler & Carlson, 2005) 
suggested that as clinicians, “ ...we tend to remember our worst tales o f woe, and let 
the memories o f doing the job well fade” (2005, p. 269). Scharff (2005, as cited in 
Kottler & Carlson, 2005) suggested that it may be due to doubt and uncertainty 
because, “ ...there are loads o f hours when you are just grinding through therapy 
wondering whether you are doing anything useful” (2005, p. 269).
Sticker (1995), C. R. Rogers (1954), Persons and Mikami (2002) proposed a 
contrasting style o f speaking about failure, constructing failure as a treatment issue 
that is rarely discussed in the literature. Despite reported failure rates in the literature 
Strieker (1995) argued that, “ . ..published case material does not reflect these 
proportions” (p. 91). Indeed, he concluded, “Psychotherapists are not eager to 
broadcast their lack o f success” (Strieker, 1995, p. 91). C. R. Rogers commented 
about the absence o f such cases in the literature in 1954 and Strieker (1995) argued 
that, “ ...the situation has not changed remarkably since that time” (p. 91). In a later 
publication, Persons and Mikami (2002) argued that, “Treatment failure, although 
common, is rarely discussed” (p. 139). In light o f these contrasting styles cited in 
Kottler and Carlson (2005) and Strieker (1995) in relation to speaking o f failure, it 
will be instructive to see what will emerge in the participating clinicians’ discourses. 
Will they be forthcoming about their experiences o f  success and failure? Will they
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experience difficulty identifying and recollecting cases o f success and failure in their 
treatment o f self-injuring patients?
Freud (1977) was the first clinician to publish an account o f treatment failure. 
He concluded that he had failed in his analysis with Dora when she terminated her 
treatment. C. R. Rogers (1954) also published a case o f failure that he named, “The 
case o f Mr. Bebb” (as cited in Strieker, 1995, p. 93). What is interesting about C. R. 
Rogers’ case o f failure is that the client Mr. Bebb was “ .. .seen by another 
psychotherapist and that psychotherapist regarded the case as a success” (Strieker, 
1995, p. 91). So what does this mean in terms o f clinicians’ discourses about success 
and failure? Is one clinicians’ failure another’s success or vice versa? Or do 
clinicians’ discourses vary in terms of how they think about and construct treatment 
success and failure? Indeed, I wonder if and how these distinctions will play out in the 
participating clinicians’ discourses about their experiences of success, failure and 
partial failure in their treatment of self-injury.
There are no direct references to partial treatment failure in the general 
psychotherapy or self-injury literature. This seems surprising especially in relation to 
self-injury when one considers the recurring discourse in the literature about the 
strong reactions self-injury evokes in clinicians. Indeed, Connors (2000) has argued 
that, “The greatest impediments to useful and effective response to self-injury are the 
feelings and reactions o f helping professionals” (p. 311). Deiter and Pearlman (1998) 
concurred with Connors (2000), noting that unmanaged countertransference limits 
clinicians’ ability to work effectively with self-injuring patients. Indeed, Mordecai 
(1991) maintained that empathic failures occur with regularity in psychotherapeutic 
encounters. She further contended that, “W hen these failures go unnoticed, they can
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cause considerable disruption to therapy” (Mordecai, 1991, p. 251), and these 
therapeutic ruptures “ ...can have a negative effect...” (Mordecai, 1991, p. 251), One 
could locate empathic failures within the discourse o f partial failure, if  these were 
noticed and addressed by the clinician in treatment and then, treatment would thus be 
prevented from becoming a complete failure.
Ross and McKay (1979) documented a treatment experience with self-injury 
that one could regard as a partial failure. These clinicians acknowledged that they 
failed to change self-injuring behaviours in adolescents in a detention centre with 
“ .. .traditional therapies...” (p. 5). However, they reported that a shift in treatment 
took place “ ...only after we were willing to concede that we did not understand the 
girls’ behaviour, when we suspended our clinical judgment, when we grudgingly 
allowed ourselves to become students. The girls became our teachers” (Ross & 
McKay, 1979, p, 5). Indeed, these clinicians conceded that, “Not only did the girls 
teach us how to understand their self-mutilatory behaviour, but they also led us to the 
development o f an intervention technique which enabled them to eliminate self­
mutilation in the institution in the space o f a few weeks from the inception o f their 
program  [sic]” (Ross & McKay, 1979, p. 5). In my comprehensive search o f the 
literature, I found almost no references to partial failure in the self-injury literature. 
Considering this absence in the literature, it will be instructive to see if a discourse of 
partial failure will emerge in the participating clinicians’ discourses. Will they be 
forthcoming about their experiences of partial failure with self-injuring clients? 
Indeed, will they even identify with the concept o f partial failure, considering it is not 
widely documented in the literature?
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Discourse makers of success, failure and partial failure. We know that 
psychotherapy works effectively, and that sometimes it fails, but how do clinicians 
decide what constitutes treatment success, failure, and partial failure? How do they 
gauge or measure treatment success, failure and partial failure? What criteria do they 
use as markers of progress, failure and partial failure? These are complex and difficult 
questions that have evoked a number of discourses. Kottler and Carlson (2005) posed 
some interesting questions, and articulated the difficulties in deciding what 
constituted treatment success. They asked, “If a client improves in a single session, 
but the therapist had little to do with the improvement, is that one’s finest hour?” 
(Kottler & Carlson, 2005, p. 1). In other words, does the clinician mark this as a 
successful outcome? These authors also pointed out that, “ ...there are times when a 
clinician engages in some masterful intervention, or builds a fabulous relationship 
with a client or family, but there is no discemable progress even after months or years 
o f treatment” (Kottler & Carlson, 2005, p. 2). How do clinicians deal with this 
conundrum? Do they classify this as a failed treatment due to the lack of 
improvement, regardless of the wonderful intervention or good therapeutic 
relationship? Kottler and Carlson raised yet another example to demonstrate the 
complexity and multiple discourses about constructing the concept o f  treatment 
success and failure. They observed that there are times, when the clinician knows that 
s/he has “ .. .done a fine piece of work that has made a huge difference in a person’s 
life, but the changes won’t be acknowledged” (Kottler & Carlson, 2005, p. 2). To 
further complicate this discourse of success and failure, Kottler and Carlson offered 
one final variation on this theme. They spoke o f instances “ ... when a client claims 
that vast improvement has occurred—thank you very much for your tremendous effort 
— but neither you nor anyone else can see a whit o f difference” (Kottler & Carlson,
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2005, p. 2). The last two examples raise the issue o f  who decides whether treatment 
has been a success or not. Is it the clinician, the patient, or is it a collaborative and 
mutually agreed outcome by both? Indeed, it will be o f interest to see if  any o f these 
discourses emerge in the participating clinicians’ discourses.
With regard to discourse indicators o f progress, Garland, Kruse, and Aarons 
(2003) reported that clinicians use a variety o f markers to gauge patients’ progress. 
These include “improvement in the home environment (eg, family dynamics)”, 
“decreased symptoms”, “cognitive changes (eg, improved understanding o f problems, 
ability to identify/express emotions)”, “improved school functioning”, “ improved 
home functioning (eg, compliance), “improved social functioning” , “changes in 
general mood or affect”, “strength-based outcomes (eg, improved skills)” and 
“individualized client-specific changes” (Garland et al., 2003, p. 399). It will be 
instructive to note, if any or all o f these general markers will emerge in the clinicians’ 
narratives.
There is also a discourse that constructs treatment failure as . .a failure to 
achieve desired psychotherapy goals...” (Mash & Hunsley, 1993, p. 293). Within this 
discourse, indicators of a failed treatment outcome result in:
.. .client refusal o f treatment, premature termination or dropout, nonresponse 
to treatment, limited magnitude o f  response to treatment, therapeutic plateaus 
or diminishing treatment returns, worsening o f presenting symptoms, and the 
failure o f treatment effects to generalize over time and across situations.
(Mash & Hunsley, 1993, p. 293)
A discourse concerning how useful outcome measurements are by clinicians in
relation to treatment effectiveness emerges in the literature. Garland et al.’s (2003)
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study o f American clinicians’ utility of outcome measurement reported that, “ ...there 
was great variability in clinicians’ attitudes about the extent to which it is possible to 
quantify the effectiveness of treatment” (p. 397). They found that some clinicians 
clearly expressed positive or negative attitudes “ .. .regarding the quantitative 
measurement of treatment effectiveness, many expressed ambivalence” (Garland et. 
al., 2003, p. 398). Their study revealed that the percentage o f the clinicians “ . ..who 
indicated that it was not possible to quantitatively measure change in treatment was 
roughly equal to the percentage who indicated that it was possible” (Garland et. al., 
2003, p. 398). The clinicians who located themselves within the discursive position, 
“ ...that it was not possible...” (Garland et. al., 2003, p. 398) to measure treatment 
effectiveness “ ...ranged from those who were ideologically strongly opposed to 
quantifying the complexity and nuance o f human change in psychotherapy 
(approximately 25% of participants), to those who felt that the measurement of 
psychotherapy outcome is virtually impossible (also 25%)” (Garland et al., 2003, p. 
398). Those clinicians, who expressed ambivalence, were generally in support o f the 
use o f outcome measures (Garland et al., 2003). According to these authors, these 
clinicians’ responses reflected “ ...frustration or recognition o f the challenges inherent 
in measuring these constructs” (Garland et al., 2003, p. 398). Therefore, it will be 
instructive to note, if the clinicians’ discourses in my study will reflect the variations 
that Garland et al. (2003) reported among American clinicians. For instance, will the 
clinicians’ narratives suggest that they are ambivalent to, totally opposed to, or open 
to the use o f  outcome measures, with regard to gauging their treatment effectiveness 
with self-injuring patients? Indeed, the application o f outcome measures may be 
incompatible with some clinicians’ theoretical or practice orientation, and others like 
those in Garland et al.’s (2003) study may be ideologically opposed to them.
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There is another discourse in the literature that relates to the use by researchers 
and clinicians of formal and informal markers of treatment progress or failure, in their 
discourse about failure to achieve psychotherapeutic goals. Hatfield and Ogles (2004) 
argued that clinicians routinely assess the progress o f their clients as part o f their 
normal clinical practice. However, it appears that clinicians predominantly, “ ...assess 
outcome in an informal manner, based on client report and clinical judgment” 
(Hatfield & Ogles, 2004, p. 485). Indeed, two studies found that relatively few 
practising psychologists in the U.S.A. (29%— Phelps, Eisman, & Kohout, 1998;
37%— Hatfield & Ogles, 2004) used some form o f outcome measure to track patient 
progress (Phelps et a l ,  1998; Hatfield & Ogles, 2004). It is interesting that the 
psychologists in both studies reported employing a variety o f standardised measures. 
Phelps et al.’s (1998) clinicians reported that they used the Beck Depression 
Inventory, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and the Symptom Checklist- 
90. Hatfield & Ogles’ (2004) clinicians employed a number o f  additional 
standardised outcome measures which had not been mentioned by Phelps et al.’s 
(1998) clinicians. In addition to the Beck Depression Inventory, and the Symptom 
Checklist-90, the clinicians reported using the Global Assessment Scale/Children’s 
Global Assessment Scale, the Child Behaviour Checklist, the B rief Symptom 
Inventory, the Beck Anxiety Inventory and the Outcome Questionnaire-45 (Hatfield 
& Ogles, 2004) as outcome measures, as part o f their clinical practice. Indeed, 
Venmeesch, Whipple, Lambert, Hawkins, Burchfield, and Okiishi (2004) criticised the 
use o f these standardised tests “ .. .as a means o f assessing the effectiveness of 
treatment” (p. 38) because they were not originally designed to measure outcome. I 
wonder if  in my study, clinicians will bring any formal or informal measures into their 
discourses o f failure to meet psychotherapeutic goals.
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In the contemporary literature, there are a number o f outcome tools available 
to clinicians that were specifically designed to measure treatment outcomes. For 
instance, Lambert, et al.’s (2004, as cited in Lambert, 2007) Outcome Questionnaire, 
which evaluates four areas o f client functioning, “ ...symptoms o f psychological 
disturbance (mainly depression and anxiety), interpersonal problems, social role 
functioning (e.g., problems at work or school), and quality of life (positive aspects of 
life satisfaction)” (p. 2), Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation (CORE) is an 
outcome measure that was developed in the UK at the Psychological Therapies 
Research Centre at the University o f Leeds. CORE is designed as a continuous 
outcome monitoring system. There is . .the 34-item version intended for use pre- 
and post-treatment, two short versions o f 17 items each are recommended as 
alternating repeated measures to tap patient change on a session-by-session basis” 
(Burton, 1998, p. 176). Indeed, this particular outcome measure is popular with some 
of my colleagues working in student counselling services in Ireland. However, there 
is no literature to suggest that any particular outcome measure is widely used by 
clinicians in Ireland, or elsewhere, to assess treatment success and failure. There is no 
agreed standard outcome measure that all clinicians use in their clinical practice to 
track or gauge their patients’ progress, and also no agreement about using such 
measures. It will be instructive to see what will emerge in the participating clinicians’ 
discourses with respect to marking out clients’ progress. Will they speak o f the use of 
standardised or non-standardised tests? Indeed, will the notion o f using some form of 
tracking system be compatible or incompatible, with their treatment theoretical 
orientation and/or their professional discipline? For instance, will the use of 
standardised outcome measures be more in keeping with a cognitive behavioural than 
a humanistic, or psychoanalytic orientation? Will the employment o f more informal
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markers o f progress, such as patients’ reports and clinical judgments be more 
acceptable to some clinicians than others because o f their clinical discipline and/or 
treatment orientation? Indeed, the participating clinicians may engage in discourses 
where they position themselves as being opposed to the use o f any kind o f formal or 
informal gauges o f clients’ progress in their clinical practice. They may also draw on 
discourse markers o f success, failure and partial failure that are not mentioned in the 
literature. So, it will be enlightening to see how these themes will play out in the 
discourses o f the clinicians participating in my research study.
There is a further discourse in the literature, that I will refer to as the discourse 
o f not knowing in relation to treatment outcomes. Kohler and Carlson (2005) 
articulated this discourse when they reported that there are “ ... very limited times in a 
therapist’s career when the long-term outcome is known” (p. 271). They proposed 
that, “So often, clients walk out the door and we never hear from them again; the 
stories remain unfinished, without endings” (Kottler & Carlson, 2005, pp. 271-272), 
Indeed, they acknowledged that, “The therapist is so often left wondering what 
changes really took place and how long they lasted” (Kottler & Carlson, 2005, p.
272). I wonder if  this discourse o f not knowing whether the treatment was a success, 
failure or partial failure will emerge in the narratives o f the clinicians participating in 
this research study.
Discourse o f Responsibility for Outcome o f Treatment
Whiston and Sexton (1993) proposed a discourse that locates the responsibility 
for the outcome o f treatment with the clinician. They argued that, “the research 
suggests that negative results are often related to the therapist” (Whiston & Sexton, 
1993, p. 49). Despite this research finding, they noted that clinicians seem to engage
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in a discourse in which they locate the responsibility for negative treatment outcomes 
with the patient. Whiston and Sexton contended that when treatment yields 
unfavourable results “ ... it may be palatable for practitioners to attribute this negative 
outcome to the client’s lack of willingness or motivation” (p. 49). Indeed, Kottler and 
Carlson (2003) agreed with this discourse. They noted that clinicians .have a long 
history of inventing ways to disown our misjudgments and mistakes” (Kottler and 
Carlson, 2003, p. ix). They reported that clinicians engage in discourses in which 
“We blame our clients for not trying hard enough or being unmotivated. We ascribe 
negative outcomes to circumstances beyond our control— meddling family members, 
organic or environmental factors, time constraints. We call our clients ugly names 
like borderline [sic] or obstructive [sic] or resistant [sic]” (Kottler & Carlson, 2003, p. 
ix).
These authors also articulated the ways clinicians can make, “blunders”, 
(Kottler & Carlson, 2003, p. ix) and thus can be responsible for negative treatment 
outcomes. Kottler and Carlson (2003) listed these “blunders” as, “We pushed too 
hard too fast; we misread the situation; we missed crucial information. Our own 
personal issues were triggered. We were less than tactful. We bungled the diagnosis. 
We were less than skilful in executing an intervention” (p. ix). In these and many 
other ways clinicians can chase “ . ..the client away” (Kottler & Carlson, 2003, p.ix) 
or, “ ...se t the treatment back significantly” (Kottler & Carlson, 2003, p. ix). These 
authors concluded that clinicians engage in a discourse o f denial in relation to making 
treatment “blunders”. They proposed, “Denial and defensiveness provide a 
convenient means to bury our mistakes, sometimes to help us pretend they never 
happened in the first place” (Kottler & Carlson, 2003, p. ix).
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In a contrasting discourse, Bergin and Garfield (1994) argued that, “ ...it is the 
client more than the therapist who implements the change process” (p. 825). Indeed, 
Bohart (1995) contended that, “ ...all good clients really are their own therapists, and 
are actively problem-solving themselves as they listen to what therapists offer” (p. 
101). Thus, Bohart appears to be locating the responsibility for treatment outcome 
with the patient once the therapist has provided “ .. .an open, connected, genuine, and 
collaborative relationship” (1995, p. 101).
How will discourses of responsibility for the treatment outcome with self- 
injuring patients play out in the narratives o f the participating clinicians in my 
research study? Will they draw on collaborative discourses in which both the client 
and clinician are constructed as sharing responsibility? Perhaps they will resort to 
blaming their self-injuring clients, especially for negative outcomes, as Kottler and 
Carlson (2003) have argued. Indeed, they may even construct themselves as being 
responsible for both negative and positive outcomes. Either way, it will be interesting 
and revealing to see how clinicians, working in an Irish context with self-injuring 
patients think about this issue and what discourses they will draw on.
I will now conclude this chapter with an examination o f the literature that 
pertains to the sources o f knowledge, that clinicians access to conceptualise and treat 
self-injury.
Discourse of Knowledge Sources
Public and clinical interest in self-injury has increased dramatically in recent 
years. Indeed, the last decade has seen a surge in publications on the phenomenon o f 
self-injury. There are multiple discourses in relation to sources o f knowledge about 
self-injury. These sources range from discursive narratives o f  individuals who
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engaged in self-injury (Kettlewell, 1999; Leatham, 2005; Pembroke, 1994; Smith, 
2006), to clinicians who outline their therapeutic approach and provide case examples 
o f their work with clients who engage in self-injury (e.g. Alderman, 1997; Babiker & 
Arnold, 1997; Clarke, 1999; Conterio & Lader, 1998; Faber, 2000; Gardner, 2002; 
Hewitt, 1997; Holmes, 2000; Hyman, 1999; Levenkron, 1998; Milia, 2000; Miller, 
1994; Ng, 1998; Selekman, 2002; Smith, Cox, & Saradjian, 1998; Strong, 1998; 
Sutton, 1999; Turner, 2002; Turp, 2002; Walsh, 2006) and research studies.
Additional forms of information on self-injury beyond the clinical and 
research literature, include published novels (e.g., Coman, 1998; Levenkron, 1997; 
McCormick, 2000; Stoehr, 1991), numerous newspaper and magazine articles. In 
addition, many internet web sites, blogs, and You Tube posts feature self-injury and 
host chat rooms where self-injury is a topic for discussion (Prasad & Owens, 2001; 
Whitlock, Lader, & Conterio, 2007; Whitlock, Powers, & Eckenrode, 2006). Self­
injury has featured in popular British, American and Australian television shows (e.g., 
A ll Saints', Bad Girls', Beverly Hills 90210', Casualty', Dangerfield; Doctors; ER; Fat 
Friends', G rey’s Anatomy; Hatty Waintrop; Hollyoaks; House; Peak Practice; Seventh 
Heaven; Silent Witness; Taggart; and The Bill), It has also emerged in films such as 
Fatal Attraction, Girl Interrupted, Patch Adams, Secret Cutting, Secretary, The Piano 
Teacher and Thirteen. In children’s literature Dobby, the house e lf  in J. R. Rowling’s 
Harry Potter and the Chamber o f  Secrets, engages in self-injury; “Dobby shook his 
head. Then without warning, he leapt up and started banging his head furiously on 
the window, shouting "Bad (sic) Dobby! Bad  (sic) Dobby!” ’ (p. 16). Thus, there are 
multiple sources from which clinicians can source information about conceptualising 
and treating self-injury.
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There is a lack o f research in the literature exploring the sources o f clinicians’ 
knowledge o f understanding and treating self-injuring clients. There appears to be 
only two studies that explore this subject with regard to therapists, namely Keane 
(1997) and Williams (2005). It should be noted that psychiatrists were not 
represented in either o f these studies. In my study (Keane, 1997) the majority of 
therapists reported that their primary sources o f information about self-injury were 
workshops, books and journals. Other sources listed included seminars, personal 
experience and supervision. Therapists in Williams’ (2005) study reported that they 
did not receive any “ .. .specific education or training on the topic o f self-injury...” (p. 
189) in their respective training programmes. These therapists reported “reading” 
(Williams, 2005, p. 189) as their main source o f knowledge on the subject o f self­
injury. Williams (2005) concluded that, “ ...the general theme is that limited 
opportunities exist for a formal training in working with and understanding clients 
who self-injure” (p. 190). Despite these two studies, there is still a lot that is 
unknown about clinicians’ (especially psychiatrists’) sources o f knowledge, including 
both their personal experience and professional training, that have influenced their 
understanding and development of their treatment models, for working with self- 
injuring patients. Hence, clinicians’ discourses about their sources o f knowledge 
about self-injury is a subject of exploration in this research study. It will be 
enlightening to discover what clinicians will reveal in their discourses about where 
they source their information about understanding and treating self-injuring clients. 
Do they actively seek out this information from various sources such as books, 
seminars and workshops on self-injury? Did they receive knowledge about self-injury 
in their primary training? Do they rely on their colleagues, supervisors or clinical 
experience from their work with self-injuring patients as sources o f knowledge?
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To summarise, in this chapter, I outlined the various discourses in the 
literature that pertains to my research study. These included discourses o f debate and 
controversy that relate to conceptualising self-injury, the various treatment discourses 
that consist o f single model, pathological, feminist, multi-modal, distress, relational 
and affect regulation. I also discussed the relevant studies in the literature that relates 
to clinicians’ treatment preferences in relation to self-injury. In addition, I examined 
the discourses about treatment success, failure and partial failure, and markers o f 
success, failure and partial failure in the literature. I concluded with a discussion o f a 
discourse of responsibility for the outcome o f treatment, and o f the sources of 
clinicians’ knowledge in relation to conceptualising and treating self-injury.
To conclude, the focus of my research study is to explore clinicians’ 
discourses about their conceptualisation and treatment o f self-injury within the Irish 
context. I am also interested in how these clinicians think about success, failure and 
partial failure and what discourse markers of progress and failure they draw on in 
relation to their work with self-injuring patients. A further purpose o f this study is to 
identify the sources o f knowledge that contribute to clinicians’ understanding o f self­
injury and o f those who engage in this behaviour.
Sum m ary and Conclusion
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Chapter Three 
Mode and Experience of Inquiry
This research study is an in-depth exploration o f eight clinicians' discourses 
about their understanding of self-injury, their treatment models, their sources of 
knowledge, and the ways in which they gauge or measure their clinical effectiveness 
in their work with self-injuring clients in an Irish context. In this chapter, I discuss 
the methodology I used and my experience o f undertaking this inquiry.
Choice o f Self-Injury
As a clinician, I wanted to conduct a research study that would be clinically 
relevant to clinicians working with self-injuring patients. Therefore, I decided upon 
the phenomenon of self-injury as my chosen topic for this study in the hope that it 
would make a contribution to the field o f knowledge, with respect to our 
understanding and treatment, in both the Irish and international literature. My specific 
focus on clinicians’ discourses is a new aspect o f research that has not been 
previously explored in the self-injury literature. In this respect, this research study is 
unique.
Qualitative Design
Rationale. The use of qualitative methodology was appropriate because in 
this study I am seeking to understand the clinicians’ perspectives. In particular, I am 
seeking to understand how clinicians’ conceptualisations o f  self-injury are 
constructed, how their understanding influences their current treatment practices, and 
their perceived measures o f their clinical effectiveness with self-injuring clients.
There were a number o f reasons why I selected a qualitative research design to
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explore this study’s research questions. Firstly, qualitative research is concerned with 
how people make sense of, interpret, understand, experience, construct and are 
constructed by their worlds (Coyle, 2007; Mason, 1996; Willig, 2001). As a method, 
qualitative research aims to understand the perspectives of the participants (Maxwell, 
2005). Adopting this approach, the qualitative researcher seeks to understand the 
behaviours and the physical events that are occurring among participants in a 
particular social context (Maxwell, 2005). In addition, the qualitative researcher is 
interested in “ ...how  the participants comprehend these behaviours and events “ ...and 
how their understanding influences their behavior” (Maxwell, 2005, p. 22).
Secondly, qualitative research studies tend to focus on a small number of 
participants in a particular context. This allows for the researcher to understand 
. .the particular context [sic] within which the participants act, and the influence that 
this context has on their actions” (Maxwell, 2005, p. 22). In this study, the particular 
social context was a face-to-face interview between the participant and the researcher. 
According to Maxwell (2005), an additional advantage o f a small sample is that the 
individuality o f each participant is preserved in the analysis. Finally, qualitative 
research is open and flexible because it allows the researcher to modify the design and 
focus o f the study during data collection (Maxwell, 2005). This facilitates the 
understanding o f new discoveries and relationships as they emerge (Maxwell, 2005).
Qualitative in-depth interviewing was the primary method o f generating data 
in this research study. Marshall and Rossman (2006) argued that this type o f 
interviewing resembles conversations in that, “The researcher explores a few general 
topics to help uncover the participants’ views but otherwise respects how the 
participants frames and structures the responses” (p. 101). This is exactly what I was
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seeking to achieve in this study, the unfolding o f the participants’ perspectives on the 
phenomenon of self-injury. Kvale (1996) proposed that, “The research interview is a 
specific form o f conversation” (p. 19), through which the interviewer asks specific 
questions to obtain knowledge of the interviewee’s world, that relate to the study’s 
research questions. He contended that this knowledge o f the interviewee’s world 
“ .. .is constructed through the interaction o f interviewer and interviewee” (Kvale, 
1996, p. 36) in the research interview. His argument is premised on the belief that as 
human beings we construct “ ...both ourselves and our worlds in our conversational 
activity” (Shotter 1993, as cited in Kvale, 1996, p. 37), and we do this through the 
medium of language. Consequently, Kvale suggested that researchers should talk 
with people if  they want to know how they understand their world and their life. 
Therefore, I selected an in-depth, conversational style, interviewing approach to 
explore clinicians’ discourses about self-injury, because this method facilitates the 
unfolding of participants’ perspectives in their interaction with me.
Discourse. Estefan, McAllister, and Rowe (2004) proposed that, “Discourse 
refers to a way o f thinking, talking, or writing about reality (Cherryholmes, 1988)” (p. 
27). They further elaborated that, “Discourses act as forms o f containment o f 
knowledge, setting parameters and limiting the ways in which a practice can be 
thought or spoken about and consequently experienced” (Estefan et al., 2004, pp. 27­
28). Therefore, the participating clinicians’ knowledge o f self-injury and the clinical 
practices they engage in with their self-injuring patients “ ...is shaped, constrained, 
and sustained through an interaction between talk in the clinical area (Horsfall & 
Clearly, 2000)” (Estefan et al., 2004, p. 28), that they are trained and work in. Thus, 
within this research study the disciplines o f psychiatry, psychoanalysis, psychology
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and psychotherapy are discursive practices; practices that are “ ...subject to and 
constitutive o f discourse” (Estefan et al., 2004, p. 28).
In this research study, I use the term “discourse” to refer to ways o f speaking 
in a clinical discipline, as well as patterns of speaking across disciplines and 
participants. Finally, I also use discourse to refer to the way speech is used, to 
address me, or an imagined audience beyond me. For instance, I create phrases and 
categories o f discourse based on listening across the clinicians’ discourses in this 
research study, such as “merging discourses”, “discourse community o f opposition”, 
“discourse community o f verification”, “expert discourse”, “inquirer discourse”, and 
“shifted to the therapist”.
Research questions. This study’s research questions were:
1. What sources of knowledge, including both personal experience and professional 
training, have influenced/shaped the development o f  clinicians’ explanations) or 
working model(s) o f treating self-injuring clients?
2. What conceptual frameworks do clinicians draw on to understand self-injury and 
their current treatment practice with self-injuring patients?
3. What explanations or models do clinicians draw on to understand their current 
treatment practice effectiveness and failures with self-injuring clients?
4. How do clinicians gauge or measure their clinical effectiveness and partial 
failures, in their current treatment practice with self-injuring patients?
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I will now discuss the methodology I used to explore these research questions 
under the following headings: the research relationship, the participants, the interview 
process, the pilot study, the data analysis and the ethical considerations o f  this study.
R esearch relationship. Since this research study involved interviewing my 
peers in the mental health profession in Ireland, Rubin and Rubin’s (2005) concept of 
“conversational partnerships” (p. 14) was an appropriate model for the research 
relationships. Conversational partnerships suggest “ . . .a  congenial and cooperative 
experience, as both interviewer and interviewee work together to achieve a shared 
understanding” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 14). Thus, this approach acknowledges the 
partnership between the interviewee and the researcher. Rubin and Rubin’s 
conversational partnerships approach also acknowledges the influence o f both the 
researcher and the interviewee in the research interview. Noting this, they 
commended this approach as it “ ...reminds the researcher that the direction o f the 
interview is shaped by both the researcher’s and the interviewee’s concerns” (Rubin 
& Rubin, 2005, p. 14). In addition, this approach to interviewing highlights the 
individuality o f each interviewee “ ...his or her distinct knowledge, and the different 
w ays...” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 14) in which the interviewee interacts with the 
researcher. Josselson (2007) also echoed this discourse about the uniqueness, 
shaping, and co-construction of each relationship: “Every relationship ‘feels’ different 
from every other one” (Josselson 2007, p. 4) and, “The way we speak together is 
unique. ..” (Josselson 2007, p. 4). This was my experience with each o f the clinicians.
Kemberg and Clarkin (1994) noted, “In the area o f psychotherapy research, 
the literature suggests that there is tension and/or separation between clinicians and 
researchers . . .” (p. 39). Indeed, Greenberg (1994) articulated a stronger view on this
67
subject remarking that, “Researchers, ...often find themselves at odds with clinicians” 
(p. 9). She argued that, “ ...a  relationship develops in which therapists are ‘insiders’ 
and researchers are sceptical ‘outsiders’” (Greenberg, 1994, p. 9) that contributes to 
“ .. .mutual scepticism and even distrust” (Greenberg, 1994, p. 1). It was anticipated 
that my transparent approach and disclosure of my background, as both a researcher 
and a practising clinician, would help to overcome the potential barriers o f tension, 
scepticism and distrust voiced by Kemberg and Clarkin (1994) and Greenberg (1994). 
Thus, in applying this relational approach, it was my intention that the interviewees 
would feel more relaxed and comfortable, in order to engage in an open discussion 
with the research topic. Heppner, Kivlighan, and Wampold (1999) acknowledged the 
importance of the research relationship when using an interview method, believing 
“ .. .the relationship is necessary for the participant to share his or her construction in 
an honest manner” (p. 247).
Participants
Selection procedures. Purposive sampling was employed in this study in 
order to select the participants. In particular, I used snowball and criterion sampling. 
Faugier and Sargeant (1997) noted the importance, and the increased recognition, of 
the employment o f non-random methods o f data collection, and the use o f innovative 
sampling techniques, such as snowball sampling, to access hidden populations for 
research studies. Therefore, my rationale for using this specific method is because 
clinicians who have worked with self-injuring patients seem to be a hidden group and 
they are not easily identified, even within their own mental health professional 
disciplines. Therefore, I began with clinicians who were known to me and who met 
the criteria for inclusion (see Appendix B) in this study. I then asked each o f these
68
clinicians to recommend colleagues, who they knew had experience o f working with 
self-injuring patients in the Irish context.
There were a number o f reasons for selecting this sampling method. Firstly, it 
allowed for the selection o f clinicians who were known to have a particular level of 
experience in working with self-injuring clients. Secondly, it facilitated the selection 
o f clinicians who had a range o f different professional training backgrounds, namely 
psychiatry, psychology, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. Thirdly, according to 
Lincoln and Guba (1985, as cited in Rudestam & Newton, 2007), it increased the 
possibility o f accessing an “ ...array of multiple perspectives...” (p. 106) from 
clinicians on their understanding and treatment of self-injury.
Population and sample size. The participants were selected from mental 
health professionals working in the Republic of Ireland. Specifically, these included 
two psychiatrists, three psychologists, two psychotherapists and one psychoanalyst.
In keeping with a qualitative research approach, the sample size was small to facilitate 
an in-depth analysis of the data. Thus, only eight participants were selected for 
interview.
Interview Process
I conducted the pilot study in August o f 2007. The seven remaining 
interviews took place between March 2008 and March 2009 over a period o f a 
complete calendar year.
The length o f time of each interview varied considerably as displayed in Table 
1. They ranged from the shortest interview o f 1 hr and 12.41 min to the longest at 3 
hr and 15.56 min. Initially, at the beginning of this study, I had anticipated that the
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duration o f the interviews would vary from lh r 30min to 2 hr, and that the follow-up 
interviews would be approximately 1 hour or less. As Table 1, below illustrates, most 
o f the interviews fitted into this anticipated timeframe, with the exception of 
Interviews 4 and 5.
Table 1 Length o f  Time o f  Each Interview
Interview Number Timeframe o f Interview Pseudonym o f Clinician
Interview 1 72.41 min Eimear
Interview 7 86.55 min Ciara
Interview 3 88.45 min Mike
Interview 6 95.11 min Sinead
Pilot Interview 96.57 min Niamh
Interview 2 117.12 min Jack
Interview 4 130.24 min Mark
Interview 5 195.56 min David
In terms o f location, all eight clinicians were interviewed in their offices at 
their places o f  work. Five o f the interviews occurred in one session. Due to time 
constraints on the clinicians’ part, three interviews had to be conducted in two 
separate parts. There was a 5-week gap between part 1 and part 2 o f two o f these 
interviews, and a 15-week break during the third one.
Procedure. Once selected to participate in this research study, participants 
received an initial contact letter (see Appendix C) by postal mail, outlining the 
research study and inviting them to participate. Within one week o f posting the 
invitation letter, participants received a follow-up telephone call from the researcher. 
The purpose o f this phone call was to assess participants’ level o f interest in my 
research study, to ask questions to ensure that they met the criteria for inclusion in this
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study (see Appendix B), and to respond to any questions or concerns they may have 
had.
Once participants agreed to become involved in my research study, we then 
agreed the date and the venue for the interview. Participants were offered a choice of 
two venues for the interviews to take place, either the participant’s offices (places of 
work), or my office, thus ensuring that the research interview took place in a private 
setting.
Prior to initiating the research interview, I asked the participants to complete 
the informed consent form (see Appendix D), and I answered any pre-interview 
questions they had in relation to this study. At this point, participants were asked if 
they wished to request a copy o f their individual transcript and a summary o f the 
results of this study. Only one participant asked for a copy o f his transcript “out of 
interest and curiosity”. All eight indicated they would like to receive a summary of 
this study’s results upon completion o f my dissertation. Once the informed consent 
form was signed, the participant was asked to complete a background information 
sheet (see Appendix E). Then, the face-to-face individual interview commenced.
Having read the interview transcripts, I had the option to request follow-up 
interviews with selected participants. This option was agreed with all o f the 
participants at the time of their consenting to participate in the study. Follow-up 
interviews were only to be scheduled if there was a need to seek clarification, to 
follow-up on an interesting point that had been missed by the researcher initially, 
and/or in the event that the researcher identified sensitive clinical information, that 
might have been too revealing, or might have led to the identity o f the participant, or
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one o f their clients. No follow-up interviews were conducted, as they were not 
necessary.
Instruments. Semi-structured, face-to-face individual interviews was the 
method selected to gather the data for my research study. The rationale for selecting 
this particular method was based on a number o f reasons. Firstly, the interview 
method allows the researcher to interact with the participants in a naturalistic setting, 
and facilitates an opportunity to gather in-depth information from them with a view to 
answering this study’s research questions. As Rubin and Rubin (2005) noted, “ ...in  
interviews, the researcher is seeking particular information and so gently guides the 
discussion, leading it through stages, asking focused questions, and encouraging the 
interviewee to answer in depth and at length” (p. 110). Secondly, this approach 
allows for flexibility in that the order and wording o f the questions can be varied with 
each interviewee (Maxwell, 2005). Thirdly, the researcher can ask additional 
questions to follow up on participants’ responses, that allow for rich and detailed 
responses from participants that are susceptible to cross-case comparability (Maxwell, 
2005). Finally, exploring the clinicians’ understanding and perspective on their 
treatment o f self-injuring patients was the primary focus o f this research study and 
interviewing allowed me to do this. In the words o f Quinn Patton (2002), 
interviewing allows “ .. .us to enter the other person’s perspective” (p. 341).
The interview schedule consisted o f  23 questions and 26 probing questions 
(see Appendix F). Each interview was audio recorded using a digital recorder.
Pilot Study
I conducted a pilot study that involved interviewing one participant 
(pseudonym Niamh), known to the researcher, who met the selection criteria. Since I
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had developed the interview schedule myself, the purpose of this pilot study was to 
test its effectiveness, to see if it yielded information relating to the research questions, 
and to check the timeframe o f the interview. The pilot study adhered to the 
procedural stages outlined in the main study.
The pilot interview was audio recorded and transcribed. Following this, the 
transcript was analysed using a discourse analysis approach, which I describe in depth 
later in this chapter. Modifications to the interview schedule, and the research 
questions, were dependent on the analysis o f the data yielded from the pilot study.
The analysis o f the pilot interview with Niamh worked in a rich and powerful way. 
Niam h’s interview transcript revealed rich data, and discourse analysis illuminated the 
process o f data analysis. This revelation will unfold in the forthcoming findings 
chapters, in which I will refer to extracts from Niamh’s transcript.
Based on my analysis o f the pilot study, I did not change the research 
questions or the discourse analysis methodology. The only modification I made to the 
interview schedule was the re-ordering o f some o f the questions, following a 
recommendation by my progress review committee. They suggested that I place the 
more open-ended questions about self-injury at the beginning and move the treatment 
type questions towards the end o f the interview schedule.
I decided to include the pilot interview in my main study because there were 
no significant changes made to the interview schedule or the selected method for 
analysing the interview transcripts. In addition, I did not want to lose the richness, 
and unique quality, o f  Niamh’s discourse from this research study.
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Data Analysis
I will now discuss the four processes o f data analysis that I engaged in under 
the following subheadings: transcription and correction, listening and multiple 
readings, discourse analysis and cross case analysis.
Transcription and correction. The first stage in analysing the data involved 
the transcription of the audio recordings o f the interviews. Hutchby and Wooffitt 
(1998, as cited in Wood & Kroger, 2000) acknowledged, “The practice o f 
transcription and production o f a transcript represents a distinctive stage in the process 
o f data analysis itself’ (p. 84). At this initial stage, I employed the services o f a 
professional transcriber who transcribed the audio recordings o f each individual 
interview. On receiving the transcripts, I assigned a pseudonym to each participant. I 
then checked each transcript against the audio recording for accuracy.
Listening to the audio recordings o f the clinicians’ interviews, I used an 
abbreviated version o f Jefferson’s (1984) transcription notation system (as cited in 
Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, 2003, p. 62) to indicate speech errors, pauses, 
interruptions, inaudible segments and emphasis were indicated in the transcripts, as 
well as audible intake and outtake of breath (see Appendix G). These are important 
features to capture because they allow the researcher to identify the function of the 
text, to read what the speech is trying to do. For instance, the function o f the 
participants’ speech may be an attempt to soften what s/he might say, it may indicate 
a contradiction, an apology or an emphasis.
Listening and multiple readings. In the next stage o f the analysis, I engaged
exclusively with each participant’s audio recording and transcript individually. Thus,
I conducted a separate analysis on each individual transcript before moving on to the
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next one. During this process, I listened to the audio recordings o f the interviews 
prior to analysing the transcripts. Then, I read “ .. .the transcripts carefully” (Willig, 
2001, p. 94), “ ...a t least once, without any attempt at analysis” (Willig, 2001, p. 94). 
This reading o f the transcripts without analysis allowed me “ .. .to experience as a 
reader [sic] some o f the discursive effects of the text” (Willig, 2001, p. 94) and “ .. .to 
become aware o f what a  text is doing [sic]” (Willig, 2001, p. 94).
Consideration of other methods o f data analysis. In place o f discourse 
analysis, I could have employed other qualitative methodologies o f data analysis in 
this research study, such as content analysis or grounded theory. Willig (2001) 
argued that, “Strictly speaking, there are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ methods. Rather, 
methods o f data collection and analysis can be more or less appropriate to our 
research question” (p. 21). Indeed, she noted that, “ ...the research question, data 
collection technique and method o f data analysis are dependent upon one another” 
(Willig, 2001, p. 21). Therefore, the researcher needs to select a method o f data 
analysis that will extract the answer to the research questions from the data.
In the following paragraphs, I will outline my rationale for specifically 
selecting discourse analysis to draw out the data that I required in response to the four 
research questions, that I posed in this research study.
Discourse analysis. The interview transcripts were analysed using the 
qualitative method known as discourse analysis. I chose discourse analysis as the 
method for analysing the interview transcripts in order to trace what each participant 
tried to do with language, and each participant’s location or “stakes” within language. 
This method seemed to be the most appropriate for this research study for the 
following reasons. Discourse analysis allowed me to see what the clinicians were
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doing with their language. It also facilitated a reading o f how dialogues, such as 
interviews, are co-constructed, and how the participants are constrained by the 
language 1 introduce, as well as the discourses they may use in daily life in Ireland 
(that are largely the same), and by discourses particular to their clinical training and 
professional lives. Finally, discourse analysis opens up the possibility o f exploring 
the use o f discursive patterns that may shift in a narrative, and to explore similar and 
variant discourses across a group o f participants.
According to Potter and Wetherell (1987), discourse analysis acknowledges 
that, . .language is not an abstract realm” (p. 14) and that language . .is made up 
from particular utterances performed in particular contexts” (p. 14). Indeed, Quigley
(2000) proposed that, . .language is an instrument for making and conveying 
meaning (constructed jointly, in conversation, rather than located inside someone’s 
head), that its structure reflects its function, and that therefore it can only be properly 
understood in terms o f its function” (p. 9). Discourse analysis is a method that is 
designed to reveal how people construct particular meanings in a social context. In 
particular, it examines how language functions for people, specifically, how people 
use language ..to construct [sic] versions of their social world” (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987, p. 33). This construction of versions is “ ...demonstrated by language variation” 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 33).
Therefore, this next stage of the data analysis involved the process of 
analysing each interview transcript individually using a discourse analysis approach. 
When analysing texts, Wood and Kroger (2000) argued, “Discourse analysis requires 
a particular orientation to texts, a particular frame o f  mind” (p. 91). Adopting this 
orientation, the discourse analyst must examine the discourse, “ ...creatively in all of
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its multifarious aspects...” (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 91), and keep an open mind 
“ ...to  entertain multiple possibilities” (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 91). Therefore, this 
stage o f analysis involved reading each transcript several times so that I could begin 
the analytic process. Wood and Kroger (2000) noted, “The overall goal of the analysis 
is to explain what is being done in the discourse and how this is accomplished, that is, 
how the discourse is structured or organized to perform various functions and achieve 
various effects or consequences” (p. 95). Thus, during these readings and re-readings 
of the transcripts, I was listening for patterns in each individual interview in response 
to the research questions. Therefore, at this point in the analysis, I wasn’t focusing on 
what the clinicians were saying in the text, but what they were doing with their 
discourses. Specifically, in this research study, this analysis allowed me to become 
aware o f how the clinicians used language to convey, contest, argue, persuade 
themselves, and me, about their understanding of self-injury, their conceptual 
frameworks for treating self-injuring clients, and how they gauge their clinical 
effectiveness, and partial failures, with this patient group. For instance, I identified 
patterns in their discourse such as what they spoke about, or didn’t speak about, in 
relation to their understanding and treatment o f self-injury.
Discourse analysis aims to make linkages between patterns o f speech, and 
theorising about the wider social context, by focusing on aspects of speaking, in an 
interview situation, that are not usually conscious or known to the interviewee. 
Therefore, another layer o f the analysis involved identifying subject positions from 
which the clinicians spoke in their discourses. Edley (2003) defined subject positions 
“ ...as ‘locations’ within a conversation” (p. 210) and they “ ...offer discursive 
locations from which to speak...” (Willig, 2001, p. 111). Subject positions can be 
identified by the particular “ .. .ways of talking” (Edley, 2003, p. 210) by the speakers
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in a conversation. These .. ways of talking can change both within and between a 
conversation...” (Edley, 2003, p. 210). Every one o f us has multiple and natural 
“ways of talking” in which we revise, contradict ourselves, and respond to different 
social contexts. These shifting subject positions in which we locate ourselves, are a 
way that we read aspects of discourse, in relation to what’s required in particular 
social situations. Thus, I traced these subject positions through shifts in the 
clinicians’ discourses. In relation to the present study, the clinicians located 
themselves within various subject positions, and their “ways o f speaking” reflected 
the wider controversial, sometimes confusing, discourses about comprehending and 
treating self-injuring patients.
Cross case analysis. Potter and Wetherell (1987, as cited in Wood & Kroger, 
2000) suggested that other patterns to be identified in the discourse include 
“ .. .systematic variability or similarity in content and structure...” (p. 95) within 
individual participants, and between participants’, transcripts in relation to a study’s 
research questions. Following this recommendation, I also examined the clinicians’ 
discourses for patterns of “contradictions”, “ resistance”, “revisions” and “repetitions” 
(A. G. Rogers et al., 1999) both within individual and across texts. In the final stage 
o f my analysis o f the clinicians’ discourses in relation to the research questions, I 
conducted a cross case analysis of all eight clinicians’ transcripts, seeking out patterns 
o f variability and similarity among their styles of discourse.
Using a cross case analysis approach, I looked for patterns of contrasts, 
variability and shifts in discourse across the clinicians’ narratives. I also searched to 
see how they constructed an imaginary audience, and made comparisons of those who 
shared the same training (e.g., the two psychiatrists, Ciara and David; two
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psychologists, Niamh and Eimear). When I identified clinicians as sharing a common 
discourse pattern, I looked further to see if  they were using the same kind o f discourse 
for different purposes.
I chose extracts from the clinicians’ interview transcripts to portray their 
discursive styles. The clinicians spoke largely in the present tense, therefore all four 
findings chapters are written in the present tense. This has the effect o f making the 
extracts appear vibrant and alive, occurring in the present in conjunction with my 
analysis.
Relevance of discourse analysis to this study. I will now discuss how these 
various aspects o f discourse analysis are relevant to this research study. As already 
outlined, the research questions focus on the phenomenon o f self-injury, in particular, 
how mental health clinicians think about self-injury and how they work with self- 
injuring clients. Potter and Wetherell (1987) noted that the research literature in 
social psychology has consistently found “ ...that people modify their behaviour, 
including their talk, in accordance with different social contexts” (p. 37). In this 
study, the social context was the various training programmes the clinicians had 
completed, their clinical settings, and ideas about self-injury in the wider Irish society. 
In addition, there was the social context o f the interview situation.
According to Potter and Wetherell (1987), “ ...variability is an expected usual 
feature o f conversation and social texts...” (p. 38). Therefore, variability within 
participants’ linguistic content in the transcripts was expected to emerge in the 
analysis o f these texts. Unlike conventional approaches, discourse analysis views 
variability as “ ...something to be understood, including the way in which participants 
use variability to construct their talk for different purposes, for different audiences,
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and for different occasions” (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 10). Variability was also 
expected in the transcripts, for reasons associated with the literature on the 
phenomenon of self-injury and with the different clinicians’ training programmes. As 
previously discussed in Chapter Two, there is no singular understanding o f self­
injury, and the literature features a multitude o f diverse treatment approaches. 
Therefore, variability among clinicians’ understanding o f self-injury, sources of 
knowledge that have shaped the development of their treatment model, conceptual 
frameworks they draw on in their treatment o f self-injuring patients, and how they 
measure their clinical effectiveness, and partial failures, were all of direct interest to 
this research study.
Participants in this study are members o f various mental health disciplines 
namely, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, psychology and psychotherapy. Each o f these 
disciplines has its own individual disciplinary discourse. In addition, participants 
might also use a common discourse, as they are practitioners who are living and 
working in Ireland. Clinicians who have trained in psychoanalysis, psychology and 
counselling may share a common discourse, as well as having their own individual 
discourses associated with their particular school o f psychotherapy. This may be 
related to the historical origins within psychology. There are five main generally 
accepted viewpoints or perspectives in psychology, namely, the biological, 
behaviourist, cognitive, psychodynamic and humanistic approaches (Glassman & 
Hadad, 2009). Each of these approaches “ .. .differ from each other in terms o f their 
basic assumptions, their methods and their theoretical structures” (Glassman &
Hadad, 2009, p. 5). Thus, “ ...each approach represents a distinct fram ework...” 
(Glassman & Hadad, 2009, p. 5).
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Psychoanalysis was the first school of psychotherapy, and it gave rise to the 
psychoanalytic or psychodynamic approach in psychology. Then, historically, 
different schools o f psychotherapy emerged from four of these approaches. For 
instance, cognitive therapy had its origins in the cognitive approach; behaviour 
therapy came from the behaviourist approach; humanistic psychotherapy emerged 
from the humanistic approach. Discourse analysis is a method that seeks to identify 
and understand these multiple and shared discourses among participants’ transcripts.
Discourse analysis was an appropriate method for analysing the data in this 
study because “ .. .one of its important elements is its use o f participants’ own 
understandings” (Potter, 1996, p. 138), and how they construct their understanding. 
Participants’ understanding are displayed in their replies to the utterances o f the 
interviewer that precede their speaking. How participants constructed their 
understanding via their discourse was probably unconscious to them, because it was 
being constructed in the moment of interaction within the context o f an interview.
This unconscious component could only be identified by the researcher when 
analysing the transcripts. This inclusion o f conscious and unconscious aspects o f 
discourse was an important aspect of the current study, as it aimed to gain an 
understanding o f how clinicians constructed their treatment models, conceptual 
frameworks, understanding and perception o f  their treatment effectiveness, failures 
and partial failures in their work with self-injuring clients. Discourse analysis 
facilitated this type o f exploration.
Philosophical stance towards the inquiry. My theoretical perspective in 
relation to this research study was drawn from hermeneutics. Josselson (2004) argued 
that hermeneutics is “ ...a  disciplined form o f moving from text to meaning” (p. 3) and
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in analysing texts, “ ...the researchers’ task is hermeneutic and reconstructive 
(Fischer-Rosenthal, 2000) in offering a telling at some different level of discourse” 
(2004, p. 3). Adopting Ricoeur’s hermeneutic interpretive stance, I conceived the 
process of interpreting the participants’ texts in two different ways; by juxtaposing 
m yself within both “the hermeneutics of faith” (Ricoeur, as cited in Josselson, 2004, 
p. 1) and “the hermeneutics o f suspicion” (Ricoeur, as cited Josselson, 2004, p. 1), or 
as Josselson (2004) referred to it as “a hermeneutics o f restoration” (p. 4) and “a 
hermeneutics o f demystification” (p. 5) respectively.
Josselson (2004) noted that a hermeneutics o f faith “ .. .aims to restore 
meaning to a tex t...” (p. 1), and she described the contrasting hermeneutics of 
suspicion as “ .. .attempts to decode meanings that are disguised” (p. 1). Applying this 
theoretical perspective to interview texts, Josselson (2004) proposed that:
“From the point o f view o f a hermeneutics o f faith, the interpretive effort is to 
examine the various messages inherent in an interview text, giving ‘voice’ in 
various ways to the participants), while the researcher working from the 
vantage point o f the hermeneutics o f  suspicion problematizes the participants’ 
narrative and ‘decodes’ meaning beyond the text” (p. 1).
Thus, Josselson (2004) proposed that, “ ...the hermeneutics animated by 
fa ith ...” (p. 4) is “ ...a  hermeneutics of restoration, since the stance o f the interpreter is 
one o f trying to unearth and highlight meanings that are present in the 
informant/participant’s communications” (p. 4). She also referred to the hermeneutics 
animated by the effort to decode as “the hermeneutics o f demystification” (Josselson, 
2004, p. 5) because “ ...the word ‘suspicion’ carries pejorative connotations and
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‘doubt’ seems unduly disrespectful to the participant” (Josselson, 2004, pp. 4-5). For 
these reasons I decided to use Josselson’s (2004) terms.
Positioning myself within an interpretive hermeneutics o f restoration, I was 
aiming to distil, elucidate, and illuminate the intended meanings o f the participants, 
while also trying to remain faithful to their original text or narrative. While I cannot 
assume I understood, or grasped their intended “meaning”— I quote extensively, 
offering long excerpts so that readers can hear nuanced meanings and draw 
conclusions about my discourse and interpretations. Shifting my stance to the 
hermeneutics o f demystification, I was seeking to unfold an additional interpretation 
of the texts, the hidden or unconscious meaning, or as A. G. Rogers et al. (1999) 
referred to as the “contradictions”, “revisions” and “negations”, that participants 
engage in but are unaware of in their narratives. Specifically, I was focusing on a 
meta-level o f interpretation, and not solely on the content o f what the clinicians were 
saying to me, and in this sense I went beyond the content o f the clinician’s 
communications.
My orientation to this research study located me primarily within the 
discursive epistemological tradition of social constructionism. The perspective, that 
knowledge is socially constructed by human beings as they socially interact with each 
other, and their world, is a central theme in the social constructionism paradigm. 
Hoffman (2005) argued that, “ ...the social construction theorists see ideas, concepts 
and memories arising from social interchange and mediated through language” (p. 8). 
Crotty (2003) contended that, “All reality, as meaningful reality, is socially 
constructed” (p. 54). Thus, underlying this theoretical perspective is the notion that 
meaning is constructed, and not created, or discovered (Crotty, 2003). Adopting this
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perspective as the researcher, I wanted to identify the various ways, that the research 
participants constructed their social reality in relation to self-injury in their discourses.
Social constructionism is a school o f  thought that also holds the view . .that 
there are ‘knowledges’ rather than ‘knowledge’” (Willig, 2001, p. 7) and that “ ...no 
absolute truth is deemed to exist but, only socially constructed realities...” (Turnbull, 
2002, p. 318). Therefore, in keeping with this perspective, in my analysis o f  the 
participants’ discourses I am acknowledging that there is no one ‘true’ interpretation. 
Indeed, multiple interpretations of their texts are possible but it is not practical to 
explore all o f these in this study. However, I have endeavoured to cover as many 
interpretations as realistically possible, within the constraints o f  this doctoral research 
study.
Philosophical approaches to analysis. My analysis o f  the clinicians’ 
discourses was a combination o f insights from the two major versions o f discourse 
analysis, Foucauldian Discourse Analysis and Discursive Psychology. Indeed, Willig
(2001) highlighted the argument that some researchers such as Potter and Wetherell
(1995) and Wetherell (1998) has proposed that both o f these methods “ ...are 
complementary that any analysis o f discourse should involve insights from both ...”
(p. 87).
The concept o f subject positions is the only feature from Foucauldian 
Discourse Analysis that I used in my analysis o f the clinicians’ texts. Wetherell, 
Taylor and Yates (2006) argued that, “language positions people” (p. 23) and that, 
“discourse creates subject positions” (p. 23). They proposed that when we speak, we 
speak from a position. Willig (2001) noted that subject positions “ .. .offer discursive 
locations from which to speak and ac t...” (p. 111). Thus, one can speak from a
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particular position or place others in specific positions. Wetherell, Taylor, and Yates 
(2006) explained that in taking up a particular subject position in a discourse we are 
drawing on “ ...culturally recognized patterns o f talk such as the ‘autonomous 
woman’, the ‘mad woman’, ‘the fragile victim’ and so o n ...” (pp. 23-24). Therefore, 
they are suggesting that subject positions, “provide us with a way o f making sense of 
ourselves, our motives, experiences and reactions” (Wetherell et al., 2006, p. 24). 
Davis and Harre (1999, as cited in Willig, 2001) explained this concept:
Once having taken up a particular position as one’s own, a person inevitably 
sees the world from the vantage point o f that position and in terms o f the 
particular images, metaphors, storylines and concepts which are made relevant 
within the particular discursive practice in which they are positioned, (p. 111)
Discursive Psychology conceptualizes psychological phenomena such as 
memory, attribution and identity “ .. .as discursive actions [sic] rather than as cognitive 
processes” (Willig, 2001, p. 91). This version o f discourse analysis is concerned with 
the discursive practices that participants engage in “ ...w ithin particular contexts to 
achieve social and interpersonal objectives” (Willig, 2001, p. 91). Thus, discursive 
psychology understands psychological activities such as justification, rationalization, 
categorization, attribution, naming and blaming as ways, in which participants 
manage their interests in particular social contexts (Willig, 2001).
In Discursive Psychology, the focus o f the analysis is on “ ...the action 
orientation [sic] o f talk” (Willig, 2001, p. 91). Thus, in analysing the texts, I 
identified the ways in which the participants “ .. .manage issues of stake and interest” 
(Willig, 2001, p. 92), the discursive strategies they engaged in, and what functions 
these strategies performed in particular discursive contexts (Willig, 2001).
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Data. The data for analysis in this research study consisted of the researcher’s 
notes documenting the initial contacts and the negotiation of the research relationships 
with each interviewee, a biographical data sheet on each participant, individual 
participant’s responses to interview questions (transcripts o f interviews), and the 
researcher’s field notes o f each individual interview. 1 employed the services o f a 
professional transcriber to produce transcripts o f verbatim accounts o f the audio 
recordings of each interview. A confidentiality contract was agreed with the 
transcriber prior to the commencement o f the transcription process. The research 
participants were also aware o f this contract and agreed to this method o f 
transcription, as contained in the participant consent form (see Appendix D).
Ethical Considerations
St. Patrick’s College Research Ethics Committee approved this research study 
prior to any data collection. During every phase o f this study, I adhered to the Code 
o f Professional Ethics of the Psychological Society o f Ireland, and the Code o f Best 
Practice in Research Ethics o f St. Patrick’s College. With these codes in mind, I 
endeavoured to protect participants’ rights to privacy and confidentiality. Thus, as in 
the case o f  the pilot study, each participant was assigned a pseudonym in order to 
protect his or her identity. Therefore, participants’ real names and any identifying 
information were not used in any documents related to this research study. In 
addition, 1 asked participants to complete the informed consent forms and sought 
permission to audio record the interviews. Participants’ rights to withdraw from the 
study were respected.
Prior to asking the main interview questions, 1 reminded participants to use a 
first name initial or a pseudonym, if  they were going to answer the questions with a
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particular patient in mind. This was an additional strategy that aimed at protecting the 
anonymity, privacy, and confidentiality o f participants’ clients. However, in the event 
that some o f the data recorded from interviews with participants contained sensitive 
clinical information, some o f which might have been too revealing for participants 
and their patients, I adopted the following steps. Firstly, I read all o f the transcripts to 
identify clinically sensitive areas that appeared too revealing. None emerged, and 
therefore I did not have to contact participants to request them to review their 
transcripts in order to disguise client information, without losing the essence o f the 
initial data, so that patients could not be identified. This process was crucial to 
protect the anonymity, privacy and confidentiality o f clients and participants.
Another ethical consideration related to data retention and disposal. The time 
frame for the period o f data retention is three to five years, or six months after the 
final submission date of my dissertation, whichever is the shorter period o f time. At 
the designated appropriate time the data will be disposed o f by two methods. The 
transcripts, biographical data sheets, informed consent forms and the field notes will 
be destroyed by means of confidential shredding by me, the researcher. I will also 
erase the audio files o f the interviews.
While acknowledging that self-injury is a topic that can evoke strong 
emotional responses, and that some clinicians experience difficulty with regard to 
treatment, it was envisaged that there would be minimal risk o f  psychological harm to 
the clinicians participating in this research study, primarily because the participants 
were all clinicians who had volunteered to participate in this study, and were invited 
to speak about their professional work. In addition, most clinicians in keeping with 
good practice guidelines, tend to have good professional support systems. Finally,
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mental health clinicians who are invited to be interviewed as part o f a research study, 
are usually not considered a vulnerable group, and therefore, they can make informed 
decisions about whether or not to involve themselves in a research study.
Josselson (2004) highlighted some ethical problems for the researcher who 
adopts a hermeneutics of restoration. She argued that:
The ethical dilemmas in this approach involve being faithful to the meanings 
o f the interviewee. The implied contract in the interview situation is that the 
interviewer is interested in learning about and in some way presenting the 
lived experience o f the participant. The participant is the author o f and 
authority on his or her own experience. Participants who read the published 
report will therefore be expecting to fmd their own meanings rendered, if not 
mirrored. (Josselson, 2004, p. 12)
Therefore, I have endeavoured to honour the participating clinicians’ time, 
expertise and their intended meanings in the long excerpts from their interview 
transcripts that I have included in the findings chapters.
Issues o f  confidentiality is another ethical dilemma raised by Josselson (2004). 
She contended that this becomes a critical issue “ ...since personal detail revealed in 
the interview situation can have harmful effects on a person’s life if they were to be 
recognized...(Lieblich, 1996; Stacey, 1988)” (Josselson, 2004, p. 12). With this 
caution in mind, I have changed the clinicians’ biographical details slightly, and I 
have removed some identifying information from their discourses. However, 
Josselson (2004) also acknowledged that, “Adequate concealment o f identity protects 
confidentiality, but does not prevent narcissistic injury (Josselson, 1996)” (p. 20).
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Applying a hermeneutics of demystification, Josselson (2004) noted that, “In 
going beyond the intended narrative of the participant, many researchers feel 
uncomfortable with the authority they must take to re-author the meanings o f the 
person who shared their stories with them” (pp. 15-16). Indeed, some participants 
may react with dismay, surprise and distress at my interpretation, decoding and 
reconstruction o f their narratives. In anticipation o f these responses, I will give each 
participant an executive summary o f my research study, and to those who requested it, 
a full copy o f my dissertation. I will follow-up with a telephone call to each 
participant and confer with them before publication o f my research study.
Biographical Information
In this section, I present the “external” characteristics of each participant. This 
information was acquired via the Biographical Information Data Sheet (see Appendix 
E), that participants completed at the beginning o f the interview. A summary table of 
this demographic data is illustrated in Appendix H.
Niamh is a woman, aged between 50-59 years. She is a counselling 
psychologist who has been practising for 17 years. She described her training 
orientation as “developmental psychology”, and her current therapeutic/treatment 
approach as “humanistic, body centred”. She acknowledged that she has worked with 
approximately 50 self-injuring females whose ages range from 13-19, 20-24, 25-29, 
30-34 and 35+. While Niamh’s clinical experience with self-injuring clients appeared 
to be significant, it is confined to one gender. She has worked in a number of 
different settings with self-injuring patients.
Eimear is a clinical psychologist, a woman whose age range is 50-59 years.
She has 15 years clinical experience as a psychologist. Her training orientation was
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in, “DBT”. She described her therapeutic/treatment approach as “CBT, DBT, 
mindfulness based CBT”. Eimear’s clinical experience is confined to females, aged 
35+. She did not indicate how many self-injuring patients she has worked with. She 
has practised in several settings with self-injuring clients, “public community 
psychiatric services”, “private hospital”, and “private practice”.
Mike is a man, aged between 40-49 years. He is a registered psychologist who 
has been practicing for 14 years. His training orientation was in “systemic family 
therapy” and “narrative therapy”. He described his therapeutic/treatment approach as 
“systemic/social constructionist, narrative therapy”. He informed me that he has 
worked with “greater than 20” male and female self-injuring patients whose ages 
range from 13-19, 20-24, 25-29. He did not give specific numbers for either gender. 
He has worked with self-injuring clients in a “training organisation, non government 
organisation community”, as well as in private practice.
Jack is a psychoanalyst, a man whose age range is 50-59 years. He described 
his training orientation as “Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalysis”. He has been 
practising for 16 years. He describes his therapeutic/treatment approach as 
“psychoanalytic”. He has worked in private practice with 11 self-injuring patients; 2 
males and 9 females in the age range 20-24.
Mark is a man aged between 40-49 years. He is a psychotherapist who has 
been practising for 10 years. He originally qualified as a medical doctor. He 
described his training orientation as “psychiatry— 2 years adult psychiatry, 
psychotherapy—  body centred psychotherapy”. He identified his 
therapeutic/treatment approach as being “body centred, integrative & humanistic, 
primarily concerned with relationship between trauma & somatic symptoms” . He has
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worked in two settings with self-injuring clients, “private practice” and “inpatient 
setting of psychiatric hospitals”. Based on the information acquired in Mark’s 
interview, it seems that his experience as a psychotherapist is confined to private 
practice, and that his reference to an inpatient setting related to his experience as a 
medical student/doctor. O f all o f the participants Mark appeared to have the least 
amount o f clinical exposure to self-injuring clients. He has only worked with 5 self- 
injuring patients; 3 males and 2 females, aged 20-24.
David is a consultant psychiatrist, a man whose age range is 40-49 years. He 
was very specific about his clinical experience, revealing that he has been practising 
for “ 11 years as a consultant”. Therefore, it is unclear how long he was practising 
prior to receiving consultancy status. He described his training orientation as “broad 
based— pharmacological, psychodynamic” and his therapeutic/treatment approach as 
“tailored to individual client”. He had a lot o f clinical experience with self-injuring 
patients, having worked with 70, o f whom 20 were male and 50 female. Interestingly, 
his exposure to these types o f patients is confined to two age ranges, 13-19, and 20­
24, which is surprising for a psychiatrist, considering that the ages most cited in the 
literature for this behaviour are 12 to 35 years (Favazza & Conterio, 1988). David has 
worked in various settings with self-injuring clients, “outpatient— hospital based 
(public & private services), private practice, hospital inpatients”.
Sinead is a woman, aged between 40-49 years. She is a psychotherapist who 
has been practising for 18 years, and she originally trained as a social worker. She 
specified her training orientation as “constructivist & systemic” and her 
therapeutic/treatment approach as “primarily systemic constructivist— interest in 
language, meaning & metaphor & social context— systems, also use mindfulness”.
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She has worked with young adults in a counselling service, included 22 self-injuring 
patients, 2 males and 20 females, aged 20-24 and 25-29.
Ciara is a consultant psychiatrist, a woman whose age range is 30-39 years.
She was the youngest o f all of the participants. She has been practicing for 11 years.
It is not clear if she has been practising for that period as a consultant as she did not 
specify this as David did. She described her training orientation as “biological 
psychosocial focus, multidisciplinary care approach” . She identified her 
therapeutic/treatment approach as “outpatient bio psychosocial MDT liase with 
psychotherapy, occupational, social work” . Ciara emerged as the clinician who 
seemed to have had the most exposure to self-injuring clients, having worked with 70 
males and more than 100 females, of the age ranges 13-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35+. 
Her experience of high numbers o f self-injuring patients may be as a result of her 
broad definition of self-injury, and perhaps her exposure to such patients as a medical 
student/doctor. She stated that she has worked with self-injuring clients in “outpatient 
day care, inpatient care, A&E setting”.
Overview of Findings Chapters
In the following Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven, I mark out and discuss 
the clinicians’ discourse patterns that emerged in their narratives, in response to my 
research questions. In Chapter Four, I explore the clinicians’ discourse patterns in 
relation to the research questions, “What conceptual frameworks do clinicians draw 
on to understand self-injury, and their current treatment practice with self-injuring 
patients?” and “What sources of knowledge including both personal experience and 
professional training, have influenced/shaped the development o f clinicians’ 
explanation(s) or working model(s) o f treating self-injuring clients?” My examination
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in Chapter Five centres around a pattern that emerged across the clinicians’ narratives, 
in which they tended to create discourse communities of “an other” to formulate their 
beliefs about self-injury and its treatment, rather than articulating particular theoretical 
or conceptual models. In Chapter Six, I consider the research question that pertains to 
the explanations or models that the clinicians drew on to understand their current 
treatment practice effectiveness and failures with self-injuring clients. I conclude 
with a deliberation in Chapter Seven, on the clinicians’ discourses that pertain to the 
ways in which they gauge or measure, their clinical effectiveness in their current 
treatment practice with self-injuring patients.
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Chapter Four 
Findings: Merging Discourses
The findings o f this research study are presented in the following four 
chapters. Throughout these findings chapters, I display extracts from the clinicians’ 
transcripts. Each o f these extracts contain symbols that I have taken from Jefferson’s 
(1984) transcription notation system (see Appendix G), which is the mode o f markers 
generally used in discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, as cited in Wetherell 
et al., 2003). Table 2 highlights the specific transcription symbols that I have 
employed in the extracts and a brief explanation on how to read them. For a more 
detailed account o f these markers consult Appendix G.
Table 2 Abbreviated Version o f  Jefferson’s Transcription Notation System
Symbol Meaning o f Symbol
(.5) A time gap in tenths o f a second
.hh Speaker in-breath
Hh Speaker out-breath
C O ) A non-verbal activity
C ) An unclear fragment
Under Speaker emphasis
[ ] The onset and end of a spate of overlapping talk
In this fourth chapter, my discussion of these findings centres around the 
following research questions, “What conceptual frameworks do clinicians draw on to 
understand self-injury and their current treatment practice with self-injuring patients?” 
and “What sources o f knowledge including both personal experience and professional 
training have influenced/shaped the development o f clinicians’ explanation(s) or 
working model(s) o f treating self-injuring clients?”
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As the descriptions of the participants revealed in the previous Chapter Three, 
all eight clinicians represented a range of therapeutic/treatment approaches/models 
and disciplinary backgrounds. These included dialectical behaviour, narrative, 
constructivist, humanistic/body centred, Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalysis, a mixture 
o f pharmacological, psychodynamic/cognitive behaviour/dialectical behaviour and a 
combination o f pharmacological, cognitive behaviour and dialectical behaviour 
therapeutic modalities. In addition, these clinicians come from a variety o f mental 
health professions including psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis and 
psychotherapy. This initial revelation is not surprising considering this was a feature 
o f the selection process as the aim was to choose eight participants who use different 
therapeutic/treatment approaches with self-injuring patients and who represent a range 
of clinical disciplines. This range is also consistent with the method o f selecting 
participants via purposive sampling, which was employed in this study.
For the majority o f the clinicians, no distinct models for considering self­
injury and approaches for working with self-injuring clients emerge, despite the range 
of therapeutic/treatment approaches/models across the group o f clinicians. There are 
two exceptions to this pattern, namely Eimear and Mark. The other clinicians’ 
(Niamh, Jack, Sinead, Mike, Ciara and David’s) models and techniques in relation to 
self-injury do not appear to be distinct from their primary training model/orientation 
to treatment. In fact, their discourses seem to merge primary training with treatment 
of self-injury. Sinead’s discourse illustrates this point, as she speaks about 
conceptualising self-injury. She states, “I would understand it in the context that I 
would understand a lot o f symptoms” (lines 69-70, part 2) and proceeds to locate it in 
terms o f her constructivist “psychotherapy training” (lines 83-84, part 2). Thus, she 
acknowledges that she does not have a separate model or framework for
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understanding self-injury from other symptoms that her patients bring to counselling. 
This appears to be the case for the majority of the clinicians.
This merging of clinicians’ conceptual orientations to treatment and their 
understanding o f self-injury seems to be driven for some by their theoretical training 
or a belief system, and for others by their practical training. Jack, Mike and Sinead’s 
discourses suggest that their treatment approach, and their conceptualisation o f self­
injury are significantly influenced by the particular theoretical modality in which they 
were trained in. Niamh is the only clinician whose merging o f her conceptual 
orientation to treatment, and whose construction o f self-injury is influenced by her 
strong beliefs. In contrast, David’s and Ciara’s merging patterns are driven by their 
clinical training. I will now discuss three clinicians’ discourses, using Jack, Niamh 
and David as exemplars o f each style of how this merging occurs.
Discourses o f Merging Theoretical Training
Jack is a psychoanalyst and constructs him self as a clinician who is “not 
particularly conscious” (line 609) of theories in his practice. He explains:
I mean 11 tend not to I if they’re there they’re there just because they’re there 
you know but I ’m not particularly conscious o f them urn but this the the 
difficulty then I mean it’s it’s I um 11 sometimes wish I could elaborate the 
work in terms o f the theory uh in a in a more um uh I know contained or a 
more deliverable way and and 111 find that the whole thing gets mixed up 
together so much in my mind the the the the practice and the theory are so 
kind o f  interlinked that I find it difficult to separate it (lines 863-873) Um what 
what’s a theory from what’s what’s something else (lines 875-876)
96
Thus, even in his own words he acknowledges the merging o f his theoretical 
training and his practice orientation.
His narrative reads as if  one has picked up his specific theoretical training 
orientation framework and literally mapped it directly onto his model for 
understanding self-injury and his treatment practice. Jack reveals that he uses a 
psychoanalytic framework in his treatment approach especially “a bit o f classical 
Freudian theory” (line 599) and “a large part o f Lacanian” (lines 600-601). Indeed, he 
captures this discursive merging feature perfectly when he speaks about self-injury 
and tells me, “I ’m making sense o f it in with uh through the lens of uh kind of 
psychoanalytic theory” (lines 756-758). This is exactly what he does. Jack locates 
his understanding o f self-injury within a Lacanian discourse that centres around “the 
failure o f language” (line 850). He elaborates:
the idea o f uh self-harm as a uh an inscription on the body uh that that 
expresses that says something it’s it’s a particular kind o f writing on one the 
one on the one side but also it’s a cut that cuts through the the internal kind o f 
anxiety and the the sense of pressure that a person experiences so one would 
might might say that there’s a kind o f a a uh a it’s it’s almost an attempt to to 
enforce a a kind o f a cut that has failed to work at some level in language 
(lines 783-793)
He continues with this discourse and introduces the idea o f cutting as a form 
o f diary writing on the body, a concept that was originally coined by A. G. Rogers
(1996). Jack does not refer to A. G. Rogers’ discourse on this subject matter, as he 
makes no reference to it. He explains his concept as:
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in a kind of a way it’s a uh it’s both it’s kind of uh both addressed to them I 
mean and it’s kind of turning it back on themselves I mean so that they’re 
they’re uh at least at some point they’re speaking to themselves um that 
they’re they they they’re they cut uh because it’s not shown it’s it’s covered up 
it’s hidden away it’s something secret so they it’s almost like a diary of 
whatever it is that that troubles them that can’t be put into words uh and you 
know in the same way as a diary is is kind of written down and it might be 
found it might be uncovered but it’s at at the same time hidden away and 
secret (lines 292-303) The cut is is is is written on the body you know and uh 
and covered up (lines 305-306) Uh hidden away and and kept as a kind of a uh 
you know a a kind of a talisman as a uh something that can be can be seen 
again and can be marked out again uh you know another line can be written 
(lines 308-311)
Another central feature of his framework is the question o f who is being 
addressed through the self-injury and who will understand. Jack returns to this 
metaphor o f the diary to elaborate on this idea. He informs me that the cut can be:
covered up again until eventually it’s discovered and in the same way as the 
diary is discovered by being left you know in the wrong place you know and 
uh the the the the cut is discovered by by chance as the sleeve falls back or 
something like that so then it’s addressed to another so uh you’ll have to think 
then in uh in the end the intention is that somebody will see somebody will 
will and and will understand (lines 313-321)
This application of a Lacanian discourse appears to be a dominant framework 
on which he draws to understand self-injury and his analytical practice with self-
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injuring patients. This Lacanian framework is repeated throughout Jack’s narrative in 
the form o f “something impossible to speak” (lines 270-271) “then uh a a cut at least 
expresses that impossibility” (lines 273-274) “addressed to another” (line 318) and 
“the intention is that somebody will see somebody will understand” (lines 319-321).
Jack explains his approach as follows:
You know 1 don’t I don't as I uh said earlier that I don’t obviously go in with 
an idea o f a particular approach that I’m going to have because this person 
self-harms (lines 2129-2132) 11 want to hear about what they have to say (line 
2134) it has to be it has to be through practice working with with individuals 
who speak in this way about uh their experiences and and we we attempt or at 
least I attempt in in that process to make some kind of sense of it uh from the 
facts (lines 762-766) You know from what’s being said you know (line 768) 
Or what the person is is is is uh describing (lines 770-771)
Thus, he acknowledges that his treatment approach for working with clients 
who self-injure is not distinctive, separate or different from his theoretical training in 
psychoanalysis.
He argues that the main focus of the analysis with a self-injuring patient is the 
shift from “cutting to speaking” (line 845). He claims that this “is the real the kind of 
the crux of the matter” (lines 845-846). This way o f working appears to relate to 
Lacanian ideas about “the failure o f language” (line 850) and the unconscious that is a 
recurring theme in Jack’s discourse. The following is an example o f this discourse 
where he speaks about cutting as an inscription on the body that cannot be spoken:
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in the end there has to be something spoken that couldn’t be spoken not in the 
sense that it was there to be said and the person found it impossible to say it 
but that it’s unconscious or the person does not simply have access to the thing 
that mustn’t be spoken about except through cutting so then it is kind o f the 
only inscription that’s possible is on the body and because some element of 
what must be spoken has been shut off in some way that’s not immediately it’s 
not immediately or not accessible to the person (lines 858-867)
This is a very good example o f where Jack’s psychoanalytic discursive 
practice with self-injuring clients merges with his theoretical training orientation. 
Therefore, how he conceptualises self-injury is not distinctive from his original 
theoretical training in Lacanian and Freudian analysis.
What is striking about Jack’s narrative is the absence o f outside discourses 
beyond his analytic training for treating and conceptualising self-injury. Even within 
his analytic discourse, he does not refer to specific psychoanalytic texts that address 
the conceptualisation and treatment of self-injury. Thus, he completely relies on his 
theoretical training to guide him in his understanding and analytic practice with self- 
injuring clients.
Merging discourses of belief system, Niamh holds definite beliefs about 
self-injury and how to work therapeutically with patients. These beliefs seem to 
influence and merge with her treatment practice as she admits, “I just take in from 
other models what actually contributes to or fits with my belief and interest and love 
o f people” (lines 1540-1542) “And I discard everything else from various models 
((laughing))” (lines 1554-1555). Indeed, her strong beliefs surface in her discursive 
responses to the language o f some of my questions. There are instances in her
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narrative when her discourse suggests a sense of dismay at reading and misreading my 
language. For instance, in Extract 1, Niamh supposes that her response to my 
question about “what models models or theoretical frameworks?” (lines 449-450) she 
uses with self-injuring clients is not what I am looking for in my dialogue with her. 
She assumes that I am seeking particular responses from her and she arrives at the 
conclusion, “I knew this wouldn’t I knew ((laughing)) this would not be useful to you 
in that mmm okay” (lines 460-461).
Extract 1 
Lines 449-462 I: Well what models models or theoretical frameworks
C: I mean that would link into a million different
theoretical frameworks really 
I: [Mm-hmm]
C: [You know and]
I: I think it’s I’m curious whether you use any o f them or
a combination 
C: Not consciously
I: Okay
C: (.2) I knew this wouldn’t I knew ((laughing)) this would
not be useful to you in that (.2) mmm okay 
I: Okay so em
There is also a pattern in her speech where she appears to be making a protest 
against my use o f certain terms of phrase. For example, when I ask her, “can you tell 
me how you work with clients who self-injure?” (lines 517-518) she seems to oppose 
my language in her reply as she informs me, “That’s very hard to say” (line 520) 
“because you’re not working with a client that self-injures you’re working with a 
person” (lines 522-523). In addition, Niamh uses her discourse to object to the way 
self-injuring patients are treated in psychiatric settings. She argues, “they see self-
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harming clients in psychiatric terms as looking attention seeking and they have very 
very negative you know attitudes to self-harm in psychiatric settings I have found 
anyway” (lines 1013-1017).
Niamh is a counselling psychologist, and constructs herself as a clinician who 
“works in a very intuitive way” (line 256) with self-injuring clients. She explains, “so 
I don’t tend to even put words for myself as I’m working” (lines 256-258). She 
acknowledges that she has received training in different conceptual frameworks but 
does not consciously use them or hold them in her mind as she works with her clients 
because this is not compatible with her “personal philosophy” . She argues, “I don’t 
tend to” (line 429) “think o f people in terms o f frameworks really although 1 have 
trained in you know various different” (lines 431-433) “therapeutic models” (line 
435). She elaborates on these points as she articulates:
I suppose I believe that in training we actually absorb into well for me it’s not 
really always consciously held and cognitively held at the front o f  my mind 
but we absorb into ourselves what fits matches our personal philosophy my 
personal philosophy (lines 464-469) and that yes I’m engaging with someone 
out o f that place but not in terms o f d ’you know (lines 471-472) cognitive 
constructs (line 474)
Thus, Niamh admits that she has been exposed to treatment modalities in her 
training as a psychologist. However, she contends that she does not operate from this 
position o f conscious knowledge in her work with self-injuring patients. Indeed, she 
questions whether any clinician consciously uses frameworks in their practice as she 
states, “ I don’t know does any therapist really have” (lines 1440-1441) “when you’re 
working with somebody all these intellectual constructs going on” (lines 1442-1443).
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She reconsiders her position on this matter, questioning, “well maybe they do” (line 
1441). She humorously follows this latter remark with “It must be very busy in there 
you know ((laughing)) it must be ((laughing))” (lines 1443-1444). She concludes, 
admitting, “1 couldn’t do this anyway ((laughing))” (line 1447).
She constructs her understanding o f self-injury as a “desperate act” (line 267) 
and sees it as “an indicator o f how often a person is in that state o f you know 
desperation to some extent” (lines 238-240) that is “an emotional physical and 
spiritual pain” (lines 301-302). Niamh views self-injury as “ immensely creative”
(line 375) and as serving multiple functions such as “it can transform emotional pain 
into physical pain that’s bearable it can bring a person out o f a deep state of 
dissociation” (lines 378-381) “It can punish” (line 384). Because o f this she claims, 
“it’s a very complex” (line 398) “response” (line 400). She creates a link between 
self-injury, trauma and dissociation. She makes the point that, “all children have 
access to trance-like states and developmentally some children grow out o f them 
except that children who need” (lines 1178-1181) “to keep them as as a coping” (line 
1183). She argues that, “trance-like states” (line 1175) “are evidence o f something at 
an early stage” (lines 1175-1176) “it’s evidence o f early distress o f early you know 
traumatic either developmental or you know” (lines 1185-1186) “trauma” (line 1189). 
Niamh proposes that self-injury occurs when a person is “at such an edge where they 
feel a degree o f emotional pain which can be emotional disconnectedness” (lines 261­
263). Elaborating on this belief, she tells me, “I think it can only happen when a 
person is in a at a certain level o f dissociation” (lines 308-310). Therefore, she views 
clients who “splits o ff’ (line 665) “are not really in contact with themselves” (lines 
624-625). She believes that when this happens the patient is in contact with their “old 
pain” (line 628).
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In the Biographical Information Data Sheet, Niamh describes her current 
therapeutic/treatment approach as “humanistic body centred”. Her discourse suggests 
that she draws on humanistic and sensory motor psychotherapeutic frameworks in her 
work. She acknowledges that she follows a humanistic approach that may not be the 
current trend in therapeutic circles as she proposes, “humanistic might be now very eh 
very eh untrendy or it mightn’t be the latest but I do believe in people’s capacity to 
heal from anything virtually” (lines 1377-1380). Once again, she refers to the link 
between her particular treatment orientation and her specific beliefs.
Niam h’s discourse also suggests a relational oriented treatment approach. She 
constructs her role as follows, “And I’m there to be an agent for change in some way 
to offer other ways and the relationship is the main way I suppose” (lines 645-647).
In addition, she argues that the therapeutic “relationship” (line 1741) “contributes” 
(line 1741) to treatment success. Thus, she holds the view that the therapeutic 
relationship is an important and significant influencing factor on the outcome of 
treatment. This is another example of where her convictions merge with her 
therapeutic practice.
Her references to a sensorimotor approach include the use o f “the modulation 
model” (line 1398), her belief “that awareness o f the body is the primary way that we 
stay out o f dissociation” (lines 954-955) and her use o f such interventions as 
“grounding staying in awareness mindfulness and noticing” (lines 650-651). In fact, 
Niamh is very clear about applying this model o f therapy as she informs me, “when 
people split and are not really in contact with themselves and I’ll go the sensorimotor 
route in the present moment” (lines 624-627). She presents her therapeutic model as 
working in a way that facilitates clients to increase their body awareness, to stay in
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connection with their bodies in the present moment, to help them become aware of 
and tolerate what is underlying the symptom o f self-injury and to develop self-care, 
and self-soothing capacities as an alternative to self-injury. She argues that self- 
injuring patients may not know:
what the underlying pain is (lines 694-695) And I suppose it is my job to in 
some way help somebody to get to a level where they can begin to know have 
awareness of and tolerate what’s underlying that symptom (lines 695-698)
Thus, Niam h’s strong beliefs and views seem to be the driving force behind 
her understanding and treatment o f self-injury.
M erging discourses of clinical practice and self-injury trea tm ent. David is 
a consultant psychiatrist, and constructs self-injury as “a coping strategy” (line 235, 
part 1). So in treating it, he proposes:
one tries to get to a point (line 1145, part 2) where the need for it recedes (line 
1146, part 2) other than simply leaving a person without recourse to a strategy 
that imperfect and damaging and all as it is nonetheless helps them get through 
(lines 1146-1149, part 2)
He describes his treatment practice as including both pharmacological and 
psychotherapeutic approaches. He confesses, “I wouldn’t be ideological driven with” 
(lines 1469-1470, part 3) “a lot o f what I do” (line 1470, part 3). He constructs his 
approach as “somewhat eclectic” (line 15, part 3) and specific to the individual needs 
o f his clients and their clinical presentations. There is a pervasive pattern in his 
narrative; he conceptualises everything through the lens o f  his clinical experience.
His discourse suggests that the merging o f his conceptual orientations to treatment
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and his understanding of self-injury is influenced by his clinical training and his 
practice.
He engages in a contingent or “it depends” (line 46, part 2) discourse in which 
he repeatedly introduces clinical case examples to illustrate his treatment approach. 
Indeed, when I ask David, “can you tell me about your work with patients who self- 
injure your kind o f therapeutic treatment approach and theoretical frameworks you 
might use” (lines 43-45, part 2), he is unable to separate his theoretical framework 
from his practice. He replies:
Well, it depends again on the individual client um frequently again with the 
young adults like individual psychotherapy sessions if there are uh biological 
components uh because commonly there may be coexisting uh depressive 
illness uh or other other disorder um if  there is a say an illness phenomenon 
um one will treat that (lines 46-52, part 2) uh as well uh obviously (lines 54, 
part 2) And the treatment will depend pharmacological the psychotherapeutic 
it it it will just vary psychotherapeutic interventions um a pretty broad church 
depending on the individual case um a lot o f support in psychotherapy um 
cognitive work I suppose one picks and mixes really (lines 56-61, part 2) Uh 
aspects o f DBT (line 63, part 2)
He explains, “So it depends it’s it’s quite broad” (lines 80, part 2). It is 
difficult to make generalisations about David’s specific treatment approach beyond 
saying that it is a mixture of pharmacological, psychodynamic, cognitive behaviour 
and dialectical behaviour modalities.
Extract 2 is a continuation of David’s response to my question about
frameworks and practice orientation. It is a good example o f where his clinical
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practice discourse about his clients continues to merge with his conceptual 
frameworks, thus making it difficult to separate them, so much so that they seem 
fused together with no demarcation line.
Extract 2
Lines 80-126, part 2 C
I:
C
I :
C
I:
C
I:
C:
C:
I:
O f clients that I have at the moment um (3) what 
worked very well was a combination of uh supportive 
(2) psychotherapy (3) understanding what was going on 
Mm-hmm
.hh And forming an alliance with the client um (1) and 
for the person themselves to develop an understanding 
of their own difficulties and their responses .hh and also 
very frequently there’s uh a mislabelling o f affect that 
goes on uh that the individual may not be actually they 
may think that their experience and ( ) where they may 
label [it]
[Mm-hmm]
As one thing but when you explore it it may in fact not 
be that could be a reflection o f uh family dynamics 
when they were [growing up]
[M m-hmm]
.hh Uh and very mixed messages so if  one simply 
assumes that what you’re being told by the person in 
terms of how they’re feeling if you simply assume that 
you’re talking the same language you can go completely 
off on the wrong track altogether 
Mm-hmm
.hh Uh but oftentimes calm explanation uh consistency 
um (2) in terms o f de-escalation of uh reactions .hh um 
.hh And (2) I oftentimes just reviewing what has 
happened why particular crises have come about (.hh) 
I’d lean heavily on uh social [work]
[Mm-hmm]
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C: Um intervention as well commonly like in the hospital
settings I have the luxury o f doing joint work that um 
I’d meet with the individual on my own but I’d also 
meet them with the social worker .hh who’d also meet 
the individual on their own and um w e’d do the same 
with the family .hh and then obviously have meetings 
with the family and the uh particular client .hh so that 
that tends to work quite well 
I: Mm-hmm
C: I had a a a young woman there um she’s doing rather
well um which is gratifying 
C: I know it’s a long haul and there are going to be bumps
but um (2) it was quite interesting because she had a 
three-year history of o f uh self-cutting
David describes his treatment approach as “somewhat eclectic” (line 15, part 
3). He explains, “it would be somewhere in between” (line 16, part 3) in terms of 
structured and directive. He elaborates:
it would be structured (line 17, part 3) because I think when (line 17, part 3) 
dealing with individuals who have a considerable amount o f uh chaos whether 
it be emotionally or behaviourally one frequently does need to be very 
structured (lines 18-21, part 3)
David argues that structure “provides a degree o f security and also provides uh 
clear boundaries” (lines 24-25, part 3). He acknowledges:
Um obviously there is a degree o f  direction uh in that being a psychiatrist and 
working with a multidisciplinary team and also um I suppose prescribing 
medication hopefully judiciously there is always going to be a degree of
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directiveness in terms o f this is what I think we should do and I think this 
would be helpful etc etc so um there is going to be a component o f direction as 
distinct from purely non-directive exploration as I say maybe in psychotherapy 
(lines 39-48, part 3) So that’s why I say it’s probably somewhere in between 
(lines 50-51, part 3)
Here, David is giving a rationale for his “somewhere in between” structured 
and directive treatment approach with self-injuring clients. He explicitly tells me 
when he would use a more structured approach “dealing with individuals who have 
considerable amount o f uh chaos” (line 18-19, part 3). He also acknowledges that in 
his role as psychiatrist “there is always going to be a degree o f directiveness in terms” 
(lines 42-43, part 3) o f “prescribing medication” (line 42, part 3) and “working with a 
multidisciplinary team” (lines 40-41, part 3). David also distinguishes between his 
treatment approach as a psychiatrist in which “there is a degree o f direction” (line 39, 
part 3) and that o f psychotherapy which he constructs as “purely non-directive 
exploration” (lines 46-47, part 3). Therefore, his construction o f psychotherapy fails 
to acknowledge the variety o f psychotherapy approaches that exist and that include 
both non-directive and directive modalities that usually depend on the theoretical 
orientation.
He explains, “the sessions themselves with the individual would usually relate 
to” (lines 26-27, part 3) “what the individual will bring up” (lines 27-28, part 3) “in 
session” (line 30, part 3). David elaborates:
if some behavioural issue has arisen that requires (lines 30-31, part 3) to be 
addressed immediately because say for example if a person has attempted 
serious self-harm (lines 31-33, part 3) clearly anything that you may have been
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working on (lines 33-34, part 3) a more longer-term agenda (lines 34-35, part 
3) very much gets in the immediate short-term gets supplanted by (lines 35-36, 
part 3) dealing with whatever crisis has arisen (lines 36-37, part 3)
At this point, David is continuing his elaboration o f his “somewhere in 
between” (line 16, part 3) structured and directive treatment approach with self- 
injuring patients. He draws on a clinical example to explain this style o f approach, 
which is a recurring pattern in his discourse. He concedes that the sessions can shift 
from focusing on “what the individual will bring up” (lines 27-28, part 3) to 
immediately addressing “some behavioural issue” (lines 30-31, part 3) that “has 
arisen” (line 31, part 3) “say for example if a person has attempted serious self-harm” 
(lines 32-33, part 3).
David draws on his clinical training in relation to the psychiatric frameworks 
he uses to understand self-injury and its treatment. Speaking of self-injuring 
individuals, David confesses, “I don’t think in terms of them as being disease entities 
or disorder entities” (lines 973-974, part 2). However, he acknowledges that, “Those 
models are very useful in terms of having structure and having resistancy and 
adhering to what is known to be helpful” (lines 975-877, part 2). Thus, he uses 
psychiatric frameworks in terms o f disorder from his clinical training. He situates 
“self-harm” (line 165, part 1) within a discourse of two categorises:
people who’ve either (lines 148-149, part 1) due to personality-related risk- 
taking behaviours or (lines 149-150, part 1) overdoses or (line 150, part 1) 
attempts at self-harm that have gone catastrophically wrong (lines 150-151, 
part 1) who end up with serious physical (line 154, part 1) debility (line 154, 
part 1) a few who perhaps have somatised their distress and (lines 155-156,
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part 1) when you’d finally get to see them that the problems are emotionally 
and psychologically based (lines 161-163, part 1)
David admits, that his models or theoretical frameworks for understanding 
self-injuring patients “depend on the uh diagnostic category” (lines 1367-1368, part 
2). He concedes:
one commonly starts thinking in terms o f of those with with with borderline 
personality when one starts thinking o f  self-injury o f course it’s much much 
broader than that but if one just looks at that group certainly uh Marsha 
Linehan’s work I found very interesting (lines 1368-1373, part 2)
In summation, David’s discourse indicates that the merging o f his conceptual 
orientations to treatment and his understanding o f self-injury is driven by his clinical 
practice. Indeed, this is so much the case that his clinical practice discourse and his 
conceptual frameworks for understanding and treating self-injury fuse together in his 
narrative. He seems to hold the view that the only way to think about self-injury is 
through the details o f  his clinical practice. He appears to come up with concepts 
inductively from his clinical work that unfolded in his dialogue with me as he speaks 
through his clinical cases o f treating self-injuring clients.
Exceptions. Mark and Eimear both have a distinctive model for
understanding and working with self-injury. Thus, in this respect they deviate from
the general pattern o f the other six clinicians (Jack, Niamh, David, Mike, Sinead and
Ciara) who do not appear to have distinct models for considering self-injury and
approaches for working with self-injuring patients. Despite having marked
frameworks for conceptualising and treating self-injury, M ark’s and Eimear’s
discourses show a merging pattern. What is striking is that their style o f merging
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differs from each other. In Mark’s case, he began with a humanistic body-centred 
model o f treatment and invented an innovative way o f mapping it onto self-injury. In 
contrast, Eimear clearly began with a specific treatment model, dialectical behaviour 
therapy; a form o f therapy that was developed to treat individuals with BPD who 
engage in self-injury. Thus, self-injury was already mapped onto this modality of 
treatment. I now discuss how this merging occurs in each of their discourses with 
respect to their understanding and treatment o f self-injury. What is striking about 
Mark’s and N iam h’s discourses is how two clinicians can locate themselves within a 
particular theoretical modality namely humanistic/body-centred but can have 
completely different orientations to practice and divergent constructions of self-injury.
Mark is a psychotherapist who informs me that his “orientation is from the 
humanistic side” (lines 390-391) and “very body-centred” (lines 752-753, part 1). He 
initially began with this humanistic/body centred model o f practice. Once he came in 
contact with self-injuring clients, he began to apply this way o f working with them.
In doing so, he developed his own particular treatment practice for working with this 
patient group and a unique framework for conceptualising self-injury, both o f which 
are absent from the vast clinical literature on self-injury. Thus, Mark invented a 
distinct form o f understanding and treating self-injury that separates him in this regard 
from the other clinicians in this study. However, similar to the other clinicians, 
M ark’s discourse shows a pattern o f merging. In his case, he began with a specific 
treatment practice and mapped it onto self-injury, thereby forming an original 
innovative treatment o f self-injury.
I now discuss how Mark’s conceptual orientation to treatment and his 
understanding o f self-injury merges with this orientation in his discourse. He
112
acknowledges, “my orientation is from the humanistic side is that even in something 
as seemingly pathological as self-harm that there’s a there’s a kernel of wisdom in the 
behaviour” (lines 390-393, part 1). He states, “So I start from that position not as a 
not as an idea but as a reality so” (lines 395-396, part 1) “from a humanistic 
orientation but it’s actually to see that it’s true” (lines 398-399, part 1).
From his theoretical orientation, Mark constructs self-injury as:
a continuum from a build-up of an impulse in some way (lines 363-364, part
1) Around uh a body sense going Into you know behavioural elements or pre­
impulse forms where people are starting to get uh the habitual form build-up 
and it’s reflected into their thinking as well (lines 366-369, part 1)
He explains, “So that urn you know uh there’s that lead into it and” (lines 371 - 
372, part 1) “the self-harming behaviour is” (lines 372, part 1) “the inevitable 
conclusion to everything that’s gone before” (lines 374-375, part 1). He argues, “a lot 
of the genesis to this is coming from the body even if the client is having more images 
or thoughts” (lines 753-755 part 1). He contends:
the whole drive of hyperarousal or hypoarousal and then the drive to crack that 
through symptom management essentially is a body-based drive even if  the 
surface layer of it is articulate through emotion or cognition it’s it’s the body 
trying to right itself and the other places joining in to help with that (lines 754­
762, part 1)
Mark elaborates on this discourse of patients using self-injury to modulate 
their physiological arousal levels. He describes this as:
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if  someone is self-harming at uh in a highly aroused end generally speaking 
they’re trying to bring themselves back in the window o f  tolerance or trying to 
they’re trying to manage their symptoms so in that case it’s an aiming so that 
that’s clever then that that what you do when you self-harm is you stop 
yourself from escalating that you bring yourself back down that that’s a way 
o f doing that yeah and similarly if someone is uh is in the dissociative end of 
the spectrum in terms o f numbness that you can say oh so that’s clever what 
you’re doing that it’s to so you actually feel something (lines 421-432, part 1) 
So you’re bringing yourself back in (lines 434, part 1)
Thus, M ark’s conceptualisation o f self-injury is firmly rooted, and merges 
with his humanistic/body centred theoretical orientation. This merging is also evident 
in his discourse about his distinctive treatment practice with self-injuring clients.
He admits that his therapeutic approach is:
fairly structured and directive because I’m holding in mind (lines 1302-1304, 
part 2) whatever builds individual’s stories (linel303, part 2) we’re 
considering these physiological responses (lines 1301-1305, part 2) w e’re 
drawing attention to (line 1307) the structure o f the nervous system and its 
responses (lines 1307-1309, part 2) and it’s also directive because (line 1309, 
part 2) if  you leave someone to their own devices they’re going to self-harm 
(lines 1310-1311, part 2)
Thus, Mark’s treatment practice is highly influenced by his views o f how 
these physiological responses around self-injury are organised. This is evident in his 
description o f how he works with the patient’s gesture o f cutting.
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Mark describes a number o f stages to his treatment practice. He informs me 
that he initially begins with a psycho-education framework that he explains to his self- 
injuring clients. He appears to use two, namely an addiction framework and the 
modulation model (see Appendix I). These theoretical orientation models are central 
to his construction o f self-injury and he uses them as a first stage in his treatment 
approach. He states:
if  someone self-harms I tend to start with addiction first (lines 632-633, part 1) 
rather than jump right in there just to give them an outside reference (line 635­
636, part 2) I think it’s a softer landing (line 637, part 1) just to explain (line 
638, part 1) what people can do with different drugs legal or illegal (lines 639­
640, part 1) to manage these symptoms (line 640, part 1)
The next step involves the introduction o f the modulation model and linking it 
to behaviours. He tells me:
I’ll talk about different behaviours and I’ll keep those fairly neutral (lines 649­
650, part 1) So I say (line 651, part 2) some people on the high end that’s 
where they leave the house and go off walking for six miles (lines 651-653, 
part 1) Or they go off running (line 655, part I)
Mark explains that the rationale behind this psycho-education framework is to 
“ introduce the idea o f a range o f things that people do with a common theme o f ’
(lines 656-657, part 1) “trying to stay within this window” (line 657-658, part 1) of 
tolerance. He then speaks to his patients about “self-harming or injurious behaviours 
as being” (line 659, part 1) “just being a natural continuum o f that” (line 660, part I) 
and “this is a way to” (line 667, part I) “help calm this down” (line 667, part 1).
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Referring to the modulation chart, he argues: “where you see either the high 
end or low end of that as discomforts we do our best to stay away from that level of 
discomfort” (lines 615-618, part 1). He explains, “there’s things we do at the high 
end there’s things we do at low end” (lines 618-619, part 2). He informs me that at 
this point in his conversation with his self-injuring clients, he introduces the concept 
o f “aspects o f  trauma response that are designed to maintain our integrity” (lines 620­
622, part 1). He elaborates:
So you can say here’s what we do in the face o f threat when discomfort going 
this high or this low (lines 624-625, part 1) and then what we do consciously 
or unconsciously you’re trying to manage these symptoms (lines 630-631, part 
1)
Having outlined the modulation model to patients, Mark continues, “And then 
it’s not a big jum p from there to discussing” (lines 609-610, part 1) “our body is is 
predicated on trying to stay within this almost” (lines 610-611, part 1) “kind of 
homeostatic range” (line 613, part 1).
He asserts that the client’s activation “is set in motion through thinking feeling 
and through the body and off it goes and off it runs” (lines 975-977, part 1). He 
proposes, “you’re looking where do you intervene” (lines 983-984, part 1). Mark 
maintains that with self-injury “there had to be a period o f lead-in” (line 309, part 2). 
He explains that he explores this with his patients. He instructs them to “turn their 
attention to the lead-in” (line 327, part 2) to “become aware o f their activation” (line 
315, part 2). He informs me, “that enabled” (line 329, part 2) the client to “start to 
pick up the earlier warning signs that they were on their way” (lines 330-331, part 2) 
to self-injure. He says, it “allowed them to head things off at the pass” (line 332, part
116
2) “It became an option of what else can I do with this charge before it rises up to a 
point where you know our our initial sessions were about cut or not cutting” (lines 
334-337, part 2). In this first stage of M ark’s work, he attempts to simply decrease 
the frequency o f self-injury.
The next stage Mark outlines as “you’re looking at the impulse formation” 
(lines 1002-1003, part 1) “you’re looking at a point where there’s activation” (lines 
991-1008, part 1) “Then you organise around that and you’ve a whole series of 
impulses” (lines 1010-1011, part 2). He cautions, “You can’t really look at impulse 
until they decrease their behaviour” (lines 1003-1004, part 1). Thus, he is arguing that 
as the clinician you cannot work with the impulse, the precision of the gesture of 
cutting until the patient has first managed to decrease their frequency and level of 
self-injury. Once this has been achieved Mark moves on to the next stage o f his 
treatment practice.
This subsequent stage resolves around focusing on the “very specific” (line 14, 
part 2) “physical gesture” (line 13, part 2) o f the cutting action “the speed” (line 15, 
part 2) the “depth” (line 20, part 2) and “the precision” (lines 24-25, part 2) o f it.
Mark frames this approach as:
I ’d look at it from a body-centred viewpoint is now the wisdom is in the 
precision (lines 23-25, part 2) let’s look at the precision in this action and help 
it so I’m going to hold that it’s part o f  that that’s generating the relief the 
speed the precision not just the uh piercing o f the skin (lines 29-32, part 2)
So he asks his client to show him precisely his/her cutting gesture with their 
hand without any instrument that could be used to make an incision in the skin. The 
next stage in his approach is:
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to take that precision of gesture in its speed and in the kind o f  line that it made 
and simply orient it away from the body (lines 80-82, part 2) because this 
gesture was associated to cutting (lines 84-85, part 2)
He then suggests to his patients that when their activation levels (i.e. hyper­
arousal and hypo-arousal, see Modulation Chart, Appendix I) “got to peak of 
activation where they were going to self-harm that they consider making this gesture 
but in a way that was away from the body” (lines 95-97, part 2). He also suggests 
that, “if they felt that they needed pressure with it with skin was that they used a blunt 
rather than a sharp instrument and just have a pressure effect” (lines 101-103, part 2). 
Speaking about a particular patient, Mark reveals:
With this person by making the same gesture with the same speed and the 
same precision except not into the body they’re able to begin to divert the 
gesture”(lines 104-107, part 2) “they could get enough satisfaction from that to 
buy themselves some time urn with with the activation (lines 109-110, part 2)
He acknowledges that, “it wasn’t as satisfying as you know as cutting 
themselves but it did have an effect” (lines 113-114, part 2). However, he states that 
as the therapist you are “looking for a match round the movement” (line 121, part 2).
It is this unique and idiosyncratic way of working with the physical gesture o f cutting 
that distinguishes M ark’s discursive treatment approach from the other clinicians.
To summarise, Mark has a distinct model for understanding and treating self­
injury. He holds the view that “there’s a kernel o f wisdom” (line 393, part 1) in self­
injury. He conceptualises self-injury as “a continuum from a build-up o f an impulse” 
(lines 363-364, part 1) and that individuals use it as a way o f modulating their
physiological arousal levels. M ark’s treatment practice is very specific in its focus on
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“impulse formation” (line 1003, part 1) and the “physical gesture” (line 13, part 2) of 
the cutting action.
Although, Mark began with a humanistic-body-centred orientation to practice 
and then mapped it onto self-injury in a unique and innovative way, his discourse 
shows a similar merging pattern to the other clinicians in which his conceptual 
orientation to treatment and his conceptualisation of self-injury merge.
Eimear is a clinical psychologist who employs a dialectical behaviour therapy 
(DBT) approach to working with self-injuring clients. Referring to DBT, she admits, 
“as soon as I started to see in self-injury I started to look for evidence” (lines 1484­
1485) “based interventions and even before I had the training I had the book” (lines 
1487-1488) and “It lead me to the dialectical behaviour therapy” (lines 418-419).
Here Eimear is referring to Marsha Linehan’s book, Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment 
o f  Borderline Personality Disorder. Thus, she acknowledges that she began with self­
injury and then went searching for a specific modality o f treatment in relation to this 
behaviour. So when she discovered DBT it became her primary approach to treating 
self-injury.
Her construction o f self-injury is firmly rooted in a dialectical behaviour 
therapy discourse that situates this behaviour within a psychological construction of 
borderline personality disorder. Eimear locates her understanding o f self-injury 
within a psychopathological discourse that places self-injury within “a diagnosis of 
conflicts post-traumatic stress disorder or borderline personality disorder” (lines 600­
601). She holds the view that “people who self-injure and who do not have 
underlying psychopathology are rare” (lines 2219-2220). She constructs self-injury 
“as a maladaptive coping style that somehow individuals who have experienced a lot
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of trauma have learned that this is a way o f self-soothing” (lines 132-134). She 
proposes that self-injuring clients have a “skills deficit” (lines 150-151) and “That 
under pressure they would experience more intense emotions that they seem to be 
unable to cope with and seem to be unable to modulate” (lines 146-148). She 
elaborates:
They do seem to be more sensitive than other people and when they get upset 
they get more upset and it takes them longer to settle” (lines 141-143) “So I’d 
say they’ve a skills deficit” (lines 150-151) “in terms o f managing distress and 
managing emotions (lines 153-154)
Eimear argues that self-injuring patients are “sensitive humans in invalidating 
environments where their needs have not been met” (lines 155-257) “Or have not 
been adequately met” (line 259). She explains, “needs” as “Emotional” (line 262) 
“Physical safety and protection those kind” (line 264). She consistently and 
repeatedly uses DBT language in her narrative such as “skills deficit” and 
“ invalidating environment”.
Eimear constructs the central discourse of her treatment model within that of 
dialectical behaviour therapy. She describes this approach as a combination of 
individual therapy and group skills building. She explains, “My style o f working 
would be with the individual” (lines 555-556). Thus, she provides individual therapy 
sessions with self-injuring clients while one o f her colleagues provides the group 
skills building which “is very much psycho-educational format” (line 564). She 
informs me that the individual therapy sessions and the group skills building occur in 
“parallel” (lines 577-578). She also tells me that for “out o f  hours in times o f crisis” 
(line 1034) “There’s always somebody on call” (line 1027) to respond to self-injuring
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patients. This team-based provision of an out-of-hours service, individual and group 
sessions are consistent with a DBT modality of treatment.
She articulates a very structured approach to working with self-injuring 
patients in terms of both the length o f treatment and the therapy session itself. Eimear 
outlines this approach as “my own personal thoughts is that you’re probably talking 
about you know maybe a four-year commitment to therapy” (lines 607-609). She 
provides the following description o f this four-year treatment model:
the skill building is very structured (line 629) It would it would probably be 
structured in the sense that you know I would literally look at what the 
difficulties are whether it’s a skills deficit trauma life goals self-esteem and 
work towards that but in a flexible sort o f way (lines 623-627) That you’d be 
talking about a year o f skill building (lines 612-613) Then maybe a year of 
working on uh self-esteem goal setting and then trauma if  somebody has a 
history o f abuse that needs to be addressed and they’re prepared to work on it 
you’d be talking maybe another two years (lines 615-619)
Thus, in her discourse she alludes to, and skirts around the complexities of 
trauma treatment, as if  it were self-evident that it would take “maybe another two- 
years” (lines 618-619) o f therapy sessions and that the client’s trauma would be 
addressed in the latter two years o f a four-year treatment programme. Her discourse 
about this particular approach to trauma treatment is spoken as a generalised view, as 
if  this is a well-established and accepted practice o f treating trauma.
Eimear also describes a structure that she adheres to within therapy sessions 
with self-injuring patients. She informs me that she sees these clients on a weekly
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basis for an hourly appointment “If it is goal setting and self-esteem” (line 1183). 
However, she explains:
If you’re working on something like urn trauma sexual abuse you’d be talking 
about an hour and a half (lines 1184-1186) so that would be a half an hour to 
get somebody comfortable (lines 1188-1189) Half an hour to work on it and 
half an hour to seal things over until the next time (lines 1191-1193)
She also acknowledges that when assessing risk she uses, “a particular urn 
assessment protocol that was developed by Marsha Linehan uh as part o f a dialectical 
behaviour therapy” (lines 221-223).
To summarise, Eimear’s discourse suggests that her conceptualisation and 
treatment o f self-injury merges completely with dialectical behaviour therapy. She 
seems to accept every aspect o f this modality unquestioningly. Indeed, she takes 
every opportunity in her narrative to promote this treatment approach and tried to 
persuade me o f its effectiveness. She is so convinced that this is the definitive way to 
work with self-injuring patients, that at no point in her discourse does she consider 
other possible modalities o f treating self-injury.
Sources o f Knowledge
I turn now to a discussion o f the findings that pertain to the question, “What 
sources o f knowledge including both personal experience and professional training, 
have influenced/shaped the development o f clinicians’ explanation(s) o f treating self- 
injuring clients?” An interesting revelation emerged among the eight clinicians’ 
narratives in this study in relation to this question. The clinicians make sparse 
references to conferences, academic readings and workshops on the topic o f self­
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injury. Indeed, there are surprisingly few references among the clinicians’ discourses 
in which they made deliberate attempts to learn or seek information about self-injury 
and how to treat it. In fact, their discourses on this issue support my earlier finding 
that their model/techniques for understanding and treating self-injury are not 
distinctive from their primary training/orientation to treatment. Jack, Mike, Sinead 
and Eimear explicitly name their treatment training as a basis for information about 
how to work with self-injuring patients. For example, Jack states, “psychoanalytic 
theory” (line 758) especially “Freudian, Lacanian” (line 2128). O f the range o f these 
clinicians’ treatment modalities, only Mark and Eimear’s approaches provided a 
particular and distinctive conceptual framework for understanding and working with 
self-injury.
All of the clinicians list a number o f multiple sources from which they acquire 
their knowledge o f self-injury and how to work with self-injuring clients. On the 
phenomenon o f self-injury, Niamh, Jack and Mike acknowledge their patients as 
fountains o f knowledge, Niamh reveals, “where I got most o f my information about 
self-injury is from clients” (lines 483-484) “They’re the greatest” (line 486) 
“educators” (line 488). Jack admits that he acquires information “through practice 
working with with individuals who speak in this way about uh their experiences” 
(lines 762-764). Mike informs me, “it’s the clients who teach you loads o f s tu ff’ 
(lines 1879-1880). Thus, they appear to rely on their clinical practice with self- 
injuring patients for comprehending and treating self-injury.
Niamh and David are the only clinicians who make any reference to personal 
experiences o f  engaging in self-injury. For instance, Niamh admits that her “own 
self-harming impulses” (line 491) was another element o f information. However, she
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qualifies this statement with, “I wouldn’t be in the traditional self-harming modes” 
(line 492). She does not elaborate further on what these modes o f hers are. David’s 
disclosure of his own self-injury surfaces in response to a discussion about one o f his 
cases. He admits, “It is quite anxiety provoking though when you’re about to usher 
somebody out o f hospital as they’re escalating in self-harm” (lines 245-247, part 2). 
He explains, “o f  course you’ll find yourself getting irritated frustrated” (lines 272­
273) when such a client “is under considerably heightened distress or stress I should 
say and she needs support” (lines 251-252) “at the moment and assistance in this 
transition rather than um like a sense of o f doom and and failure being conveyed to 
her” (lines 255-257) by the hospital staff “but the end one has to contain that anxiety 
within oneself and also contain s ta ffs  anxiety” (lines 257-259). I enquire how he 
contains his anxiety and he humorously laughs as he confesses, “I do my own self- 
harming behaviour I go off I have a cup o f coffee ((laughter)) I have a smoke I have a 
ventilation and then I go back” (lines 277-279). Thus, one could argue David’s 
discourse is similar to Niamh’s with regard to engaging in the non-traditional modes 
o f self-injury. Although David’s version of “self-harming” is not cutting, his use of 
the term however, connects him to his patients.
Training is the most frequently cited source by seven clinicians, Eimear, Jack, 
Mike Mark, David, Sinead and Ciara. However, this reference to training is not 
specific to self-injury; it relates to training in their own particular treatment modality. 
Sinead and Ciara’s response captures the thread o f some o f the clinicians’ general and 
non-specific discourses about accessing multiple sources o f information alongside an 
absence o f direct references to self-injury conferences, workshops and specific 
treatment books. Sinead reveals:
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The most consistent one being as I say my own constructivist systemic 
framework plus (lines 287-288, part 2) attachment theory (line 289, part 2) and 
then what you pick up along the way is useful ideas from colleagues (lines 
289-290, part 2) or even the internet (line 292, part 2) actually a student giving 
me a printout o f a list o f things to do to distract from harming yourself (lines 
293-294, part 2) so (line 297, part 2) you come across tools (lines 297-298, 
part 2) from a variety o f different sources (lines 298-299, part 2)
Ciara mentions:
I think you (line 1530, parti) utilise aspects o f various forms o f treatment that 
that you can administer given the setting that you’re in (lines 1531-1533, part
1) like reading about DBT knowing what the basis of DBT reading about CBT 
knowing what the basis o f it is (lines 1533-1535, part 1) and then trying to 
incorporate aspects o f everything into your patient is the way I work (lines 
298-200, part 1)
A reference to Marsha Linehan’s work emerges in three (Eimear, David and 
Ciara) o f the clinicians’ discourses. Eimear and Ciara inform me that they have read 
her book. David attended a DBT workshop facilitated by one o f Linehan’s 
colleagues. Eimear is the only clinician who has had specific training in DBT. She 
refers to three books on self-injury in her narrative. She names, “A Bright Red 
Scream” (line 362) by its title but did not mention the author, Marilee Strong. She 
provides the full reference for “The Scarred Soul by Tracy Alderman” (lines 479­
480). The third and final book she omits the title and refers to it by the author 
“Marsha Linehan” (line 1506) and informs me that it was “published in ‘93” (line 
1509).
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In this section, I examined the clinicians’ discourses in relation to their sources 
o f knowledge that influence the development o f their explanation(s) o f their treatment 
o f self-injuring patients. The clinicians articulate a number of sources of knowledge 
about self-injury and how to treat it, such as their clients, their training in their own 
specific treatment approach and Marsha Linehan’s DBT treatment modality. Despite 
this naming o f multiple sources, there is an absence in the clinicians’ narratives of 
references to conferences, academic readings, workshops and a lack o f  deliberate 
efforts to seek information about self-injury and how to treat it.
M issing discourses. There is an absence o f research and publications in the 
literature in relation to self-injury and its treatment in the Irish context in comparison 
to other countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia and the UK (Keane, 1997). As 
a result o f this, it is highly likely that Irish clinicians are not being exposed to current 
research on the phenomenon o f self-injury in their initial training, as well as at their 
professional conferences and continuing professional development days.
In addition, the lack o f direct citations to self-injury workshops, seminars and 
training among the clinicians’ discourses may be due to the scarce availability and 
difficulty accessing such modes o f learning in the Irish context. For example, only 
the clinicians who had worked or currently work in the psychiatric services mention 
DBT and had some training exposure to this form o f treatment. As a clinician and 
researcher in the field of self-injury for over a decade, I have only come across one 
lecture and one workshop on the topic of self-injury, namely Professor Annie G. 
Rogers’ “Understanding Self-Injury with Girls and Women: A New Clinical 
Approach” at TCD, on the 29th o f January, 1998 and Dr. Kay Inckle’s “Understanding 
and Responding to Self-Injury” in Dublin, 4lh o f January, 2010. Another factor may
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be due to limited advertising o f such training events. For instance, I only discovered 
recently that Dr. Inckle runs a certificate training course, “Understanding and 
Working with Self-Injury: A Harm Reduction Approach” in Ireland. In addition, the 
first conference on self-injury in Ireland took place on the 2nd o f March 2009. I did 
not see any advertisement o f this conference prior to the event. The first reference I 
came across was a brief report in the Irish Times, 3rd o f March 2009 announcing that 
it had taken place.
However, this same argument cannot account for the omission in the 
clinicians’ discourses of the numerous texts on the subject o f self-injury and its 
treatment that are available in Dublin bookshops and from various internet book 
suppliers. Their discourses would seem to suggest that they do not actively engage in 
self-directed learning activities in terms of searching for direct sources o f information 
and knowledge in the form of books or journal articles on the subject o f self-injury.
A further striking finding in this study in relation to the clinicians’ narratives 
about self-injury is the missing discourses that pertain to the aetiology o f self-injury. 
Considering the numerous references in the literature emphasising the link between 
childhood trauma (especially sexual abuse) and self-injury, it is astounding that only 
three clinicians (Eimear, Niamh and Mark) briefly mention trauma in their discourse 
about self-injury. However, they do not engage in a discourse o f elaboration on this 
beyond making the initial connection.
Early childhood experiences of individuals who self-injure in relation to 
illness, injury and early hospitalisation were completely absent from all eight 
clinicians’ discourses. A further omission is the early loss o f a parent through death 
or separation as a key antecedent to self-injury (Arnold, 1995; Friedman, Glasser,
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Laufer, Laufer, & Whol, 1972; Walsh & Rosen, 1988). References to the familial 
environments that self-injurers grow up in were not mentioned by the clinicians other 
than a brief reference by Eimear to “invalidating environments where their needs have 
not been met” (lines 256-257). Again, this is surprising when one takes account of 
the various research studies emphasising that those who self-injure are more likely to 
come from families characterised by parental alcoholism or depression (Walsh & 
Rosen, 1988), divorce, neglect, parental deprivation (Arnold, 1995; Carroll, Schaffer, 
Spensley, & Abramowitz, 1980; Friedman etal., 1972; G raff & Mallin, 1967; 
Grunebaum & KJerman, 1967; Leibenluft, Gardner, & Cowdy, 1987; Pattison & 
Kahan, 1983; Rosen, Walsh, & Rode, 1990; Simpson, 1976; Simpson & Porter,
1981), emotional distancing through inconsistent parental warmth or the expression of 
anger being severely restricted (Podvoll, 1969).
While it appears that both men and women engage in self-injury, a lot of the 
literature leans toward considering self-injury as a gendered phenomenon. This is 
another missing discourse in the clinicians’ discourses other than Ciara’s argument 
that:
I’d say it’s possibly a lot more common in men that we actually believe it to 
be or know it to be urn and I think it probably takes more subtle forms in men 
or in males so it’s not necessarily cutting or overdosing but but could be much 
more in the sense o f kicking the wall or banging their head sore or um being 
physically aggressive toward themselves (lines 343-349)
C h ap ter Sum m ary
In this chapter, I explored the clinicians’ discourses and provided extracts 
from their interview transcripts with respect to the research questions, “What
128
conceptual frameworks do clinicians draw on to understand self-injury and their 
current treatment practice with self-injuring patients?” and “What sources of 
knowledge, including both personal experience and professional training, have 
influenced/shaped the development of clinicians’ explanation(s) or working model(s) 
o f treating self-injuring clients?”
To summarise: the findings o f the research question that pertains to the 
examination o f the conceptual frameworks that the clinicians draw on to understand 
and treat self-injury, demonstrates that all eight clinicians exhibit a range o f treatment 
approaches to working with self-injuring patients. These include dialectical 
behaviour, narrative, constructivist, humanistic/body centred, Freudian/Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, a mixture o f pharmacological, psychodynamic/cognitive 
behaviour/dialectical behaviour and a combination of pharmacological, cognitive 
behaviour and dialectical behaviour therapeutic modalities. In addition, these 
clinicians come from a variety of mental health professions including psychiatry, 
psychology, psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. For the majority o f the clinicians, no 
distinct models for considering self-injury and approaches for working with self- 
injuring clients emerge, despite the range o f therapeutic models across the group of 
clinicians. However, there are two exceptions to this pattern, namely Eimear and 
Mark. The other clinicians’ (Niamh, Jack, Sinead, Mike, Ciara and David’s) models 
and techniques in relation to self-injury do not seem to be distinct from their primary 
training model/orientation to treatment. In fact, their discourses appear to merge 
primary training with treatment o f self-injury. This merging o f clinicians’ conceptual 
orientations to treatment and their understanding of self-injury tend to be driven for 
some by their theoretical training or a belief system, and for others by their practical 
training. Jack, Mike and Sinead’s discourses suggest that their treatment approach
129
and their conceptualisation of self-injury are significantly influenced by the particular 
theoretical modality in which they were trained. Niamh is the only clinician whose 
merging o f her conceptual orientation to treatment and her construction o f self-injury 
is influenced by her strong beliefs. In contrast, David’s and Ciara’s merging patterns 
tend to be driven by their clinical training.
Mark and Eimear both have a distinctive model for understanding and 
working with self-injury. Thus, in this respect they deviate from the general pattern 
of the other six clinicians who do not seem to have distinct models for considering 
self-injury and approaches for working with self-injuring patients. Despite having 
marked frameworks for conceptualising and treating self-injury, M ark’s and Eimear’s 
discourses show a merging pattern. What is striking is that their style o f merging 
differs from each other. In M ark’s case, he began with a humanistic body centred 
model o f treatment and invented an innovative way of mapping it onto self-injury. In 
contrast, Eimear clearly began with a specific treatment model, dialectical behaviour 
therapy; a form o f therapy that was developed to treat individuals with BPD who 
engage in self-injury. Thus, self-injury is already mapped onto this modality of 
treatment.
I concluded this chapter with a summary o f my discussion o f the findings in 
relation to the sources o f knowledge that have influenced the development o f  the 
clinicians’ explanations of their treatment o f self-injuring patients. It seems that 
despite the fact that all of the clinicians name multiple sources from which they gather 
information on self-injury and how to treat self-injuring clients, they make few 
remarks about conferences, academic readings and workshops on the phenomenon of 
self-injury in their narratives. Indeed, their discourses suggest that they do not engage
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in deliberate activities to inform themselves about self-injury and how to treat it 
beyond their clinical practice and their primary training orientation or perhaps it is due 
to the lack or availability of same.
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Chapter Five 
Findings: Using Discourse Communities
In the current chapter, I consider the clinicians’ discourses with respect to the 
research question, “What conceptual frameworks do clinicians draw on to understand 
self-injury and their current treatment practice with self-injuring patients?” What 
emerges is an interesting pattern across the clinicians’ narratives. They do not speak 
in terms o f theoretical or conceptual models; rather, they tend to create discourse 
communities o f “an other” to formulate their beliefs about self-injury and its treatment 
rather than simply articulating particular theoretical or conceptual models. I use the 
term “discourse communities” to refer to the imaginary communities that the 
clinicians construct and appear to address through me as the interviewer, or an 
imaginary “other” beyond me.
The clinicians’ constructions of imaginary “other” discourse communities in 
their narratives to formulate their beliefs about self-injury and its treatment reflect and 
emphasise the divergences among and between their various approaches and 
disciplines o f psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, psychology and psychiatry. For 
example, two clinicians from the same discipline drew on diverging discourse 
communities. David, a consultant psychiatrist, creates a discourse o f opposition and 
constructs him self as not conforming to the traditional view o f psychiatry. Ciara who 
is also a consultant psychiatrist, but, unlike David, her discursive clinical language 
suggests that she conforms to the professional image o f a psychiatrist in that she 
thinks diagnostically about her patients’ symptoms, reflects on what to do, uses 
different techniques such as distraction and mood logs and likes to work as part o f a 
multi-disciplinary team. Thus, she creates a psychiatric community discourse of
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verification to support her views and her particular approach to working with self- 
injuring clients.
The following extract is an example o f how Ciara thinks diagnostically about 
self-injuring patients and her use of “pharmacological interventions” (line 601, part 
1).
Extract 3
Line 587-619, part 1 C: (4) .hh And um you know there are significant I feel
there’s a significant number o f people with self- 
injurious behaviour that that that aren’t actually 
affectively uh (1) driven in the sense that they’ve a form 
of depression or a form of manic and mixed mood 
episode or that are .hh you know (1) necessarily 
psychotic or .hh fulfil the diagnostic criteria for an 
anxiety disorder .hh (1) um they’re probably more along 
not all of them but certainly some people would be 
more along an Axis II diagnosis diagnostic spectrum .hh 
and and again I think it’s important to try .hh (1) and try 
and establish [that] ,hh 
I: [Mm-hmm]
C: Because there are certain you know pharmacological
interventions that will reduce self-injurious behaviour if 
(2) you know if if  (2) it’s Axis I driven.
I: Okay and what sort o f  medication [would that be]
C: [Well antidepressants]
if somebody’s depressed and they’re self-injuring 
because they’re feeling futile or somebody’s extremely 
anxious and they can’t 
I: [Mm-hmm]
C: [Neutralise] their anxiety .hh you could use you know
an anziolytic in the sense o f an SSRI or you could use 
short-term benzazepine or whatever whatever but um
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I: [Mm-hmm]
C: .hh [But there’s] a significant proportion of people who
wouldn’t respond to medication because their primary 
diagnosis is not Axis 1 and urn (1) and I think you can 
give a harmful message that medication will resolve this 
hh when it’s when it’s when it’s clearly not Axis I um 
driven hh
In Extract 3, Ciara’s discursive clinical language reflects how she 
conceptualises self-injuring patients in diagnostic terms. Her use of psychiatric terms 
such as “affectively” (line 589, part 1), “depression” (line 590, part 1), “manic and 
mixed mood episode” (line 591, part 1), “psychotic or fulfil the diagnostic criteria for 
an anxiety disorder” (lines 592-593, part 1), “Axis 11 diagnosis, diagnostic spectrum” 
(lines 596-597, part 1), “pharmacological interventions” (line 601, part 1), “Axis I” 
(line 602, part 1), “antidepressants” (line 605, part 1), “anxiety” (line 609,part 1); 
“anziolytic” (line 610, part 1), “SRRJ” (line 610 , part 1) and “benzazepine” (line 611, 
part 1) illustrates this.
Two D istinct Discourse Communities
Two distinct discourse patterns emerge from the clinicians’ narratives, 
“Discourse Communities of Opposition” and “Discourse Communities of 
Verification”. Clinicians who construct discourse communities o f opposition position 
themselves as having particular styles o f treatment that are different or in some 
instances, antithetical to the imaginary “other” community. In contrast, they use 
discourse communities o f  verification to verify, authorise and legitimise their 
particular approach. In terms o f a global pattern across the clinicians, what is striking 
is that they all refer to discourse communities. However, for four o f the eight
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clinicians, namely Ciara, David, Sinead and Mike, this pattern o f creating discourse 
communities only emerges as a momentary or transitory reference, and is not 
sustained throughout their narratives. For example, Ciara engages in a discursive 
pattern where she appears to shift from addressing a visible audience such as myself 
as the researcher to a position from which she seems to be speaking to an imaginary 
client. In the following Extract 4, Ciara constructs a discourse community o f an 
“other”, an imaginary patient, as a way o f validating and verifying her treatment 
approach with self-injuring clients.
Extract 4
Lines 789-812, part 1 C: .hh Um so I try to get you know (2) patients to manage
their medication to be responsible for their medication 
to um (3) to be responsible for making their 
appointments and those sort o f  things rather than have it 
very much uh .hh hand them out I ( ) and say to people 
when would you like to come again and and I think that 
can be very helpful because .hh um (2) it gives a sense 
it gives me a sense o f where they feel they’re at if they 
say well I don’t need to come back for three months um 
that can say they can confirm how I feel they’re doing 
but if they say I need to come back in three days then 
we kind o f fell three months hh well that’s then that’s 
kind of incongruous [so]
I: [Mm-hmm]
C: .hh Um that can be quite helpful clinically to to get a
sense of what level o f support they need so I really try 
to hand a lot .hh lot o f decision making back to the 
individual and (1) and responsibility for mood ties and 
mood logs and if somebody is keeping one it’s you 
know I my general approach is that they bring it to me
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as opposed to I ask them for it that’s just the approach 
that I use
In contrast, Niamh, Jack, Mark and Eimear’s narratives are rich with 
constructions o f discourse communities that appear as a recurring, persistent and 
pervasive style. I discuss these patterns in more detail using extracts from David, 
Niamh and M ark’s narratives as exemplars o f discourse communities o f opposition 
and verification respectively. It is intriguing how David, Niamh and Mark all engage 
in the same pattern o f producing discourse communities, yet, they do not do the same 
thing with their discourses. I now address their discursive differences in the ensuing 
paragraphs.
Discourse community of opposition. I begin with David’s pattern o f creating 
a discourse o f opposition. His style o f using discourse communities momentarily in 
his narrative to articulate his beliefs about self-injury and his treatment approach is 
typical o f Ciara, Sinead and Mike’s narratives. However, David is atypical among 
these four clinicians in that he constructs discourse communities o f opposition, while 
they use discourse communities o f verification. He employs this style as a way of 
emphasising how his particular treatment approach contrasts with that o f  traditional 
psychiatry. For instance, he constructs him self as not adhering to a medical model 
and speaking back to that community of practitioners. Referring to his patients he 
confesses, “ I don’t think in terms of them being disease entities or disorder entities or 
anything like that those models are veiy useful in terms o f having structure and 
having resistancy and adhering to what is known to be helpful etc etc but not if they 
become a label” (lines 973-978, part 2) “That’s a disaster” (line 980, part 2).
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In keeping with this oppositional discourse, there are moments in David’s 
narrative where he appears to disagree with his medical colleagues. For instance, he 
tells me about his colleagues’ reaction to his disclosure that he gives his mobile 
number to his clients. He reveals, “all of my patients have my mobile phone number” 
(lines 938-939, part 3). He admits, a lot o f  colleagues will say, “Oh my God I don’t 
believe they have your mobile phone number sure you’re hostage uh people will 
always be calling you” (lines 942-945, part 3). In contrast to this belief o f his 
colleagues’, David acknowledges that his clients “tend not to abuse it” (lines 954-955, 
part 3) and “there are times when you wish they had” (line 957, part 3).
Indeed, at times he almost speaks against his own discipline o f psychiatry in 
the language he uses. Speaking about his disagreement with the diagnoses that his 
self-injuring clients have received, he states:
and then there’s always (line 155, part 1) a few who perhaps have somatised 
their distress and (lines 155-156, part 1) will have presented through the 
medical services perhaps for a number o f years and received a whole raft of 
physical diagnoses which in retrospect may have been quite dubious (lines 
156-159, part 1) when it would be clear when you’d finally get to see them 
that the problems are emotionally and psychologically based (lines 161-163, 
part 1)
Similarly to David, Niamh creates a discourse community o f  opposition in her 
narrative. However, Niamh deviates from David’s occasional pattern in that her 
discourse o f opposition was a consistent and repeating pattern. Early in her narrative, 
she sets up this discourse o f opposition when she constructs herself within a discourse 
community that is oppositional to a cognitive behavioural approach to working with
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self-injuring patients. She acknowledges that her clients “tend to focus on” (line 669) 
self-injury “an awful lot more than I do” (line 669) in her particular model o f  therapy. 
From her perspective she argues, “So it’s not about the behaviours in itse lf’ (line 678) 
“1 mean that’s much more cognitive behavioural approach” (lines 683-684). Thus, 
she positions herself as having a contrasting style to CBT and as not necessarily in 
agreement with this focus on the behavioural aspects o f  self-injury as she admits, “ I 
wouldn’t be really going for that” (line 687).
In the following extract, Niamh sets up another discourse community of 
opposition when she speaks o f her humanistic orientation to therapy as being 
perceived as “now very eh very eh untrendy or it mightn’t be the latest” (line 1378).
Extract 5
Lines 1373-1415 I: Okay em are there what models or ideas guide you in
your work with again self-injuring clients 
C: (5) I think w e’ve been here before ((laughing))
I: ((Laughing)) ( )  Yes
C: j'J, Yeah and I know you know humanistic might be
now (4) very very eh (2) untrendy or it m ightn’t be the 
latest but (.hh) I do believe that people 1 do believe in 
people’s [capacity] to heal 
I: [Mm-hmm]
C: From anything virtually
1: Mm-hmm
C: And eh (.2) through their capacity to relate you know
I: Mm-hmm
C: (2) Is that a model ((laughing)) well it’s
I: Yeah
C: It’s a core humanistic belief really
I: Uh-huh
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C: And I suppose in the sort (3) of useful constructs you
know that some o f the sensory motor maps you know 
I: Are there any [maps in particular]
C: [somewhere there in] the background you
know
I: M m -hmm are there any [maps in particular you find]
helpful
C: [I suppose the modulation]
model you know the the first and favourite and you 
know 
I: Mm-hmm
C: But I suppose more so now it’s the whole (2) again
much more humanistic elements it’s only recently that 
there I think (4) you know (2) describing it as the core 
o f how they see people is d’you know I don’t know if 
you’re aware of that map where they show the 
authentic self 
I: Mm-hmm
C (2) And you know (2) then traumatic histories and then 
the the the the (2) top level o f you know personality and 
coping styles and all that 
I Uh-huh
C And I think that’s very useful for people to see who feel 
that all they are all that they know themselves to be is 
pain and you know .hh ern
Niamh initially responds with humour, to my question about models and ideas
that guide her work. However, her reply is also a show o f resistance, as she reminds
me that as far as she is concerned we have covered this ground earlier when I asked
her about the models and frameworks she draws on to understand self-injuring
patients. As I discussed previously in Chapter Four, she acknowledges, “I don’t tend”
(line 429) to “think o f people in terms o f frameworks” (line 431). She speaks about
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the idea that her particular humanistic conceptual orientation to treatment has gone 
out of fashion and therefore, is not a popular framework from which to work. In this 
way, albeit with humour, she situates her practice outside o f what she perceives as the 
more common discourse community of clinicians.
The strongest discourse community of opposition surfaces in relation to 
Niam h’s opinions about the psychiatric profession’s response to patients who self- 
injure. In fact, she constructs her subject position as anti-psychiatry and bases her 
opinions on the narratives of her self-injuring clients’ reports of their experiences of 
the Irish psychiatric services. Her discourse seems highly critical of the psychiatric 
profession’s response to patients who self-injure as illustrated in Extract 6 below.
Extract 6 
Lines 1004-1017 I: Okay (2) em do you work with self-injuring clients that
have a psychiatric history or psychiatric diagnoses 
C: °Yes yes°
I: Okay mm-hmm em
C: (2) Because I don’t think psychiatry works with it
I: Okay
C: In an effective way at all it’s very very .hh hhhhh ah
they see self-harming clients in psychiatric terms as
looking attention seeking and they have very very 
negative you know attitudes to self-harm in psychiatric 
settings I have found anyway
She is very explicit in the strong emotional language she uses to express her 
disapproval o f the treatment individuals who self-injure receive in psychiatric 
hospitals. Niamh articulates this as follows:
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I have a lot o f disdain for the way the people who engage in self-injury are 
treated in psychiatric hospitals (lines 1602-1604) yeah it certainly adds to a 
person’s you know level o f distress to have that meeted out that sort of 
treatment (lines 1606-1608) And it makes it much harder for people to be open 
about it and harder then for people to be open about it and to you know it puts 
another level layer in the way really that people have been treated like that in 
psychiatric hospital cause they internalise then some o f them hospitals 
treatment yeah o f themselves (lines 1611-1616)
Niamh continues with her discourse o f opposition, as she speaks about the 
impact on patients o f having been in the psychiatric system. She informs me that, 
“clients who have been caught up in the psychiatric” (lines 1812-1813) “services” 
(line 1814) “they no longer believe in the possibility o f you know o f o f really living” 
(lines 1814-1816). She elaborates on this discourse explaining:
the people I would see as lost and have haven’t the capacity to get something 
out o f counselling are people who have been fairly long term involved in 
psychiatric services either because early on you know they needed help that 
they didn’t get (lines 1852-1854) and that they now are dissociated you know 
they have that structured dissociation inside themselves but they have the 
dissociation because o f the level o f  medication as well (lines 1861-1864)
In addressing me as the interviewer, Niamh also engages in this discursive 
pattern o f opposition as she positions herself as strongly resisting my discourse. She 
establishes this style o f engagement with me early in our conversation and repeats it 
throughout her narrative. Her discourse o f opposition to mine emerges in the initial 
moments of our dialogue when she resists the categories I offer her. For instance, she
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rejects the notion of classification of self-injury into mild, moderate and severe.
When I ask if  she would use such terms as “mild” or “moderate” to describe clients’ 
level o f self-injury, she replies, “You see this is why I’m not great on these sort of 
things because I don’t tend to even in my mind quantify” (lines 187-189). Thus, 
Niamh rejects the idea of classification with her language and emphasises this 
repeatedly with the following utterances, “I don’t” (line 218) “I don’t really” (line 
220) “Because I don’t tend to classify” (line 222) “But in actual practice I don’t” (line 
230). She also resists the idea o f frameworks as a way to help the clinician 
understand self-injuring clients. She responds, “I don’t tend to think o f people in 
terms o f frameworks” (lines 429-431).
Niamh also opposes certain terms I use and perhaps, was aligning me to a 
particular discourse with which she is not in agreement with and therefore, contrasts 
with her own. When I enquire how often she sees self-injuring patients, she responds 
by challenging and disagreeing with my discursive term “self-injuring clients” . She 
replies, “you see now again like the self-injury is the identification” (lines 1117­
1118). Niamh may be interpreting my utterance as indicating a particular discourse, 
possibly behaviourist or psychiatric, to which she does not subscribe. Her discourse 
is person centred and she reads my use o f  the term self-injuring as labelling a client. 
She tells me, “there’d be clients that might have at one stage been so do I still call 
them self-injuring clients I would never call them self-injuring clients anyway” (lines 
1139-1141).
She repeats this discourse o f opposition pattern when I ask her about treatment 
success as Extract 7 illustrates, on the following page. Niam h rejects my discursive 
term “treatment” and informs me, “I mean people who engage in therapy are not
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being treated” (lines 1626-1627). It is possible that she associates the word 
“treatment” with a medical discourse that implies a particular subject position for the 
individual receiving treatment. Quested and Rudge (2002) proposed that, “A patient 
is a person under medical treatment who is expected to endure the treatment, be 
subservient and submissive to the dictates o f medicine” (p. 556). This medical 
discursive practice and subject position of the client is in opposition to Niam h’s 
relational, person centred discursive practice. It is highly probable that Niamh’s 
discourse o f opposition concurs with that of Denham (2008) who cautioned against 
positioning psychotherapy within a biomedical discourse. He contended that, 
“Psychotherapy belongs as an adjunct to biomedicine, not within its borders” (Deham 
2008, p. 59). Denham noted that:
In misconceptualizing psychotherapy as treatment [sic] or intervention [sic] 
(Pawson, 2006), resources have been wasted in trying to prove that the 
effective component o f psychotherapy (the treatment or intervention) can be 
discovered and separated from the psychotherapeutic relationship in much the 
same way that effective active ingredients of a new drug can be separated from 
the placebo effects, (p. 59)
Extract 7
Lines 1620-1637 I: Mm-hmm what would constitute a treatment
success with self-injuring clients 
C: (5) .hh Treatment success (9) .hhh success implies
failure as well f doesn’t it 
I: Yes.
C: (13) .hh And treatment success I mean (3) .hh people
who engage in therapy are not being treated 
like you know ((laughing))
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I: Mm-hmm
C: They’re actually (2) they’re actually learning for
themselves to (2) recognise and respect what’s 
happened to them and the pain it’s caused them 
and how to tolerate that and share it with you 
know other people
I: Mm-hmm
C: To actually be able to allow themselves to own
it in the presence o f other people you know
Niamh is certainly consistent in her discourse o f opposition, and as one would 
expect, she rejects my concepts o f success and failure in relation to treatment. She 
argues:
So I mean the word success the word failure doesn’t actually I mean it’s like 
you say to me is your life a success I don’t know that my life’s a success I’m 
doing the best to get by and to enjoy and fully live (lines 1642-1648) it’s like 
that with a client too (line 1655)
To summarise, Niamh’s pervasive discourse o f opposition defines her position 
within her beliefs about self-injury and her humanistic orientation to therapy.
Though, she positions herself as strongly resisting my discourse, her style of 
engagement with me in our conversation reflects her ease with me. This sense o f her 
relaxation with me is evident in the moments where she draws me into her Irish wit 
and playfulness in her replies, even when she challenges my discourse. For instance, 
N iam h’s humour surfaces when she confronts me about my use o f the word 
“treatment”, “I mean people who engage in therapy are not being treated like you 
know ((laughing))” (lines 1626-1628).
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Discourse community of verification. In contrast to Niamh, Mark 
predominantly employs discourse communities o f verification to support his 
particular therapeutic approach. This contrasting style is an interesting feature of their 
respective discursive positions, considering they both describe their individual 
treatment approaches as humanistic and body centred. Mark constructs several 
discourse communities namely, psychiatry, addiction, humanism and neuroscience.
He draws especially upon a repeating neuroscience discourse to legitimise his unique 
application o f merging humanistic and body-oriented psychotherapies to working 
with self-injuring clients.
M ark’s neuroscience discourse is a dominant feature o f his narrative. He 
establishes this discourse of verification in the initial stages o f our interview and it is 
closely aligned with his conceptualisation o f self-injury as previously outlined in 
Chapter Four. To briefly recapitulate on this point, he constructs self-injury as:
a continuum from a build-up of an impulse in some way (lines 363-364, part
1) around uh a body sense going into you know behavioural elements or pre­
impulse forms where people are starting to get uh the habitual form build-up 
and it’s reflected into their thinking as well (lines 366-369, part 1)
Thus, one can hear the beginnings o f a neuroscience discourse coming through 
in his articulation o f his views and the terminology he employs such as “ impulse” and 
“pre-impulse” . He continues with this discourse when he speaks o f the body trying to 
right itself through the action o f self-injury. He states:
So uh quite simply the body trying to right itself is trying to feel alive where 
it’s dead so if it’s numb and hypoaroused then it’s trying to calm if it’s
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hyperaroused and that’s it’s trying to remain within its homeostatic settings 
(lines 665-669, part 2)
Mark employs what he refers to as “the basic pain pleasure principle” (lines 
777-778, part 1) to support his argument here. He explains this as follows:
You take a single-cell organism it has two gears it goes towards things that are 
pleasurable and it backs off things that are painful and that’s that basic relation 
to discomfort or comfort (lines 780-782, part 1) I am talking around the basic 
principle o f of approach or avoid (lines 797-798, part 1)
He constructs his treatment approach as focusing on the “very specific” (line
14, part 2) “physical gesture” (line 13, part 2) o f the cutting action “the speed” (line
15, part 2) the “depth” (line 20, part 2) and “the precision” (lines 24-25, part 2) of it. 
Mark frames this approach as:
I’d look at it from a body-centred viewpoint is now the wisdom is in the 
precision (lines 23-25, part 2) let’s look at the precision in this action and help 
it so I’m going to hold that it’s part o f that that’s generating the relief the 
speed the precision not just the uh piercing o f the skin (lines 29-32, part 2)
So he asks his patient to show him precisely her cutting gesture with her hand 
without any instrument that could be used to make an incision in the skin. The next 
stage in his approach is:
to take that precision o f gesture in its speed and in the kind o f line that it made 
and simply orient it away from the body” (lines 80-82, part 2) because this 
gesture was associated to cutting (lines 84-85, part 2)
146
In his explanation o f how he works specifically with the gesture o f cutting 
with self-injuring clients, Mark draws on specific terms such as “impulse to cut” (line 
6, part 2), “activation” (line 92), “peak of activation” (line 90, part 2), “motor 
neurons” (line 124, part 2) and “brain” (line 128, part 2) in order to connect to a 
neuroscience discourse.
Interestingly, his unorthodox style o f working with the patient’s “gesture as if 
you were cutting” (lines 127-128, part 2) is not documented in the literature. Neither 
is it mentioned by any o f the other clinicians in this study. I believe that Mark is 
aware o f the absence o f documented literature for his unique style o f working with 
self-injuring patients. In light o f this, I think he is trying to articulate an argument to 
legitimise his approach to himself, to me and to the wider therapeutic, scientific and 
medical communities as he responds to my questions. When working initially with 
self-injuring clients, he admits, “I didn’t know motor neurons at the time” (lines 122­
123, part 2). He follows this statement by launching into constructing a discourse 
community o f verification, drawing on a neuroscience discourse to support his 
treatment approach. Mark argues that the “looking for a match round the movement” 
(line 121, part 2) “you could even see it in terms o f  motor neurons” (lines 123-124, 
part 2). He elaborates on this scientific discourse of verification as he explains:
if  you’re taking the gesture as if you were cutting your brain will give you the 
kickback for that as if you are (lines 127-129, part 2) and so it’ll be milder 
than the than actually doing it but you’ll still get an effect as if you are doing it 
(lines 131-133, part 2) so it’ll miss some local release but (line 135, part 2) it 
will kick off the same neurons (line 136-137, part 2)
I mean scientifically speaking you know so it’s just a matter of uncoupling it 
from some elements o f the action (lines 139-141, part 2) so that um by not 
doing the gesture you won’t get that effect (lines 143-144, part 2)
In the following Extract 8, Mark elaborates further on the neuroscience 
community’s discourse about “motor neurons” (line 152, part 2) to validate or endorse 
his particular treatment approach in relation to the gesture o f cutting.
Extract 8
Lines 152-232, part 2 C: Well motor neurons are this is open to some debate in
terms o f human um (1) importance but they’re they’re 
they’re a class o f neuron that span sensory and motor 
um ability .hh I ’m not making them sound like much 
but that makes them very special because most uh brain 
cells are are either sensory or motor so they’re all 
sensory cortex or motor cortex so they’re .hh uh either 
you know so incoming information or outgoing 
information so these span both so for example if  you 
were having a cup o f  tea in fact if  we had you in a 
sophisticated brain scanner and part o f your brain lit up 
that uh corded with having some tea right .hh it would 
light up if you saw me drinking tea that same part of 
your brain would light up and if  you imagine drinking 
tea the same part o f your brain would light up .hh so um 
you have and the only difference would be [intensity]
I: [Mm-hmm]
C: So when you imagine doing the thing it lights up a wee
bit when you see me do it it lights up more and when 
you actually do jt it lights up more .hh but the same area 
lights up .hh ((cough)) and uh it also holds context and 
intentions it’s not simply uh that you had your hand in 
this way it would be the context o f  drinking tea .hh and
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so uh emotionally (1) it’d be considered a neural basis 
for empathy so we get an immediate read in people’s 
emotional state through uh .hh you know if their face 
goes into disgust then the part o f my brain that registers 
disgust will light up and I know in a fe]t sense 
immediately what it is right .hh so urn (1) so if I bite 
into a lemon myself I feel disgust not nice so if I see 
disgust in your face 
I: Mm-hmm
C: It lights up and if  I imagine disgust it lights up again
yeah so it’s why horror movies work you know the 
spiders crawling up the (.1) hero’s arms or legs the 
tarantula and we go [Ugh]
I: [Yeah]
C: Right so uh we’re uh kicking the football when the
match is on and stuff so urn (2) and it works you know 
the idea is that it codes emotionally and also for 
physical actions and and also for [thinking]
I: [Mm-hmm]
C: .hh as well so (1) um if  you look at it uh, if you look at
it that way then if  I imagine cutting that will have some 
[effect]
I: [Okay]
C: Right if  I see someone else cutting it’ll have an effect
and it’ll be a personal context with that too o f course 
and um if I do it m yself there’s the greatest effect so if 
if you if you thought if you think o f that skill and you 
think well what’s one what’s the smallest increment 
down from that it would be I make an action like cutting 
and that would generate a lot of the the associative 
chemicals now without cutting okay so that would (1) 
be just about as near as you could get to [it]
I: [Mm-hmm]
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C: (1) So making a you can see in that way that uh just not
making a gesture won’t do anything 
I: Mm-hmm
C: Just say oh don’t just don’t do [that]
I: [Mm-hmm]
C: Right or saying or not being precise about that gesture
then wouldn’t do anything because the very precision of 
that gesture was generating something .hh so you said 
Instead of doing that just do uh that well they’re just not 
related so how’s that and doing that going to have any 
comparative benefit so if  you take that and then make it 
there well that’s pretty close 
I: Mm-hmm
C: Just turn it a wee bit this way instead of that way there’s
a there’s an awful lot similar about those so it makes 
sense to me that that would have a somewhat 
comparative effect
In the opening sentences o f Extract 8, Mark begins his discursive argument by 
calling on a neuroscience discourse about “a class o f  neuron that spans sensory and 
motor um ability” (lines 154-155, part 2). He uses examples from everyday motor 
and sensory activities such as the drinking o f a cup o f tea, biting into a lemon, 
watching a horror film and kicking a football to further his thesis o f  how the brain 
responds in a similar way regardless o f whether we are engaging in these activities or 
observing somebody else doing them. By the time he reaches the focal point o f his 
reasoning: “I make an action like cutting and that would generate a lot o f the the 
associative chemicals now without cutting” (lines 209-211, part 2), one is almost 
convinced that this is the case even though he does not refer to any scientific papers to 
support this conjecture. His discourse builds the linkages very persuasively, to verify
his own position, as he describes how it works.
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Mark uses a psychiatric discourse about patients with borderline personality 
disorder (BPD) as being perceived as “untreatable” (line 270, part 1) and responded to 
with a “punitive attitude” (line 248, part 1) within “the inpatient setting” (line 283, 
part 1). He sets up this discourse initially with the following joke:
there’s a joke in psychiatry is how do you ((laughter)) how do you make a 
near-to-retirement um consultant uncomfortable in one word uh borderline 
(lines 232-235, part 1) Because they kill themselves as much as depressives or 
schizophrenics (line 237-238, part 1)
He informs me:
the view at that time (line 257, part 1) wouldn’t have been that borderline were 
treatable (line 258, part 1) and that (line 259, part 1) view would be retained 
by a number o f psychiatrists no matter what Marsha Linehan or anybody else 
is doing (lines 259-261, part 1)
He seems to be addressing his discourse to a wider community beyond me, 
including the staff in psychiatric hospitals and whose treatment o f particular patients 
can end up recapitulating clients’ traumatic experiences. Speaking o f patients with 
BPD, Mark argues:
they don’t get anything like the same uh compassion empathy or support so uh 
in in an inpatient setting in fact the opposite they’re the bane o f the life o f the 
staff because they end up chasing them down corridors and they end up 
smashing windows and their their acting their behaviour is much stronger so 
they um staff and hospitals um find find them very hard to deal with and so
151
they tend to take a punitive attitude towards them and so in that way they 
recapitulate the trauma (lines 249-250, part 1)
He follows these comments with the following utterances:
so in retrospect I kind of wonder about that you know you you wonder about 
uh chasing someone down a corridor and then being held down and and 
something stuck into them it’s it’s not good so but uh when all you have is a 
hammer then that’s what you do and that’s (inaudible) (lines 250-256, part 1)
He appears to be totally opposed to this form o f treatment o f patients that he 
perceives as normal practice in a psychiatric setting. However, there also seems to be 
a note o f resignation in his discourse about how things are in these settings as he 
acknowledges, “when all you have is a hammer then that’s what you do” (lines 255­
256, part 1).
Mark creates a humanistic discourse community o f verification to support his 
therapeutic approach. However, this is not as strong and repeating as his neuroscience 
discourse. He positions himself within a humanistic discourse that he argues views 
“something as seemingly pathological as self-harm” (lines 391-392, part 1) as having 
“a kernel o f wisdom in the behaviour” (lines 391-393, part 1). To my knowledge, 
there is no reference to support this view o f self-injury in the literature from a 
humanistic tradition. Therefore, Mark is constructing this community of verification 
in his dialogue with me in the following extract:
Extract 9
Lines 390-416, part 1 C: Because they start from (1) my orientation is from the
humanistic side is that even in something as seemingly
152
pathological as self-harm that there’s a there’s a kernel 
o f wisdom in the behaviour 
I: Mm-hmm
C: .hh So 1 start from that position not as a not as an idea
but as a reality so that .hh it’s not something I sign up to 
because (1) you’re supposed to ((Laughter)) you know 
if you’re from a humanistic orientation but it’s actually 
to see that it’s true that 
I: So you take it as a given
C: I take it as a given
I: Mm-hmm
C: And and I 1 take it that that has to be now a starting
point when I’m working with someone who’s self-
harming because uh on on a level that’s true for them if 
we can’t engage in that level w e’re not going to get 
[much further]
I: [Mm-hmm]
C: Going to lose we’re going to lose .hh (2) uh the
cooperation o f the unconscious you know that there has 
to be um you know .hh naming where things are at and 
and seeing that not in a punitive light just don’t do that 
.hh or only seeing that as a wrong thing or a judgmental 
thing so starting from the the viewpoint o f seeing 
acknowledging the (2) uh wisdom albeit skewed 
wisdom in their actions first
In Extract 9, I barely comment as Mark addresses me and begins to unfold his 
interesting and idiosyncratic way o f thinking about self-injury and his particular way 
o f working with self-injuring clients.
Mark also constructs a discourse community o f verification that centres 
around addiction, trauma and the body to support his views about self-injury and his
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proffered treatment approach. In the following Extract 10, he critiques addiction 
treatment programmes for ignoring the trauma histories o f addicts and the absence of 
“a strong somatic orientation” (line 383, part 2).
Extract 10
Lines 368-384, part 2 C: I I know w e’ve talked about this before in terms of
addiction you know like the elephant in the room in
addiction is body and trauma (1) right so up until a 
couple of years ago if  you look at most addiction 
programmes they didn’t include trauma (1) you know as 
an active teaching part o f the course and the the most 
addicts 80% plus o f addicts have active trauma histories 
or strong trauma histories and those are one’s 
documents so I don’t know about the other 20%
I: Mm-hmm
C: So you know one o f the recent sort o f the theory of
rehab is that their traumas get activated .hh and yet 
trauma was not part o f  a joint approach with addiction 
.hh ((cough)) even more elephant in the room is body in 
that if you look at most approaches to addiction they 
don’t include a strong somatic orientation .hh and if 
addiction isn’t tied into the body I don’t know what is 
((laughs))
He uses the metaphor of “the elephant in the room” as an idiom to refer to the 
denial o f  the existence o f the “body and trauma” in treatment programmes for addicts. 
His discourse shifts momentarily to one o f  accusation when he argues that, “most 
addicts 80% plus o f addicts have active trauma histories or strong trauma histories 
and those are one’s documents” (lines 373-376, part 2). It is not clear to whom Mark 
is addressing his judgment o f addiction programmes’ exclusion o f “trauma” (line 372, 
part 2) “as an active teaching part o f the course” (lines 372-373, part 2) even though
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“one of the recent sort of the theory of rehab is that their traumas get activated” (lines 
378-379, part 2). Is he saying this solely to me, or is he speaking to clinicians 
working in the field of addiction, or to all clinicians?
At this point in his narrative, Mark begins to link this discourse about 
addiction to self-injury as he informs me:
so the the cognitive elements of it are very well looked at and the emotional 
elements and relational elements and group elements and the body element 
just isn’t you know so those same principles apply um arguably even more so 
where self-injurious behaviour is concerned because uh the intensity has gone 
up a few notches you know it’s it’s similar in many many ways uh around 
there there’s probably going to be a trauma history known or unknown and the 
symptom profile suggests that the rate o f escalation and activation suggests 
that the the acting out behaviours and and thoughts and images that come in 
can certainly suggest it (lines 387-399, part 2)
Thus, he uses his critique o f addiction treatment programmes to highlight that 
his approach with self-injuring patients’ focuses on their trauma history and has a 
strong somatic orientation. What is also striking here is that he is not only criticising 
addiction programmes for not paying attention to the addict’s trauma histories and 
their somatic responses but he is also addressing other treatment modalities that he 
believes ignore the link between clients’ trauma and the activation/arousal levels in 
their bodies.
Speaking o f self-injury and chaos, Mark shifts to a discourse of opposition that 
was the exception to his more customary discourse o f verification. Locating himself 
within this discursive position o f opposition, he creates an imaginary audience who
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have not been through this experience of chaos and who tend to back off when they 
shouldn’t as their clients enter a field of chaos. He addresses a critique to this 
imaginary therapeutic community whom he constructs as a group o f people who do 
not like being exposed therapeutically to patients’ intensity or chaos. He uses this 
critique to articulate his own views and validate his therapeutic approach and outline 
the shortcomings of the wider therapeutic community as he sees them in relation to 
working with self-injuring clients. He argues:
people can stay away from it because o f its intensity either in what happens or 
blood or uh I don’t mean people who are doing it I just mean as a topic as a as 
a therapeutic engagement as a you know people m ightn’t necessarily be drawn 
to the area or want to go near it (lines 770-776, part 2)
He informs me, “I think that’s the paradox o f it is that when something gets 
more intense a lot of the complexity drops away” (lines 778-780, part 2). Mark 
contends:
in the moment o f trigger paradoxically all that drops away and you’re into uh 
you know maybe a skewed reaction but a fairly clean reaction in the sense of 
um its habitual elements and its predictive elements and uh its physiological 
elements (lines 786-790, part 2) So it um so the very place people shun or 
would be startled or alarmed by um you could you would see in a normal 
setting you would say that’s a place o f opportunity (lines 792-795, part 2) 
Because it’s the one time when all the complexities are out o f the way (lines 
797-798, part 2)
However, he admits, “it’s a very narrow window o f opportunity and and 
finding a way to um to deal with that is a very strong therapeutic challenge” (lines
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833-836, part 2). Here, Mark is proposing that there is “a very narrow window of 
opportunity” (lines 833-834, part 2) for the clinician to intervene “in the moment of 
trigger” (line 786, part 2) when the self-injuring patient reaches a nexus o f intensity 
upon entering “a field of chaos” (line, 862 part 2). He argues that this is the very 
point where “a lot o f the complexity drops away” (lines 778-780, part 2) and “that’s a 
place o f opportunity” (lines 794-795, part 2) for the clinician but “people shun or 
would be startled or alarmed” (lines 792-793, part 2) and “people can stay away from 
it because o f its intensity” (lines 770-771, part 2).
He maintains that when clients reach a:
nexus point the peaks o f the activation (line 851, part 2) then therapeutically 
people are naturally being alarmed by that because we don’t like intensity 
(lines 852-853, part 2) Culturally or socially or uh you know we we want to do 
it to the intensity what they’re already doing do you know which is we want to 
medicate it and you know you’re shaking get rid o f  it (lines 855-858, part 2) 
Take the Valium uh it’s loud quiet you know you know our our whole 
orientation is right because you’re now in the field o f chaos and um it’s a very 
hard thing to be in relation to and our client is exactly is relation to it and you 
think o f other things therapeutic to these an idea that we can embody 
something and therefore lead our client towards something that’s helpful and 
when most o f us come into the field o f chaos we we’ll run from it before a 
client does so I would argue that w e’re the great limiting step around that 
(lines 860-870, part 2)
At this point in his narrative, he seems to be drawing others, him self and me 
into a community in his discourse with his address o f “we don’t”, “we want”, “we’ll
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run”, we’re great”, “our whole”, “most o f us”, “you know”, “you’re now”, “you 
think”, “most o f us”.
Mark continues with his critique o f the “therapeutic world” (line 900, part 2) 
one in which he is implicated, and then shifts his discourse to distinguish between 
“them” and “I” . He claims:
it’s very poorly articulated in the therapeutic world (line 899-900, part 2) 
because in if you look at it therapeutically (lines 901-902, part 2) they talk 
about hyperarousal and going up going up into high arousal states but they 
don’t tend to distinguish between levels o f hyperarousal other than to say 
there’s dissociated hyperarousal and there’s hyperarousal and I would make a 
clear distinction between high arousal and a a line being crossed where it goes 
into chaos pattern (lines 907-913, part 2)
He continues:
And um so you can look at self-injurious behaviour as being reflective o f the 
level o f  intensity and being reflective o f the level o f chaos (lines 945-947, part
2) it probably speaks to high end trauma and it also speaks to the unlucky way 
their nervous system organises around intensity so that they’re going into not 
just hyperarousal (lines 949-952, part 2) they’re probably finding themselves 
more in a chaos field more than most and that doesn’t get differentiated 
enough (lines 953-954, part 2) It’s actually they’re they’re hitting those peaks 
more and they’re the peaks are worse (lines 958-960, part 2) It’s intolerable 
(line 967, part 2)
He argues:
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I don’t think that’s articulated enough that they get into they get into a 
particular quality o f hyperarousal which then demands extraordinary means of 
o f  management which it does because there’s that’s an extraordinary 
organisation o f experience it’s not ordinary (lines 970-975, part 2) And 11 
think it needs to be placed in that almost transpersonal language you know 
because it your body can’t tolerate it it’s in it’s a it’s a definition o f intolerable 
so that’s the challenge how do you tolerate the intolerable ((Laughter)) (lines 
978-982, part 2)
Mark seems to be articulating a language for understanding self-injury that he 
proposes, “needs to be placed in that almost transpersonal language” (lines 978-979, 
part 2). He contends that patients who self-injure are at the “high-end o f trauma” (line 
949, part 2) that they experience a “level o f chaos” (line 947, part 2) that’s 
“intolerable” (line 965, part 2) “which then demands extraordinary means o f of 
management” (lines 972-973, part 2) “because it your body can’t tolerate it” (lines 
979-980, part 2). He attempts to draw on a neuroscience discourse of verification to 
support this conceptual framework of self-injury by arguing that this is “the unlucky 
way” (line 950, part 2) that self-injuring clients’ “nervous system organises around 
intensity” (lines 950-951, part 2). Mark seems to be trying to create a language to 
carry an experience o f the “intolerable” and “extraordinary” arousal that he believes 
self-injury patients feel. He appears to be saying that this very experience cannot be 
articulated in clinical or therapeutic language other than the transpersonal.
He returns to his critique o f the therapeutic community as he addresses 
therapists through his discourse with me and demands:
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And show me the therapists you know at large or a psychiatrist or a 
psychologist who can do that and and they won’t fill a room you know 
because you have to have had an embodied experience to tolerate the 
intolerable in whatever setting that is (lines 982-987, part 2)
Mark criticises therapeutic frameworks that fail to include “a transpersonal 
view” (lines 1087-1079, part 2) in relation to understanding the “peak o f chaos” that 
he believes self-injuring clients experience. He argues:
when you get to that peak o f chaos to me you leave ordinary explanations as 
the only explanation and so to only explain things through the prism o f 
therapy or therapeutic field that’s not including a transpersonal view is daft 
(lines 1075-1079, part 2)
He concludes, “It’s like being left-brained about a right-brained thing” (lines 
1080-1081, part 2).
Mark is arguing that therapists who haven’t entered their own field o f chaos 
and passed through it, will not be able to provide this space and opportunity for a 
patient. He begs the question, “how can you hold a space a therapeutic space from a 
humanistic viewpoint (inaudible) viewpoint a body-centred viewpoint that empowers 
a person to tolerate the intolerable and you haven’t done it” (lines 991-995, part 2).
He contends, “If you haven’t you are the rate limiting factor” (line 999, part 2). 
Laughing, he proposes as the therapist:
you can encourage it and you can work at a lower level and you can have it 
establish a strong therapeutic relationship you can be as warm and 
compassionate as you like and if  you don’t have a relation to that place I think
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you’re lost absolutely lost there (lines 1001-1006, part 2) You know so 
whatever your medicine is you know and that can be spiritual medicine so you 
could be a meditator who has gone into chaos and can tolerate that field 
through the agency o f spiritual help through prayer and mediation whatever it 
is (lines 1009-1013, part 2) Or somebody who’s gone through it as an addict 
or whatever but somebody who’s gone into that crucible and survived it I 
think only someone there offers a felt sense in the room safety to that person 
that says you can hold it (lines 1015-1019, part 2) That you can you you are 
able to there is an option here not an option that I read from a book not an 
option that I think is a good idea but actually I am telling you with my body 
that there’s an option here and there’s not many people can do that (lines 
1021-1025, part 2)
Here, M ark’s discourse shifts subtly toward opposition as he speaks about 
clinicians who have no experience o f particular bodily states and have not gone 
through “that crucible and survived it” (lines 1016-1017, part 2). These clinicians in 
his view are “absolutely lost” (lines 1005-1006, part 2).
Another interesting feature o f his narrative is his construction o f a quasi­
neuroscience discourse of verification to critique other therapeutic approaches that he 
believes are influenced by a particular scientific framework. This pattern o f M ark’s is 
apparent in the following extract.
Extract 11
Lines 387-415, Part 2 C: You know and um ( 1) so the the cognitive elements o f  it
are very well looked at and the emotional elements and 
relational elements and group elements and .hh the body 
element just isn’t you know so those same principles
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apply um arguably (2) even more so where self- 
injurious behaviour is concerned because uh (2) the 
intensity has gone up a few notches you know it’s it’s 
similar in many many ways uh around there there’s 
probably going to be a trauma history known or 
unknown and the symptom profile suggests that the rate 
o f escalation and activation suggests that the (1) the 
acting out behaviours and and thoughts and images that 
come in can certainly suggest it .hh and even if  you 
don’t you don’t have to argue whether that’s true or not 
well that’s not my job to do that it’s simply noting that 
it looks like trauma is ((laughts)) is having an influence 
here (1) .hh uh on the one hand and then saying well as 
such the body ((snigger)) is um you know is is a central 
part o f this and uh you know uh an overall (.1) 
understanding o f this should include the body’s 
elements o f it you know because so much o f it’s 
implicit and that’s body and emotional it’s not cognitive 
and it’s not to divide the cognitive piece just to say that 
uh .hh you can you can miss the point if you only come 
at it from a cognitive you know (.3) .hh uh academics 
are very left-brain people and the problem is a right- 
brain problem .hh and people present in a left-brain 
manner and research is a left-brain topic
In Extract 11 Mark employs neuro-scientific terms such as “cognitive” (line
410, part 2), “ implicit memory” (lines 448-449, part 2), “right-brain” (line 413, part
2), “left-brain” (line 412, part 2), “sub-cortical reactions” (lines 450, part 2) and “the
cortex” (line 454, part 2) to support his argument. He uses this scientific community
discourse to validate his humanistic body centred view o f how to work therapeutically
with self-injuring clients. He argues that, “an overall understanding” o f self-injury
(line 406, part 2) “should include the body’s elements” (line 407, part 2). He posits
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that, “the cognitive elements of it are very well looked at and the emotional elements 
and relational elements and group elements and the body element just isn’t” (lines 
387-390, part 2) and “you can miss the point if you only come at it from a cognitive” 
(lines 411-412, part 2). Mark claims that, “the problem is a right-brain problem” (line 
413, part 2) “research is a left-brain topic” (lines 414-415, part 2) and “a lot of 
treatment programmes are based on a left-brain protocol or a left-brain” (lines 473­
475, part 2) “analysis and view” (line 477, part 2). He appears to be constructing a 
discourse where he is making over generalising comments about research being “a 
left-brain topic” (line 415, part 2), and self-injury “is a right-brain problem” (line 413, 
part 2) and “treatment programmes are based on a left-brain protocol” (lines 473-474, 
part 2). Thus, he is over simplifying a neuroscientific discourse about the functional 
characteristics o f the left and right hemispheres o f the brain by engaging in a 
metaphoric use o f neuroscience to validate his argument about why “the problem is a 
right-brain problem” (line 413, part 2).
Continuing with his quasi-neuroscience discourse o f the brain hemispheres to 
support his body centred approach, Mark posits that self-injuring clients are:
in nice left-brain mood mode and we can talk then they’re hijacked into right- 
brain mood and that’s where the problems occur for them their difficulties are 
in managing their their triggers and their activations that’s entirely been 
hijacked by implicit memory so up comes all the right-brain reactions you 
know are all the sub-cortical reactions all that stuff comes up (lines 444-451, 
part 2) And their management of that even if it’s with the cortex is is why they 
end up in hospital or why they end up in therapy (lines 453-455, part 2)
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This discourse of opposition is the exception rather that the norm for M ark’s 
discursive pattern. He criticises science because he proposes that if the clinician 
moves into a scientific position to comprehend his/her patients, s/he will not be able 
to understand their first person or subjective experience. He asserts that science 
“continually elevates objective experience over subjective experience and that’s a 
difficulty when our clients ((Laughter)) with subjective experience you know uh they 
they’re there’s a clash in it” (lines 483-486, part 2). Mark uses the metaphor of 
“applying two different languages” (line 487, part 2) to emphasise his argument that 
there is “a clash” (line 486, part 2) or “a mismatch” (line 491, part 2) between 
scientifically oriented treatment approaches and the patients’ subjective experience 
when they get into difficulty trying to manage “their triggers and their activations” 
(lines 447-448, part 2). He claims:
So w e’re you know we’re applying two different languages w e’re saying it has 
to be through this language and they’re saying uh yeah it’s fine we talk 
English but I go into Chinese or Russian whenever I get bothered so it’s uh 
there’s a mismatch (lines 486-491, part 2)
In summary, Mark draws predominantly on a discourse of verification and a 
repeating neuroscience discourse to validate his unique application o f merging 
humanistic and body-oriented psychotherapeutic approaches to treating self-injuring 
clients. His unconventional style of focusing on the patient’s “gesture as if  you were 
cutting” (lines 127-128, part 2) is not documented in the literature and neither is it 
articulated by any o f the clinicians in this research study. He also employs a 
discourse o f opposition, although, it is not as pervasive as his discourse o f 
verification. His narrative suggests that he is searching for a language that describes
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his construction o f self-injury and his specific treatment approach and that also 
traverses his discourse of verification and opposition.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I examined the clinicians’ discourses that pertain to the 
conceptual frameworks on which they draw on to understand self-injury and their 
treatment practice with self-injuring patients. Surprisingly, none o f the eight 
clinicians speak in terms o f theoretical or conceptual models; instead, they all seem to 
create discourse communities of “an other” to formulate their beliefs about self-injury 
and its treatment. However, this pattern o f creating discourse communities only 
emerges as a transitory reference for four o f the eight clinicians (Ciara, David, Sinead 
and Mike) and is not maintained throughout their narratives. In contrast, the other 
four clinicians’ (Niamh, Jack, Mark and Eimear’s) narratives are rich with 
constructions o f discourse communities that appears as a repeating, persistent and 
pervasive style.
As I illustrated in this chapter with numerous extracts from the clinicians’ 
interview transcripts, their constructions o f  imaginary “other” discourse communities 
in their narratives to formulate their beliefs about self-injury and its treatment mirrors 
and stresses the variances among and between their various approaches and 
disciplines o f psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, psychology and psychiatry. For 
instance, the examples from Niamh and M ark’s narratives demonstrate how two 
clinicians from different disciplines can share the same therapeutic orientation and yet 
create different discourse communities to formulate their beliefs about self-injury and 
its treatment. Niamh is a counselling psychologist and M ark is a psychotherapist. 
Both o f these clinicians subscribe to a humanistic, body centred approach, yet they
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construct contrasting discourse communities to articulate their views about self-injury 
and its treatment. Niamh mostly formulates a discourse o f opposition to affirm her 
own beliefs and practices while Mark composes one o f  both opposition and 
verification but primarily verification, as he searches for a language to convey bodily 
subjective experiences. These patterns reflect not only the diversity and uniqueness of 
approaches and understanding among this small group o f clinicians working in the 
Irish context with particular reference to self-injury, but also different imaginary and 
shifting audiences.
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Chapter Six 
Findings: Styles of Discourse
In the current chapter, I discuss the research question that pertains to the 
explanations or models that the clinicians drew on to understand their current 
treatment practice effectiveness and failures with self-injuring clients. However, prior 
to launching into this analysis, I would like to remind the reader o f the range o f 
approaches that these clinicians use. These include dialectical behaviour, narrative, 
constructivist, humanistic/body centred, Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalysis, a mixture 
o f psychodynamic/cognitive behaviour/dialectical behaviour and a combination of 
cognitive behaviour and dialectical behaviour therapeutic modalities.
Two Discursive Positions
There are striking differences in the clinicians’ discourses with respect to 
taking a position about their conceptions of self-injury and their treatment approach in 
the face o f questions about the effectiveness of treatment. This questioning leads to 
either a defensive response, or becomes an opportunity for the clinicians to think 
deeply, critically and in unaccustomed ways by the fact that they are being asked to 
think about their current treatment practice effectiveness. Thus, two distinct 
discursive positions, which I refer to as the “expert” and the “inquirer” emerge in 
relation to clinicians’ conceptual orientations to treatment. Rather than naming or 
simply explaining their conceptual orientations, the clinicians engage with the 
interview itself, and with me, to open up an inquiry or to narrow the terms o f the 
conversation. These discourses show specific patterns. For instance, the “expert” 
discourse emerges as a repeating, clear, constricted, and unquestioning stance among 
some clinicians. This pattern has the effect o f shutting down any exploration o f other
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possible conceptual frameworks for treating self-injuring patients. In contrast, the 
“inquirers” appear to think out loud, muse, wonder, question and revise their 
discourses in response to my questions. Thus, this discursive position opens up a 
process o f inquiry in which the clinicians engage in a dialogue with me, the 
interviewer.
To illustrate these contrasting discourses in detail, I refer to extracts from two 
clinicians’ narratives (Eimear and Jack) as exemplars o f each style. However, before 
entering this discussion, I would like to briefly mention the general patterns of the 
other clinicians, Mike, Niamh, Mark, David, Sinead and Ciara, in relation to these two 
discursive positions o f the “expert” and the “inquirer”. Mike, Sinead and Ciara 
engage in an “expert” discourse, while Niamh, Mark and David speak from within the 
“inquirer” discourse.
Mike tends to adhere to a strong and narrow discursive frame o f narrative 
therapy throughout the interview. He repeats his discourse about narrative therapy 
throughout the transcript using the same words and phrases. He circles around 
answering my questions from his point o f  view and takes up a position of responding 
from the patient's perspective. At times, he tends to exhibit a dismissive tone. There 
are moments in the interview when he seems defensive and engages in a pattern o f 
resistance. Sometimes, he may be attacking o f me, or my language and my questions. 
For instance, he repeatedly challenges my questions, telling me, “I'm not sure what 
your question is about” (line 881) and “What do you mean what do I think it is” (line 
310). There is a recurring pattern in Mike's discourse where he appears to resist 
engaging in a dialogue with me about his thoughts or views o f self-injury. The first 
instance is in the early moments of the interview. Initially, he asks me to clarify my
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question about his thoughts on self-injury. Then, he gives me a very brief reply, “Um 
it's a it's a some action that somebody's taking in relation to their life” (lines 314-315). 
He immediately shifts his position to posing the following question, “Um if you're 
asking what do I think the the the their understanding is behind it or my understanding 
behind it um” (lines 317-319). I reply, “both yours and theirs” (line 320) and he shifts 
his discursive position to speaking about his clients’ perspectives. Thus, Mike takes 
up the “expert” discursive position in response to my questions in that he reacts to my 
open-ended questions by avoiding answering them, and then, responding briefly, 
curtly, “What do you mean” (line 300).
Mark and Niamh have very definite beliefs about self-injury and their 
idiosyncratic therapeutic approaches. Yet, they both engage in a discourse of inquiry 
where they enter a dialogue with me in response to my questions. Mark introduces a 
number o f varying discourses (e.g. neuroscience and quasi-scientific) and ideas 
throughout his narrative as discussed in Chapter Five. Therefore, he does not take up 
a repeating and narrow discursive position. An example of his discourse o f inquiry 
emerges in his responses to my questions about his external responses to seeing his 
patients’ injuries. Speaking “o f having seen an extreme” (line 1465, part 2) case of 
self-injury early in his career, he tells me, “I have a normalised reaction” (line 1466, 
part 2) “ to it” (line 1468, part 2). He then shifts his discourse a fraction and begins to 
question this “normalised reaction” (line 1466, part 2). Referring to his self-injuring 
clients he wonders, “did I just did they seem too normal to me” (line 1481, part 2) “to 
the point maybe did they want do they want me to react more” (lines 1484-1485, part
2) “but I didn’t” (line 1487, part 2).
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Niam h’s discursive pattern of inquiry is quirky in that there are two distinct 
patterns that deviate from the other clinicians. While her discusive position is 
predominantly one o f inquiry, there are moments in her narrative in which she 
initially appears to be closing down a dialogue by resisting and rejecting the 
categories I offer her in my questions. Then, she seems to shift by re-engaging with 
the question and responding. For example, when I ask Niamh about treatment 
success, she engages initially with the question. Then, she pauses and rejects the 
discursive term “treatment” (line 1626) and finally re-engages with the treatment 
discourse by speaking about what happens for patients who engage in therapy.
David positions himself within an inquirer’s discourse. In fact, his interview 
is the longest of all (total o f 195.56 min), which is a testament to his level of 
engagement in dialogue with me. His responses indicate this discursive position as he 
muses and wonders aloud as he answers my questions. For instance, when I ask him 
about his experience of treatment success he replies, “Goodness” (line 893, part 3) 
treatment success “is an area that we probably don’t focus a huge amount on” (lines 
893-894, part 3). He acknowledges, “one tends to be veiy caught up with those who 
are” (lines 894-895, part 3) “acutely presenting” (lines 895-896). He then launches 
into his familiar passionate discourse about his clients revealing, “there’s a few people 
that come to mind” (lines 898-899, part 3) “in terms o f outcomes” (lines 899-900, part
3)-
Sinead seems to engage in an expert discourse despite her funny, engaging, 
relational and conversational style o f interaction. She uses declarative sentences that 
are just short of generalisations on self-injuiy. For instance, she proposes, “we 
language in our behaviour” (line 236-237, part 1) that “behaviour is a way of asking a
170
question” (lines 95-96, part 2) and that “often” (line 251, part 1) patients who engage 
in self-injury “don’t know themselves” (line 251, part 1) the reasons or meaning 
behind their behaviour. She states, “The other people I see using cutting” (line 176, 
part 1) “are people” (line 177, part 1) “particularly young women with eating issues” 
(lines 177-178, part 1). She constructs these “young women with eating issues” (lines 
177-178, part 1) as moving “in and out” (line 305, part 1) o f  “the starve binge cycle” 
(lines 300-301, part 1) “And sometimes self-harm would be part o f that picture as 
well” (lines 307-308, part 1). So, Sinead offers these general statements as expert 
knowledge in declarative sentences.
While Ciara fully engages with me in the interview, her discursive position is 
mostly that o f the expert. She consistently draws on her psychiatric training to 
support her views. At times she seems to shut down any possibility o f  engaging in or 
exploring other discourses. For instance, Ciara did not directly answer my question 
about her experiences o f success with self-injuring clients. Therefore, there is an 
absence o f a discourse about her experiences o f success with self-injuring patients in 
her narrative. In fact, she avoids answering my question by launching into a discourse 
about a general definition of success. She replies:
Um I mean I think success is a combination of um it’s a combination of 
factors if it’s an affective disturbance that’s driving it well then medication can 
can be can be helpful um I think age and experience and maturity can you 
know can can settle it down without any sort o f  intervention at all um and 
whatever just addressing the addressing the the difficulty whether it’s an 
interpersonal difficulty showing people coping skills (lines 1298-1306)
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Ciara also closes down a discourse about failure in which she does not 
consider any other possibility beyond suicide, even though I invite an alternative 
discourse with the phrasing o f my question. I enquire, “Okay and how did you decide 
that that particular approach was or treatment was a failure I know you’ve mentioned 
suicide as the ultimate but if are there any other criteria that you would use” (lines 
1424-1427, part I). She responds, “Well I mean that would be the only way I would 
view a failure” (lines 1429-1430, part 1).
Expert discourse. Eimear establishes her expert discourse in the early 
moments o f our conversation. She constructs her subject position in relation to 
dialectical behaviour therapy. Speaking from this position she expounds the efficacy 
o f this particular treatment approach as the most effective model for treating self- 
injuring patients. This master discourse repeats throughout her narrative as she 
portrays Marsha Linehan’s ideas about self-injury and DBT as apodictic in that she 
presents her argument as being categorically true. She appears to accept 
unquestionably and uncritically the causes o f self-injury within a psychopathology 
framework. She asserts, “the majority o f people who self-injure probably have a 
diagnosis o f conflicts post-traumatic stress disorder or borderline personality 
disorder” (lines 599-601). The possibility that some individuals who engage in self­
injury may not meet the criteria for a diagnosis o f BPD or other psychiatric disorders 
and therefore, DBT may not be a suitable modal o f  treatment does not enter her 
discourse at all.
In conversation with me, about her understanding o f her current treatment 
practice effectiveness with self-injuring patients, Eimear is firmly convinced that DBT 
is the most appropriate and effective treatment for individuals who engage in self­
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injury. Staying within her expert discourse, she considers herself to be a clinician 
who “was particularly successful with a limited number o f people” (lines 1451-1452) 
who engaged in self-injury. She claims that in order to achieve this outcome, “it was 
a a considerable commitment” (line 455) on her part. Thus, she sets herself up as a 
significant contributor to her treatment practice effectiveness and as such maintaines 
her expert discourse. Eimear states, “I suppose as soon as I started to see in self­
injury I started to look for evidence” (lines 1484-1485) “based-interventions and even 
before I had the training I had the book” (lines 1487-1488). The book she is referring 
to is Marsha Linehan’s seminal text on DBT, Cognitive Behavioural Treatment o f  
Borderline Personality Disorder, which was first published in 1993. Speaking of 
applying Linehan’s treatment approach from a book, she proposes, “I think it was the 
success from that” (lines 1494-1495) “would have been encouraged you know 
management to organise training” (lines 1497-1499) within this CBT modality.
Despite Eimear’s obvious allegiance to DBT, her discourse suggests a 
committed clinician who is relationally oriented in her work and adopts a non- 
judgemental attitude with self-injuring clients. Indeed, she is opposed to the 
perceived view o f these types o f patients as manipulative. She points out, “But my 
own belief is that it’s a skills deficit if  they had better skills they’d use them” (lines 
245-246) “And I’m uncomfortable with the term manipulation” (lines 250-251).
Eimear engages in a discursive pattern o f a repeating and narrow stance. She 
repeats words, phrases and ideas associated with dialectical behaviour therapy in her 
responses to my questions about her conceptualisation and treatment o f self-injury. 
The most frequently repeating words throughout her narrative emerge as “dialectical 
behaviour therapy” (10 times) and “skills deficit” (14 times). In terms of a repetition
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of ideas, she constructs self-injury as a “maladaptive coping style” (line 132) and 
continues to repeat this conceptualisation in different forms throughout her narrative. 
For instance, she informs me, “I view self injury as a maladaptive coping style that 
somehow individuals who have experienced a lot o f trauma have learned that this is a 
way of self soothing” (lines 132-134). A few moments later when I enquire about the 
purpose and functions that self-injury serves for those who engage in this behaviour, 
she replies:
I think it’s very much self-soothing (lines 227-228) And it’s usually affect 
modulation (line 234) 1 think people learn ways o f behaving when they’re 
young that are maladaptive and unfortunately they continue to use them (lines 
241-243) my own belief is that it’s a skills deficit (lines 245-246)
Thus, she confines herself to a narrow discourse about the functions o f self­
injury and does not consider other possibilities with the exception o f one brief 
reference to “self-injury is a form o f communication” (lines 284-285).
Eimear’s repeating discourse about DBT and her construction o f self-injury 
from within that framework re-emerges in Extract 12 in response to my question 
about helpful strategies or interventions. Thus, she does not take this opportunity to 
introduce new information. Instead, she repeats what she has already shared with me 
earlier in her narrative as the following extract demonstrates:
Extract 12
Lines 1081-1099 I: Okay are there any particular strategies or interventions
that you find helpful working with this particular 
[clientele]
C: [I think] dialectical behavioural therapy is particularly
helpful
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I: Okay
C: I think the kind o f  description o f self-injury as a self-
soothing strategy is you know part o f somebody who 
has kind (.hh) o f a very sensitive um emotionnal 
[system]
I: [Mm-hmm]
C: Is very helpful the notion that these people have a skills
deficit and if they had the skills they would use them 
totally changes how you experiencing somebody
I: Mm-hmm
C: And it takes away the pejorative way that this group of
people are often dealt with
She does not engage in a pattern o f  elaboration or inquiry in her discourse. 
Eimear’s discursive style is predominantly a pattern o f short responses to my 
questions. Indeed, there are moments when I have to use probing questions as an 
invitation to expand on her brief answers as illustrated in Extract 13.
Extract 13
Lines 128-158 I: Um just in terms o f can you tell me how you think
about self-injury (1) what you think it is the individuals 
that engage in it 
C: (.hh) I view self injury as a maladaptive coping style
that somehow individual who have experienced a lot of 
trauma have learned that this is a way o f self-soothing 
I: Okay and are there particular types o f trauma (1) you’d
consider associated [with this or]
C: [It’s very d ifficu lt to know a very
large percentage o f the patients have a history o f some 
kind of abuse 
I: Mm-hmm
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C: They do seem to be more sensitive than other people
and when they get upset they get more upset and it takes 
them longer to settle 
I: Okay and when you say they they’re more sensitive in
what ways are they more sensitive 
C: That under pressure they would experience more
intense emotions that they seem to be unable to cope 
with and seem to be unable to modulate 
I: Okay and would you say (1) [that they um]
C: [So I’d say] they’ve a
skills deficit 
I: [Okay]
C: [In terms of] managing distress and managing emotions
I: Okay
C: But it may simply be that they have experienced trauma
to a degree that their emotion regulation system has 
become disregulated
In her narrative, Eimear makes a link between self-injury and “a history of 
some kind o f abuse” (lines 138-139). I try to open a dialogue about this but she does 
not take up my invitation. In fact, all she does is repeat my words verbatim and 
thereby, shuts down a discourse o f inquiry as Extract 14 demonstrates.
Extract 14
Lines 160-164 I: Okay but when you say um abuse do you mean physical
sexual [emotional]
C: [Physical] emotional sexual
I: Okay so it’s the whole range
C: The whole range
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When I broach the question with Eimear, about her experiences o f failures or 
partial failures with self-injuring clients, she replies in her expert discursive mode, “I 
don’t” (line 1578). Here, she repeats once more her familiar expert discourse about 
the success o f DBT and that she has had no episodes o f failure using this modality of 
treatment. She again seizes the opportunity to espouse the virtues o f DBT as she 
claims, “if  there was a failure it was in terms o f  convincing the government that it was 
worth funding this kind o f intervention on a large scale” (lines 1580-1582). Thus, she 
shuts down the discourse about failure.
To summarise, Eimear’s expert discourse centres predominately on dialectical 
behaviour therapy. In her narrative, she draws on repeating words and phrases 
associated with DBT in response to my questions about understanding and treating 
self-injury. Her discursive pattern is chiefly one o f  non-elaboration, an absence o f 
inquiry and short responses to my questions. In the next section, I explore the 
inquirer discourse, drawing on Jack’s narrative to illustrate this discursive style.
Inquirer discourse. Jack admits that his conceptual orientation to treatment 
is that o f both Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Unlike Eimear, this does not 
preclude him from positioning himself within the inquirer’s discourse in response to 
my interview questions. Jack's responses to my questions are predominantly a series 
o f monologues (varying in length from VA - 2 pages) with very few exceptions to this 
discursive pattern throughout his narrative. This is in sharp contrast to Eimear’s brief 
replies to my questions. During these monologues, a number o f different things are 
happening. It is almost as if I am occupying the subject position o f  analyst for him, 
while Jack positions himself as the analysand. In addition, there are moments when 
his discourse almost appears as a stream o f consciousness; he seems to be
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externalising his inner thoughts when he thinks aloud, muses, wonders and questions 
his discourse. Indeed, there is also a pattern where Jack tends to elaborate and 
develop his ideas as he enters these monologues. The following two Extracts 15 and 
16 are examples of the longest monologues in Jack’s narrative.
Extract 15
Lines 473-597 I: Okay an area you said about urn that there’s something
unspoken for the individual that engages 
C: Yeah
I: In this behaviour um what is that individual that
unspoken or are there certain generalising general 
things that people this population can’t speak o f that 
they have in common 
C: Well I think it’s al always these things are particular to
the individual although because we’re all we we (2) 
we’re all human and we have a certain common 
discourse if you like there are going to be (2) uh similar 
themes I think
C: Um .hh and like they’re always actually more difficult
to pick out it’s easy to stay with the individual and and 
and that that this these are the issues for that particular 
individual or these are the things that they’re they’re 
speaking about that are important to them hh uh if  I 
were try and generalise more um (2) .hh the (3) the I I 
think that there’s there’s something (3) uh oh where will 
I begin (2) I guess that there I I begin with the idea o f 
uh an an anxiety and an anxiety about (2) what the the 
person can speak that (2) will be uh acceptable or 
unacceptable to those whom they would wish to hear or 
wish to uh respond .hh um and the the (1) notion that 
um (2) a a person can (2) either imagine or or it can 
actually be the case that that something about the way in
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which they uh (2) see themselves um and who which 
they might wish to express .hh can be can seem to be 
entirely unacceptable to those who they would wish to 
uh accept it or to (1) to understand it 
C: And and most usually that’s there’s (2) this in in the
first instance uh is addressed to the parents (3) .hh uh 
that there there’s something about me as the person as 
the as the child or as the the young person growing .hh 
up uh that I feel is entirely unacceptable uh to to those 
whom I wish to to (2) whose acceptance I wish to to 
have 
I: Mm-hmm
C: Um .hh uh now and you see (2) then it gets a little bit
more complex you can see the kind o f the very very 
straightforward case .hh uh where (3) a in a in a 
particular in a particular family where there are there 
have been all kinds o f difficulties in terms o f of the 
parental relationship .hh that a uh a a young young girl 
in her early teens uh at at that kind o f uh where where 
her sexuality is beginning to develop .hh uh (3) takes a a 
or feels herself to be uh her her particular kind of 
desires to be completely unacceptable to those to to the 
(2) to the to the parents 
I: Mm-hmm
C: .hh I I I have in mind a uh a young woman who came
when she was in her uh (1) .hh early twenties and uh 
was quite you know was was cutting and uh uh and also 
had you know some uh eating difficulties and .hh uh 
whose whose parents had (2) been through a kind o f a 
long and acrimonious uh separation um which hadn’t 
quite come to uh kind o f the final stage when she came 
to me .hh um and (1) who was uh kind (3) o f trying to 
make sense o f her own her own desires her own sexual 
desires .hh um (2) and leaving aside all the kind of 
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questions o f how she came to have these particular 
desires .hh in the in the end her her behaviour was apart 
from the cutting and and the the the difficulty in in .hh 
uh uh the eating difficulties she was also very uh 
promiscuous and and was uh (1) you know (2) very 
condemning o f herself in that .hh uh and in the course 
o f uh coming to me she uh (3) began uh a a relationship 
with another uh woman who was (2) you know slightly 
older than her so she kind o f  uh her her the desires the 
sexual (2) desires that she had began to be expressed in 
a way that uh for her were was much more um (4) 
wholesome I guess .hh um and and in the course of that 
o f  that change from uh (3) that particular promiscuous 
kind of behaviour .hh to this this relationship she gave 
up uh (I) she overcame her her her the the cutting and 
also .hh her eating difficulties now that’s kind o f the (3) 
that might seem that the the answer to it is almost like if 
you can if if a person can uh allow themselves to uh 
find a way to express their uh their desire uh (2) without 
a overcome the kind o f the the the the sense of 
disapproval o f that desire if so such a disapproval exists 
then everything is solved you know but uh but clearly 
there were there were a lot o f (2) historical issues I 
mean there’s the whole kind o f particular situation in 
that family uh the the all the (2) the the lack of um 
connectiveness between the the the child and the parents 
because the parents were so engaged in in their in their 
own uh [struggle]
I: [Mm-hmm]
C: Uh in this ongoing uh war with each other that what
what (2) that it was actually it was almost impossible to 
be uh (2) to effectively engage the parents and for the 
child to be to to be heard um and and in that kind of 
situation (4) she turned to uh writing a diary on herself
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in a way nobody was listening to her so she she had 
found uh a way to do it uh (3) I’m not sure if I’m 
making myself veiy very clear on this I ’m trying to I’m 
sort o f struggling a bit to trying to uh to to kind of put it 
all together in a in a in a way that’s that’s fairly brief 
you know 
I: Mm-hmm
C: But I uh 111 feel I ’m probably not doing a doing the the
(2) the thing justice really in uh these these things these 
situations cases like this you know in in these kind of 
individuals tend to be enormously complex as we all are 
you know and it is very difficult to kind o f break it 
down to uh (2) strands that can be easily then uh they 
can be taken out and and used as a as a kind of a 
measure for other cases for other presentations (3) uh so 
I: So are you
C: [There has to be more]
I: [So that’s very interesting] so are you saying then that
in terms of um that each case is individual to itself 
C: Absolutely yeah
Early in this monologue, Jack seems to be addressing him self as he wonders 
how he would begin to answer the question I have posed to him about “the unspoken” 
(line 1147). The following utterances from him almost appear as an extemalisation of 
an inner dialogue, a stream of consciousness as he struggles to construct a response:
Uh if I were try and generalise more um the the 11 think that there’s there’s 
something uh oh where will I begin I guess that there 11 begin with the idea of 
uh an an anxiety and an anxiety about what the the person can speak that will 
be uh acceptable or unacceptable to those whom they would wish to hear or 
wish to uh respond (lines 491-497)
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He elaborates on his thesis o f the unspeakable and self-injury and he uses a 
case to exemplify these ideas. Jack does this without any probing questions from me. 
His speech in this monologue is almost uninterrupted except for my occasional 
utterances o f “Mm-hmm”. Towards the end o f this monologue, there is a moment 
where I seek clarification and enquire, “So that’s very interesting so are you saying 
then that in terms of um that each case is individual to itself’ (lines 594-596). Jack 
unusually gives a brief reply, “Absolutely yeah” (line 597). I respond with another 
question and he answers by returning to his repeating pattern o f long responses and to 
his familiar discourse o f inquiry. The theme he returns to is his argument that 
whatever the individual presents with is:
always individual they’re always particular (lines 604-605) so we still have to 
find out from uh from each individual at the individual level what is it (lines 
633-634) that has that can’t be spoken and to whom can it not be spoken (lines 
636-637)
This discursive theme of inquiry is illustrated in the latter part o f  his 
monologue in the following extract:
Extract 16
Lines 598-658 I: That the common (2) um .hh theme or behaviour may
be the self-harm 
C: Yeah
I: but the actual triggering factors
C: Yeah
I: And circumstances
C: Yes they’re they’re always individual they’re always
particular and I think that that there’s uh .hh it’s uh .hh I 
mean the the thing about this is true whatever you know
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whatever kind o f presentation you have I think it’s just 
as true in in in the in the case o f  the the the person the 
obsessional you know and even the extreme that the 
person has .hh you know uh extreme obsessional 
behaviour ( ) and so on it it it’s not it’s not possible 
simply to to nail it down to particular traits and then 
then take those traits as measures o f o f  uh (2) o f (2) of 
other presentations or o f  ways in which now that we 
know we’ve got this case then we can kind o f deal with 
.hh you know this other person who comes with similar 
uh (1) symptoms because it’s there’s I mean they this 
there are there are bound to be similar symptoms 
because w e’re you know (1) w e’re w e’re we’re similar 
in in that in the sense that we’re human and we we find 
ways to express ourselves within the the culture that 
that we we uh that we grew up grow up that that are 
going to there’s going to be a parallel kind o f a 
similarity between between one mode o f expression and 
another and at the moment in this in this present age 
you know (1) uh (2) self-harm tends to be one o f the 
modes of expression that’s available to people who find 
themselves with uh (2) faced with with something that 
can’t be spoken (2) uh so (2) we still have to find out 
from uh from each individual at the individual level 
what is it
I: Mm-hmm
C: That has that can’t be spoken and to whom can it not be
spoken (2) uh you know and uh and and in a way I 
mean and always there’s the question o f  .hh (2) well the 
uh the question o f  o f what’s what’s true in that and true 
in the sense o f actual fact and and what you know how 
and and and what’s understood or imagined by by the 
(2) um (3) particular individual you know it might be 
that that uh some that there is if the parent is (1) is
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listening but the the the the child for whatever reason
(1) uh (2) then sees the parent as someone who can’t 
hear (2) um so there’s there’s that kind o f difficulty that 
uh (3) how do you get over that and you know that it’s 
it’s not well I suppose what I ’m saving is that that 
difficulties aren’t external uh they’re they’re they’re (2) 
in the in the first instance um leaving aside cases of 
extreme abuse and and and uh (2) whether in the first 
instance there’s a kind o f an internal uh (.2) struggle for 
the individual (1) uh (2) about to speak in any case um 
and then the question o f well if I speak (1) who’d hear
(2) um so
Jack constructs self-injury within a Lacanian discourse o f the failure of 
language. He describes it as:
there’s uh the question of of language and the failure o f language in in uh in 
that whole idea o f in in in self-harm or in in the cutting and the failure of 
language which give which leaves no room except to find another expression 
(lines 849-853)
This discourse o f “the unspoken”, “the unspeakable”, “who will understand” 
recurs and repeats throughout his narrative. It appears to be a dominant framework 
for understanding his self-injuring patients and his analytic practice. Like Eimear,
Jack repeats some o f his ideas in his narrative. However, he diverges from her pattern 
in that he does not reiterate the same phrases to repeat his ideas about his conceptual 
frameworks for understanding self-injury and his current treatment practice. For 
instance, in Extract 17, this notion o f the failure o f language resurfaces in Jack’s 
responses to my questions about the models and frameworks from psychoanalysis that 
he draws upon in his practice.
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Extract 1 7
Lines 848-884 C: I mean when you think think about there is there’s
there’s uh the question o f o f language and the failure of 
language in in uh in that whole idea o f in in in .hh self­
harm or in in the cutting and the failure o f language 
which give which leaves no room except to find another 
expression (2) um so that’s kind o f (4) I’ve a bit o f (2) 
classical Freudian theory and a bit you know a big large 
part o f .hh Lacan in it I suppose 
I: Okay so you would draw on both
C: On both yeah definitely yeah I would I certainly would
and I think that probably probably that in in the main
(3) you know that uh 
C: I’d I’d I’d tend um other (3) other theories (4) like ( ) or
whatever attachment theory or whatever all these I 
mean I I tend not to I if  they’re there they’re there just 
because they’re there you know but I’m not particularly 
conscious o f them .hh um but this the the difficulty then 
I mean it’s it’s I um I (3) I sometimes wish I could 
elaborate the work in terms o f  the theory uh in a in a 
more um uh I know contained or a more (2) deliverable 
way and and I I I find that the whole thing gets mixed 
up together so much in my mind the the the, the practice 
and the theory are so kind o f interlinked that I find it 
difficult to separate it 
C: Um what what’s a theory from what’s what’s something
else
I: And you would feel that there’s something unspoken
about the way one practices (1) um that one can’t 
exactly [describe]
C: [That’s]
I: Exactly what happened
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C: I absolutely agree with that yeah yeah that’s no question
about it that’s one o f the real difficulties
Jack speaks about how language is failing him in his attempts to articulate 
responses to my questions and put words on his practice and the psychoanalytic 
theory he uses in his work. One can hear this struggle to articulate in the following 
responses where he stammers and repeats a word before continuing as he confesses:
I am not sure if I am making myself very clear on this I am kind of struggling 
a bit to kind o f put it all together in a way that is fairly brief you know I feel I 
am probably not doing the thing justice really these situations cases like this in 
these kind o f individuals tend to be enormously complex as we all are and it is 
very difficult to break it down to the strands that can be easily then taken out 
and used as a kind o f a measure for other cases for other presentations (lines 
409-417) I sometimes wish I could elaborate the work in terms o f the theory 
uh in a in a more um uh I know contained or a more deliverable way and and I
I I  find that the whole thing gets mixed up together so much in my mind the 
the the the practice and the theory are so kind o f interlinked that I find it 
difficult to separate it (lines 867-873)
I acknowledge Jack’s point about this struggle with language as I reply, “And 
you would feel that there’s something unspoken about the way one practices um that 
one can’t exactly describe” (lines 877-879). He concurs with me as he states, “I 
absolutely agree with that” (line 882). Jack’s discourse is unlike the other clinicians 
in that it is about discourse. He is unique in speaking about “the question o f o f 
language and the failure o f language in” (lines 849-850) self-injury “which leaves no 
room except to find another expression” (lines 852-853).
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Jack opens a discourse about psychoanalysis as “having a a a particular 
language a particular discourse which is slightly at odds uh with the rest o f the the 
common discourse” (lines 915-917) “o f medicine or” (line 920) “psychiatry or or 
even psychology” (line 921) which he constructs as “a kind o f a way a straight line 
discourse” (line 922). Jack’s inquirer’s discourse allows him to view psychoanalysis 
from outside his discipline. Referring to psychoanalysis, he admits:
in the main and it has uh a kind of a body o f theory that you know can can 
sometimes seem pretty whacky (lines 887-889) a particular discourse which is 
slightly at odds uh with the rest of the the common discourse (lines 915-917)
So here, he is talking about the difficulty of describing the analytic practice. 
Continuing with this theme about a struggle with language he speaks about “the 
reluctance to speak” (line 939) “I guess on my part but the part o f psychoanalysis in 
general” (lines 940-941). I wonder if Jack’s discourse about a reluctance to speak 
mirrors that o f his self-injuring clients and the discourse about who will hear if  I 
speak and whether it will be understood.
There are many instances in his narrative where Jack thinks aloud, muses, 
wonders and questions his discourse. The following Extract 18 is an example o f this 
pattern o f his.
Extract 18
Lines 1495-1539 I: No very interesting um I’m just wondering if you can
tell me about your experiences of success with this kind 
o f group
C: .hh Um (2) well now that’s that’s again another difficult
question my experiences o f what well I tins I ’d have to 
I’m starting with more general way I mean my my what
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does it mean to have success to be successful with .hh a 
a particular (1) client um it it it really means that they 
go off and they they disappear um and and one hopes 
that they’re living their life (1) reasonably successful (1) 
somewhere .hh um so that’s pretty well what I would 
expect and what I’d uh I’d I’d hope for for those whom 
I worked with who who self-harm .hh um all I would 
know is that the the something has changed in the 
course of the work and when they leave (3) they’re no 
longer cutting themselves um (1) and they seem to have 
made some (2) progress and movement in their life you 
know something has changed and it’s usually it’s more 
than simply not cutting themselves there are lots of 
other external circumstance they’ll have they’ll have 
done different things you know urn .hh (1) they’ll have 
left home or got a relationship or .hh done whatever 
they’ll so there’s a uh a a movement has begun in their 
life that that seek that .hh they’ll seek to uh that allows 
them some kind o f of o f  (1) enjoyment and and uh (2) 
progress uh that’s as much as I know I mean I (1) 
otherwise 1 I don’t know it’s not I don’t do a six-month 
.hh follow-up you know ((laughs))
I: Okay
C: So 111 take it to be the case and I that that things are are
are still fine six-months down the road but 1 don’t know 
that
I: Mm-hmm
C: You know and the difficulty with that is o f course if you
start if you go back (1) and you say to someone well 
listen I’d like to maybe you could come back in six- 
months they might or might not come back and if they 
do you know so so what (2) how (2) they’ll come back 
and give you a report but then for whom would they do 
that (1) for me or (1) or for them .hh um so all I can say
then is that .hh I think (1) I’ve been successful but I 
can’t prove it
Jack begins by acknowledging, “that’s again another difficult question” (lines 
1498-1499). Then, he muses as he poses the question, “what does it mean to have 
success to be successful with a a particular client” (lines 1501-1502). He provides the 
following reply:
Um it it it really means that they go o ff and they they disappear um and and 
one hopes that they’re living their life reasonably successful somewhere um so 
that’s pretty well what I would expect and what I ’d uh I’d I’d hope for for 
those whom I worked with who who self-harm (lines 1502-1507)
Thus, in his response to my questions about his current treatment practice 
effectiveness with self-injuring clients, Jack is opening up a discourse of inquiry 
about what it means to be successful with self-injuring patients or as he states, “a 
particular client” (line 1502). He speaks about the difficulty of trying to figure out 
whether one has been successful. Jack reveals:
Um all I would know is that the the something has changed in the course of 
the work and when they leave they’re no longer cutting themselves um and 
they seem to have made some progress and movement in their life (lines 1509­
1513)
He acknowledges, “Uh that’s as much as I know I mean I otherwise 11 don’t 
know” (lines 1521-1522). Therefore, Jack admits that there is a knowing about 
changes that he observes in his work with self-injuring patients, but he also holds the 
possibility that there is an unknowing too. He confesses:
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I don’t do a six-month follow-up you know (lines 1522-1523) So 111 take it to 
be the case and I that that things are are are still fine six-months down the road 
but I don’t know that (lines 1527-1529)
This leads him into a discourse of inquiry about the difficulty with follow-up 
sessions. Jack makes some interesting points here. He posits:
if you go back and you say to someone well listen I’d like to maybe you could 
come back in six-months they might or might not come back and if  they do 
you know so so what how they’ll come back and give you a report but then for 
whom would they do that for me or or for them (lines 1532-1537)
He concludes, “Um so all I can say then is that I think I’ve been successful but 
I can’t prove it” (lines 1537-1539). Thus, he acknowledges that he lacks evidence to 
support his treatment effectiveness with self-injuring clients other than his own 
observations of patient changes but in the course o f saying this he questions how he 
understands “success” and its limitations.
In summary, Jack locates himself within an inquirer’s discourse in which he 
appears to think aloud, muses, wonders and examines his discourse in response to the 
questions I pose. His pattern o f response is mostly a sequence o f long monologues in 
which he seems to be working out his thoughts in relation to the questions I ask him. 
He elaborates on his ideas and even draws on one o f his clinical cases to further 
articulate his view.
C hap ter Sum m ary
In this chapter, I considered the striking differences in the clinicians’ 
discourses with respect to taking a position about their conceptions o f self-injury and
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their treatment approach in the face o f questions about the effectiveness o f their 
treatment. Two distinct discourses surface with specific patterns. The “expert” 
discourse emerges as a repeating, clear, narrow and unquestioning stance among some 
clinicians. In contrast, the other discourse, that o f the “inquirer” appears to think out 
loud, muse, wonder, question and revise their discourses in response to my questions.
I examined two clinicians’ narratives in detail (Eimear’s and Jack’s), as exemplars o f 
both of these discursive patterns. Eimear’s narrative illustrates an expert discourse, 
while Jack engages in an inquirer discursive style.
These findings suggest that some clinicians may be open to engaging in a 
discourse o f inquiry in relation to questioning and revising their conceptual 
frameworks for self-injury and their particular treatment modality. Others may 
position themselves within an expert discourse where they are convinced that their 
particular conceptualisation of self-injury and treatment approach is the best and 
therefore, shut down any possibility o f exploring other discourses. I will discuss these 
findings further in Chapter Eight.
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Chapter Seven 
Findings: Discourse on Outcomes
In this chapter, I mark out the clinicians’ discourses with respect to the 
research question that pertains to the ways in which they gauge or measure their 
clinical effectiveness in their current treatment practice with self-injuring patients. 
They engage in various styles of response to my question where I invite them to speak 
about their experiences o f and criteria for measuring treatment success, failure and 
partial failure with self-injuring clients. In addition, the clinicians engage in various 
discourse indicators o f success, discourse indicators o f failure and a discourse pattern 
o f assigning responsibility in relation to treatment effectiveness.
Discourse of Success
I begin by discussing the clinicians’ initial responses to the first interview 
question that I had asked them in relation to treatment effectiveness. I commence this 
section o f the interview with a question inviting them to speak about their experiences 
o f success with self-injuring patients. Their various responses suggest that my 
question causes them difficulty. This is evident from their multiple patterns o f 
response that include a surprised response, a floundering response and a difficulty 
relating to the question.
David seems to be surprised by my question about treatment success as he 
responds, “Goodness um I suppose that is an area that we probably don’t focus a huge 
amount on” (lines 893-894, part 3). Here, he appears to be speaking as a collective 
voice on behalf o f himself and other clinicians whom he constructs as not paying a 
“huge amount” (line 894, part 3) o f  attention to their experiences o f  treatment success
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with self-injuring patients. He gives the following reason for this absence o f focus, 
“Um one tends to be very much caught up with those who are uh acutely presenting” 
(lines 894-896, part 3).
Jack flounders as he admits the difficulty o f this question. He points out, “Um 
well now that’s that’s again another difficult question” (lines 1498-1499). This 
floundering response o f his and his inability to take this discourse any further is in 
sharp contrast to his more usual pattern of fluent and elaborate responses. He 
continues to be thrown and disconcerted by my question as he struggles to articulate 
his response, “My experiences of what well I this I’d have to” (lines 1499-1500).
This struggle continues as he attempts to articulate his response, as he states, “I ’m 
starting with more general way” (line 1500) and then he stops and reframes my 
question as he makes the following address, “I mean my my what does it mean to 
have success to be successful with a a particular client” (lines 1498-1502). It is not 
clear to whom Jack is addressing his question, himself, me or some other.
My question about “what would constitute a treatment success” (lines 2071­
2072) appears to evoke a strong response from Mike. He exclaims, “Oh Jesus I've no 
idea” (line 2073), This response suggests that he has no idea how to answer the 
question I had posed. Then, he shifts the focus away from his difficulty in responding 
to my question and reacts to my use of the word “treatment”. He informs me, “I don't 
do treatment” (line 2076) and he laughs.
Niam h’s discourse also suggests that she is experiencing difficulty relating to 
my questions about treatment effectiveness. Indeed, she even articulates this problem 
in her address to me as she admits, “I can’t relate to the question Aida to be honest” 
(lines 1935-1936). She further reiterates her difficulty by repeating her reply, “I really
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can’t relate to the question” (line 1938) a second time. Despite this obstacle, she tries 
to engage in a dialogue about treatment success and failure. She begins, “I mean the 
word success the word failure doesn’t actually I mean it’s like you say to me is your 
life a success” (lines 1642-1645). She then opens up a discourse in which she centres 
around this question she has posed. She acknowledges, “I don’t know that my life’s a 
success I ’m doing my best to get by” (lines 1645-1646) “and to enjoy and fully live” 
(line 1648).
Ciara demonstrates a completely different response to my question about her 
experiences of success. She does not take up this discursive invitation o f mine. Thus, 
there is an absence o f a discourse about her experience in this area. Instead, she shifts 
her discourse by telling me about her thoughts about what success means. She states, 
“I think success is a combination o f ’ (line 1298, part 1) “factors” (line 1299, part 1). 
She explains, “ If it’s an affective disturbance that’s driving it well then medication 
(lines 1299-1300, part 1) can be helpful” (line 1301, part 1). She argues:
I think age and experience and maturity (lines 1301-1302, part 1) can settle it 
down without any sort o f intervention at all (lines 1302-1303, part 1) and (line 
1303, part 1) just addressing the (line 1304, part 1) difficulty whether it’s an 
interpersonal difficulty showing people coping skills (lines 1305-1306, part 1)
I now consider the various discursive patterns that emerge in the clinicians’ 
narratives in relation to treatment success, failure and responsibility for outcome. In 
mapping out the clinicians’ discourses in relation to the ways they gauge or measure 
their clinical effectiveness, there appears to be little to no systematic way o f thinking 
or conceptualising “success” with regard to self-injury. Rather, the clinicians seem to 
develop parameters o f success by looking elsewhere beyond self-injury itself. What is
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striking about their discourses is that they map out other markers of progress and 
appear to reach some agreement about these indicators.
Discourse m arkers of success. As a group, most of the clinicians give a nod 
to the reduction or cessation o f self-injury as an indicator o f progress with the 
exception o f Mike, who does not mention this at all. These discourse markers in 
relation to self-injury range from, “moderation o f self-harm” (David, line 1124, part 
3) “a reduction in frequency” (Mark, lines 1983, part 2) to “they’re less kind of 
preoccupied about it” (Ciara, lines 1321-1322, part 1) “that the self-injury doesn’t 
become part o f their daily routine” (Ciara, lines 1547-1548, part 1) to “they’ve 
stopped” (Sinead, lines 350, part 2). Some clinicians such as Niamh, Ciara and Jack 
all agree that stopping self-injury is not always an indication o f progress. Niam h’s 
discursive response to this subject matter is interesting because she tries to read me as 
she attempts to anticipate the response she believes I am searching for with my 
question. She does not appear to realise that I am trying to engage in a discourse of 
inquiry with her as she informs me, “I know that you want me to say that the self- 
injuring behaviours disappear but I’m I’m saying okay they reduce and they’re not the 
norm” (lines 1789-1791) “But that’s only one aspect” (line 1793). Ciara also 
elaborates on her discourse and makes the point that the cessation o f self-injury is not 
necessarily a reliable gauge o f progress. She claims that, “sometimes the self-injury 
can transfer into into again more subtle forms” (lines 1318-1325, part 1). She 
explains this point:
Um well I don’t think you can measure success purely on somebody stop 
stopping self-injuring because they might start writing very black stuff in their 
diary and it’s very worrying and they keep the diary forever and self-injuring
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has stopped but the actual psychological trauma hasn’t so I don’t think 
necessarily stopping the self-injury is a measure of success or otherwise (lines 
1311-1318, part 1)
Collectively, the eight clinicians in this study do not appear to adhere to a 
shared set o f specific criteria for measuring or gauging successful treatment outcomes 
with self-injuring clients. However, the following markers o f success in relation to 
changes they notice in their patients emerge in their discourses, improved coping 
skills, more enriching relationships, changes in discourse and knowledge o f 
themselves, increased functioning and active participation in their lives.
Two discursive patterns emerge in the clinicians’ narratives as they mark out 
the indicators o f success other than changes in the behaviour o f self-injury. These 
include a discourse o f elaboration and a discourse o f non-elaboration. A discourse of 
elaboration refers to the discursive pattern where the clinicians not only speak of 
markers o f progress but also develop their discourses to include an articulation o f the 
changes they observe in their practice with self-injuring patients. Three clinicians, 
Jack, Niamh and David engage in a discourse o f elaboration. In contrast, clinicians 
who engage in a discourse of non-elaboration do not go beyond merely listing a 
number o f indicators of success in relation to their treatment o f self-injury. In this 
regard, Mark, Mike, Eimear, Ciara and Sinead’s narratives emerge as discourses of 
non-elaboration.
Jack, Niamh and David engage in very different discourses o f elaboration in 
which they develop and articulate a discursive logic around treatment success and 
markers o f progress, which is the antithesis to the other five clinicians’ discourse. 
Their discourses go beyond a mere listing o f indicators o f success. They speak about
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their views about this subject matter and construct a logical argument to defend their 
discursive position.
Jack considers my question, “Urn I ’m just wondering if  can tell me about your 
experiences o f success with this kind o f group” (lines 1496-1497) and poses his own 
version, “what does it mean to have success to be successful with a a particular client” 
(lines 1501-1502). He then responds to this question telling me:
Um it it it really means that they go off and they they disappear urn and and 
one hopes that they’re living their life reasonably successful somewhere um so 
that’s pretty well what I would expect and what I ’d uh I’d I’d hope for for 
those whom I worked with who who self-harm (lines 1502-1507)
However, his discourse does not end there, he elaborates further and enters a 
discourse about what is known to him as the analyst and what is unknown to him in 
relation to the client’s treatment progress. He admits:
Um all I would know is that the the something has changed in the course of 
the work and when they leave they’re no longer cutting themselves um and 
they seem to have made some progress and movement in their life you know 
something has changed and it’s usually it’s more than simply not cutting 
themselves there are lots o f other external circumstances they’ll have they’ll 
have done different things you know um they’ll have left home or got a 
relationship or done whatever they’ll so there’s a uh a a movement has begun 
in their life that that seek that they’ll seek to uh that allows them some kind o f 
o f  o f enjoyment and and uh progress (lines 1509-1521)
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Jack is the only clinician who names a change in the patient’s discourse as an 
indicator o f an advance in treatment. This is not surprising considering he is a 
psychoanalyst who applies a Lacanian framework and therefore, focuses on the 
analysand’s speech and discourse in his analysis o f self-injuring clients. He explains 
that this discourse marker:
becomes much more elaborated and uh you know the and and the the uh the 
focus on uh the the the particular things that might have that are a are kind of 
tied up with uh with the cutting (lines 1553-1556) Uh that that tends to have 
fallen away both the both the behaviour but also uh a lot o f the other ways in 
which the person will have made sense o f things you know that their their 
sense of things uh their understanding would have been become much more 
um multilayered (lines 1558-1563)
In relation to these markers of success, Jack concludes, “Uh that’s as much as 
I know I mean I otherwise 11 don’t know it’s not I don’t do a six-month follow-up 
you know” (lines 1521-1523). He elaborates, “So 111 take it to be the case and I that 
that things are are are still Fine six months down the road but I don’t know that” (lines 
1527-1529). He admits, “Um so all I can say then is that I think I’ve been successful 
but I can’t prove it” (lines 1537-1539). Thus, he is articulating that he has no formal 
systematic way o f evaluating his treatment success with self-injuring patients. In 
addition, he acknowledges that as the clinician, he has no way o f knowing if clients’ 
progress has been maintained because he does not conduct “a six-month follow-up” 
(line 1523). Jack’s discourse suggests that he is not necessarily in favour o f “a six- 
month follow-up” (fine 1523) as he questions whose interest does this serve, the
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patient, or the clinician, as he wonders “for whom would they do that for me or or for 
them” (lines 1536-1537).
To summarise, Jack engages in a discourse o f elaboration where he initially 
questions the whole notion o f “success” (line 1501) “with a a particular client” (line 
1502). He then names some markers of success such as “they go o f f ’ (line 1503) 
“they’re living their life reasonably successful” (line 1504-1505) “they’re no longer 
cutting themselves” (line 1511) “they’ll have left home or got a relationship” (line 
1517) their discourse “becomes much more elaborated” (line 1553). He also 
articulates a discourse that centres around these markers o f success as identified by 
him as the clinician, in relation to a client’s progress. However, he also speaks about 
an aspect o f success that is unknown to him in relation to whether these markers of 
success are maintained by the patient in six-months time. Thus, he acknowledges that 
he has no way o f knowing because he does not conduct six-month follow-up sessions 
with self-injuring clients.
N iam h’s discourse o f elaboration is very different to Jack’s on the subject of 
treatment success. Her discourse suggests that she has a difficulty with the language 
o f my question about, “What would constitute a treatment success with self-injuring 
clients” (lines 1620-1621). She responds, “Treatment success success implies failure 
as well doesn’t it” (lines 1622-1623). She further elaborates on her discourse about 
“treatment success” (line 1626) where she rejects my language. She argues:
I mean people who engage in therapy are not being treated (lines 1626-1627) 
They’re actually they’re actually learning from themselves to recognise and 
respect what’s happened to them and the pain it’s caused them and how to 
tolerate that and share it with you know other people (lines 1630-1634) To
199
actually be able to allow themselves to own it in the presence o f other people 
(lines 1636-1637) and find ways on a daily basis o f coping with it that are not 
about further you know hurting themselves (lines 1640-1642)
She elaborates further and continues with her objection to the concepts of 
failure and success and questions their value. Niamh posits, “So I mean the word 
success the word failure doesn’t actually I mean it’s like you say to me is your life a 
success” (lines 1642-1645). She answers this question acknowledging, “I don’t know 
that my life’s a success I’m doing my best to get by” (lines 1645-1646) “and to enjoy 
and fully live” (line 1648). She concludes, “So you know it’s like that with a client 
too” (line 1655). She puts forward the argument that only patients can actually decide 
whether treatment is successful. Niamh proposes:
It’s like w e’re all looking for greater degrees o f freedom and to live more fully 
(lines 1655-1657) And you know no outside source is going to be able to 
assess that properly (lines 1660-1661) for me about my you know my life (line 
1663)
She contends that:
clients again will be able to say when life has opened up to the degree they are 
now (lines 1665-1666) able to tolerate respect (line 1675) the pain that’s 
happened to them in their lives and (line 1680) live more fully in the present 
(line 1683) and the self-harming bit is one aspect o f it (lines 1667-1668)
Thus, she appears to be proposing that only patients can judge whether 
treatment has been a success. She maintains that it is not a therapists’ role or function 
to make a judgement about treatment success and failure. She states, “And and I
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don’t think it’s a therapist’s job to hand out you know you’re an A+ you’re a B- (lines 
1945-1946) “It doesn’t have much reality” (line 1948) “for me really” (line 1950).
She explains, “D’you see I’m not really thinking in terms of failure pass or fail or 
honours” (lines 1841-1842).
In summary, Niamh engages in a discourse of elaboration but she appears to 
encounter some difficulty with my question about treatment success. Her specific 
problem seems to be related to the phraseology o f my question, which she rejects. In 
her narrative, Niamh objects to the notion o f people being treated and the concepts o f 
success and failure.
David’s discourse of elaboration about treatment progress is centred around 
his clinical experience with self-injuring clients and his construction o f success as 
“it’s going to depend on the individual” (lines 1109-1110, part 3). This discourse is 
consistent with a pervasive discursive pattern that repeats throughout his narrative, 
where he seems to think o f everything through the lens o f his clinical experience and 
his contingent or “it depends” (line 46, part 2) discourse. He is the only clinician who 
provides clinical examples in response to my invitation to speak about experiences of 
success with self-injuring patients. He replies, “Um well I suppose the I know the 
there’s a few people that come to mind I mean uh in terms of outcomes so is that what 
you’re asking” (lines 898-900, part 3). He continues:
Like I’ve had a few different and uh people male and female who’ve certainly 
moved on very effectively in their lives and uh attend me occasionally now 
largely for uh touching base reasons maintaining contact and um some of 
whom are on medication so it might be once in a six-month period or 
sometimes maybe once in a year (lines 902-908, part 3)
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Thus, David seems to hold the view that treatment can be a success even if the 
client still has reduced or less frequent contact with him. He appears to use markers 
other than contact as indicators o f success.
He develops a logical argument about his particular construction o f treatment 
success and markers o f progress. He proposes that success has different criteria for 
each patient and is related to the starting base, at which they started when they entered 
treatment. David tells me that the indicators o f progress “would have to be tailored to 
the individual base really” (lines 1498-1499, part 3). He refers to his clinical case 
examples informing me:
in those few cases I mentioned people’s lives obviously became very w e’ll say 
quite aligned towards uh what would be viewed as the average (lines 1110­
1113, part 3) for people as a whole that they weren’t having a crisis their lives 
had moved on embarking on relationships there’s stability work uh work work 
going okay etc (lines 1115-1118, part 3)
He argues:
So on those levels I suppose the the uh in those cases the the indications of 
progress were were great and over a broad number o f  areas uh another case it 
can be quite different um an index o f success may well be um moderation of 
self-harm (lines 1120-1124, part 3) Um it could be um a degree o f adjustment 
if they’ve been moving away from crisis presentations moving away from 
(lines 1126-1128, part 3) potentially dangerous forms o f self-harm um which 
either by intent or accident could prove fatal um could be establishing oneself 
in independent living (lines 1130-1132, part 3)
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In keeping with this contingency or “ it’s going to depend on the individual” 
(line 1109-1110, part 3) discursive position, he contends, “that being able to bring uh 
acute problems to the therapy session rather than acting out (inaudible) self­
damaging” (lines 1491-1493, part 3) “that will be a success” (lines 1493-1494, part 3).
David uses the analogy o f the Special Olympics to emphasise his argument.
He begins:
Um as what will be successful for one may be uh a a small opening for another 
uh but like the um Special Olympics for example um one could compare to 
another athlete and say oh well sure that’s not particularly high on the 
achievement stakes but it could be an enormously high on the achievement 
stakes if one looks at where the person was coming from (lines 1501-1507, 
part 3)
Thus, he is arguing, “what’s a success for one person um maybe maybe seem 
like fairly limited steps” (lines 1486-1488, part 3) for another individual. So he 
concludes, with his recurring discursive pattern o f “it depends” (lines 1507-1508, part 
3).
He also engages in a long and elaborate discourse about four self-injuring
patients whom he has worked with over a number o f years in his clinical practice to
support his discursive position on success. In fact, David’s narratives o f these clients,
extends for nine and a half pages of the interview transcript. He tells me about these
four patients and how they have moved from one end o f a continuum to another in
terms o f marked changes in their abilities to cope and engage in life activities. These
case examples seem to suggest that he considers treatment to be successful even if the
client still has contact with him. For example, he speaks of:
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one young woman (lines 908-909, part 3) who had quite a long history of uh 
self-harm through overdoses” (lines 911-912, part 3) who had been very 
emotionally unstable and inclined to respond catastrophically to all sorts of 
scenarios urn stressful scenarios or adversity or perceived adversity (lines 920­
923, part 3)
He explains that his sessions with her had moved from a “period o f protracted 
therapy” (line 986, part 3) to “gradually reduced the frequency o f attendances and she 
was now attending me occasionally” (lines 987-988, part 3). David informs me, “then 
a pretty major life stress arose” (line 989, part 3) and she contacted him “in uh a state 
o f acute uh distress” (lines 929-930, part 3). He notes:
the response on the telephone um when she called me actually had done uh the 
trick (lines 934-936, part 3) the contact had acted as a sounding board as an 
opportunity for her to express her upset but also to formulate a plan (lines 965­
967, part 3) she didn’t decompensate at all (line 991, part 3)
To summarise David builds his discourse pattern o f elaboration around his 
clinical practice from which he argues that success is contingent or “it’s going to 
depend on the individual” (lines 1109-1110, part 3). He puts forward a discursive 
logic from which he argues that the markers o f success are different for each 
individual depending on their “individual base” (line 1499, part 3) at the point of 
entering treatment. He draws heavily on his clinical cases and the analogy o f the 
Special Olympics to elaborate and support his argument.
The other five clinicians, Sinead, Mike, Mark, Ciara and Eimear’s, narratives 
emerge as an unelaborated discourse that rarely goes beyond naming a few indicators
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of success other than self-injury itself. For example, Sinead mentions the following 
markers o f progress:
in terms o f self-harm if you’re dealing with self-harm has stopped (lines 1389­
1390, part 1) that’s one marker (line 1392, part 1) the individual has managed 
to find a way to deal with the adversity whether it’s the how they deal with 
themselves or the their how they manage their emotions or some external 
adversity (lines 1395-1398, part 1) they feel more able to meet the challenge 
o f  that (lines 1400-1401, part 1) they’re more confident about how they can 
move through it (lines 1406-1407, p a r t)
She does not develop her discourse further, other than adding:
So you know in many ways that 1 mean success is yes and the symptoms are 
gone (lines 1407-1408, part 1) the story has a happy ending ((laughter)) but 
you know it’s not always that clear (lines 1410-1411, part 1) Sometimes it’s 
simply I’ve got enough here to feel that I have the skills or the confidence or 
the strategies to to manage (lines 1413-1415, part 1) from here on in and that I 
have management rather than it’s gone (lines 1417-1418, part 1)
What strikes me about her discourse is the missing reference to changes in 
patients’ relationships. This omission stands out because she specifically mentions 
attachment theory as a framework that she draws on in her work.
M ike’s discourse about markers o f progress is brief. Surprisingly, he does not 
name the cessation or reduction o f self-injury as an indicator o f  success. His 
indicators o f success are broad and general statements and he does not explain what 
they mean. He articulates:
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I just would see success as people sort o f leaving with different knowledges 
about their lives with with with uh a sense of direction in their lives with sort 
o f um a sense o f knowing what they need to do rather than what I need to do 
for them (lines 1648-1652) it’s more than somebody just leaving and saying 
that they’re happy you know (lines 2081-2082) Because but it’s also me from 
being happy for them to leave as well (lines 2083-2084) if they’re they’re 
they’re doing something that’s healthier or if they’re responding to their 
experiences in a way that isn’t harmful to themselves or others so that would 
be a success (lines 2086-2089)
Mark is the only clinician whose discourse about signs o f success does not go 
beyond self-injury. Thus, he engages in a limited discourse in relation to gauges of 
treatment success. He states, “so from a decrease in frequency over time um to 
extended you know increasing gaps between uh harming right up to practically 
practical cessation of o f o f uh harming” (lines 1696-1699, part 2).
Ciara’s discourse is also somewhat limited in terms o f not elaborating beyond 
her naming the markers o f success that she employs in her treatment practice. She 
proposes:
I don’t think you can measure success purely on somebody stop stopping self- 
injuring because they might start writing very black stuff in their diary (lines 
1311-1313, part 1) So I don’t think necessarily stopping the self-injury is a 
measure of success or otherwise but if somebody’s functioning in their day-to- 
day activities they’re subjectively feeling better objectively they look better 
and they’re planning for the future they’re less kind o f preoccupied about it 
that would be more of a measure of success than physically stopping the self-
injury because sometimes the self-injury can transfer into into again more 
subtle forms (lines 1315-1325, part 1)
Eimear’s discourse is striking because o f its lack o f elaboration on an 
evidence-based discourse considering that she is the only clinician who declares, 
“Well I think it it you know I ’m a great believer in evidence-based interventions and” 
(lines 1380-1381) “certainly dialectical behaviour therapy is one intervention for 
which there is a good scientific evidence base in terms o f effect” (lines 1383-1385). 
She lists the following markers o f progress, clients are:
no longer patients of a psychiatric service” (lines 1459-1460) “the reduction in 
self-injury the reduction in time spent in psychiatric hospice the reduction in 
time spent with the team the reduction in medication and then the success in 
terms o f life goal that people were getting back into academia getting back 
into work getting back into the life that had meaning for them (lines 1524­
1539)
She also adds that “having more rewarding relationships” is another sign o f a 
positive treatment outcome. An interesting feature in relation to her list o f  indicators 
o f success is the absence o f a reference to self-injuring clients learning affect- 
regulation skills as her construction o f self-injury centres around these individuals 
having a “skills deficit” (lines 150-151) “in terms o f managing distress and managing 
emotions” (lines 156-158).
Her discourse of non-elaboration is more surprising than the other clinicians
who engage in a similar pattern o f not speaking beyond naming a few indicators of
progress. Eimear acknowledges being “a great believer in evidenced-based
interventions” (lines 1380-1381) and she claims that DBT has “a good scientific
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evidence-base in terms of effect” (lines 1384-1385). Yet, she does not engage further 
on either of these points. What is also interesting is that she does not elaborate on 
progress in relation to patients acquiring emotional regulation skills considering the 
central feature of her view of self-injury hinges around “a skills deficit” (lines ISO- 
151) in this area.
D iscourses of Failure
I now examine the various discursive patterns that emerge in the clinicians’ 
narratives in relation to treatment failure and partial failure. The clinicians’ 
discourses about their criteria for gauging or measuring failure and partial failure, 
with regard to their treatment effectiveness with self-injuring clients, is in marked 
contrast to their discourses about treatment success. Indeed, their discourses are wide 
ranging and unelaborated in terms of not engaging in a dialogue beyond naming a few 
markers of failure. For instance, Eimear’s discourse is a good exemplar of this 
discursive pattern as illustrated in the following Extract 19 below:
Extract 19
Lines 2115-2131 I:
C:
I:
C:
I:
C:
I:
C:
208
Um and then what would you constitute as what do you 
think constitutes a treatment failure partial failure with 
this group 
Suicide
Okay that would be the ultimate [( )]
[Mm-hmm]
Or would it be related to anything else (2) where a 
clinician might fail (2) with somebody who self-injures 
I suppose it it would be that or just failing to engage 
somebody in [therapy]
[Mm-hmm]
(9) 1 can’t think o f anything else
There is also a pattern among some o f the clinicians’ discourse where a level 
o f uncertainty emerges in their narratives in relation to what exactly constitutes a 
treatment failure. The following Extract 20 from M ike’s narrative is a good example:
Extract 20
Lines 1799-1822 I: Okay I was just wondering if you could tell me about
your experiences o f failure or partial failure in working 
with self-injuring clients 
C: (4) Um (10) sorry I’m not sure about failure ((laughs))
I: Mm-hmm
C: I know there was one person I met who came once and
who didn’t come back but that’s their choice so that’s 
not that’s whatever I was doing didn’t gel with them or 
whatever 
I: Mm-hmm
C: But it’s yeah (2) I would have liked if  they’d come back
because I thought we could have really got somewhere 
with it um (2) but (3) they didn’t come back I invited 
them back but they didn’t come back (2) so um see 
what’s failure ((Laughter))
I: Well what do you think failure is
C: Um (1) I think failure would be somebody leaving
having attended uh for a while, somebody leaving 
dissatisfied but if  they come for one meeting and then 
they leave and they don’t come back well they’re 
making a choice 
I: Mm-hmm
C: That this is not for them or this is not what they
expected or whatever (2) um
So initially Mike acknowledges he is “not sure about failure” (line 1803).
Then, he appears to be trying to work out what treatment failure is, and decides that a
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client must attend for a period o f time and then stop coming. This teasing out o f the 
concept o f failure surfaces in some o f the clinicians’ narratives.
Discourse markers of failure and partial failure. No singular clear 
discourse emerges with respect to markers of failure among the clinicians’ narratives. 
However, five discursive patterns surface across the group o f clinicians’ narratives. 
These include discourse o f failure in relation to suicide, discourse o f  disengagement in 
relation to failure, discourse of narrative experience o f failure, discourse o f  partial 
failure and discourse of remain the same or worse.
Discourse of failure in relation to suicide. The phenomenon of suicide as a 
marker of treatment failure with self-injuring patients emerges in four clinicians’ 
discourses, Eimear, Sinead, David and Ciara. A possible reason for this missing 
discourse in the other four clinicians’ narratives may be due to their clinical 
distinction between suicide and self-injury that they reveal in their dialogue with me 
about their conceptualisation o f self-injury. In response to my question, “what 
constitutes a treatment failure or partial failure with self-injuring clients”, Eimear 
replies with a one word response, “suicide” (line 2118) and does not elaborate further. 
In contrast, Sinead does not explicitly mention suicide as a treatment failure.
However, she does make a reference to the possibility that a patient could die as a 
result o f self-injury and that she would consider this “a real failure” (line 379, part 2). 
She states, “Urn I suppose a real failure would be if if they either didn’t want to stop 
or couldn’t stop and/or became seriously ill or died as a result o f the self-injury” (lines 
379-381, part 2). She concludes, “That would be the ultimate awful outcome” (lines 
383, part 2) “Bad outcome” (line 385, part 2). In contrast, both psychiatrists, David
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and Ciara engage in a more open discourse in which they speak about grappling with 
suicide, and the difficulties and the impact o f a client’s suicide.
David comments, “the ultimate failure is when a client commits suicide” (lines 
1165-1166, part 3). As a discourse marker of suicide as a treatment failure, he admits, 
“clearly if  you’re getting a a request from the coroner uh for a report you can fairly 
gauge that it was unsuccessful in the intervention” (lines 1272-1275, part 3).
Speaking o f patients committing suicide, he acknowledges that this “has happened” 
(line 1168, part 3) “in terms o f o f o f patients with a history o f self-harming 
behaviours” (lines 1168-1170, part 3). He confesses, “Um it’s very difficult” (line 
1170, part 3) Um there were times when you know that somebody you’re treating 
therapeutically may well uh end their life” (lines 1172-1174, part 3). David reveals:
I mean I have two in hospital at present and I know it’s a very distinct 
possibility (lines 1176-1177, part 3) Uh it’s extremely difficult it’s always 
traumatic um I suppose all you can do is acknowledge it and uh be open about 
it (lines 1180-1182, part 3)
His discourse on suicide ends here with no further elaboration.
Ciara’s discourse of failure in relation to suicide is the antithesis to David’s.
In Extract 21, Ciara engages in a long monologue that is atypical o f her usual brief 
discursive pattern o f responses to my questions. She appears to be making a plea to 
an invisible audience whom she constructs as not understanding the impact and 
effects o f  a client’s suicide on psychiatrists. In addition, you can also hear her 
discourse o f distress as she speaks about the personal impact that a patient’s suicide 
had on her.
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Extract 21
Lines 1336-1423, part 1 I:
C
I:
C
Uh and just around in terms o f I ’m wondering if you 
can tell me about your experiences o f failure or partial 
failure with self-injuring clients 
Oh well failure is suicide 
Okay the ultimate
(2) Um I’ve had people who have attempted hanging 
and have been caught in the act .hh um so that’s very 
distressing that’s very distressing for family for the 
individual .hh very distressing for the therapist and the 
doctor the clinician I think people .hh families 
individuals greatly under underestimate the impact of it 
on on therapists and um .hh (2) my view is that that 
individuals patients have a responsibility to their 
therapist as well emotional responsibilities .hh (2) and 
um I think it can be kind o f important to introduce that 
into a dynamic um particularly i f  somebody has 
recurrent suicidality and and quite often people don’t 
they think as far as the act they don’t think beyond the 
act they don’t think about who will find the remains and 
who will have to identify and the funeral and who will 
pay for the funeral .hh and who’ll be at the funeral and 
sometimes people fantasise about the eulogy but don’t 
actually think about the first week and the first 
anniversary and birthdays and how does your brother 
say when they go to see a doctor any family history o f 
mental illness and um and that can be very helpful that 
actually can be very helpful in terms o f suicidality and 
people talk about it when you make people walk 
through (2) if they committed suicide well beyond the 
the actual act itself and the impact .hh on A B C D E 
and the psychiatrist or the therapist and um (2) people 
feel that therapists become neutralised and immune to to
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suicide and they and they don’t and um .hh (2) I think 
it’s important to back that up where people have found 
that that really we don’t become immune to it it’s 
extremely distressing um .hh it’s much more distressing 
to lose a patient through suicide than it is to lose 
somebody through a heart attack and .hh there’s a huge 
degree of personal responsibility assumed and guilt 
assumed and regret .hh assumed and um again it’s not 
something we in psychiatry talk enough about is is is 
the .hh um is the huge distress that suicide can cause to 
us um (2) and quite often it’s not something you can 
share at home because it’s people don’t really 
understand it and you don’t want to be burdening 
somebody with that each evening .hh um, and your 
colleagues can often be quite busy so it’s very difficult 
to to um (2) personally I find it very difficult to to deal 
and cope with the suicide of a patient um .hh and I find 
it very distressing and and it comes after you years 
afterwards um and it never actually goes away and you 
never actually forget um may move on and get on with 
things but at the same time it doesn’t actually go away 
and quite often the anniversary o f the suicide the 
psychiatrist thinks o f probably as much as the the 
family members might think about and um .hh I think 
people aren’t aware o f that I think patients (1) family 
members feel that this is part o f your day’s work and 
you move on and it’s actually not
I: Mm-hmm
C: .hh And um so I try to tell people that particularly to try
((laughs)) and use it as a deterrent in some ways and um 
that they they might say oh my family have no 
experience of suicide so they would I wouldn’t know 
what they would expect and I can say well this is my 
experience and um (2) and again that can be um I mean 
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I don’t use it to manipulate but I I think I use it to try 
and illustrate that it’s not as benign an act as as people 
think it is so yes I have I haven’t had ((laughs)) very 
many suicides thank God but I ’ve had a few and um I 
suppose you could view them as failed deliberate self­
harm you could view them as suicide it depends (1) you 
know some some weren’t self-harm at all some were 
some were .hh (1) very deliberate acts o f  suicide um (3) 
and I’ve had a couple o f acts that have gone self-harm 
acts that people didn’t intend to kill themselves but that 
have gone very close to the brink because people have 
taken too many medication .hh too much medication .hh 
or you know (2) that they’ve the the precautions they 
took to be discovered didn’t actually work out or those 
sort of things (2) so urn (3) that’s it
In the Extract 21, Ciara enters into a very elaborate narrative about the 
emotional impact on the professionals involved and holds the view that the patient is 
responsible for the emotional impact of suicide on the clinician. She constructs 
failure as suicide as she states, “Oh well failure is suicide” (line 1339, part 1). I reply 
to her with the following, “Okay the ultimate” (line 1340, part 1). She in turn 
responds in which she speaks about how suicide is “very distressing for the therapist 
and the doctor the clinician” (lines 1342-1343, part 1) and her opinion that “patients 
have a responsibility to their therapist as well emotional responsibilities” (lines 1350­
1351, part 1). Thus, it seems that she holds the notion that suicidal clients have an 
emotional responsibility to their clinicians and are responsible for the impact they 
leave behind following a completed suicidal act.
Mid-way through this extract, Ciara constructs “people” (line 1370, part 1) as 
holding the view “that therapists become neutralised and immune to to suicide” (line
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part 1). She challenges this and claims that, “we don’t become immune to it” (lines 
1373-1374, part 1). She speaks o f the emotional impact o f  this, o f how “it’s 
extremely distressing” (lines 1374, part 1) for the clinician and that “there’s a huge 
degree o f personal responsibility assumed and guilt assumed and regret assumed” 
(lines 1377-1379, part 1). She refers to not speaking o f this experience o f a patient’s 
suicide among colleagues in psychiatry and that “it’s not something you can share at 
home because it’s people don’t really understand it and you don’t want to be 
burdening somebody with that each evening” (lines 1382-1385, part 1). She 
confesses, “Personally I find it very difficult to to deal and cope with the suicide of a 
patient” (lines 1388-1389, part 1) “I find it very distressing” (lines 1389-1390, part 1). 
Ciara maintains that, “quite often the anniversary o f the suicide the psychiatrist thinks 
o f probably as much as the the family members might think about” (lines 1394-1396, 
part 1). She admits, “it comes after you years afterwards um and it never actually 
goes away and you never actually forget” (lines 1390-1392, part 1).
This long monologue o f Ciara’s is an exceptional pattern in her discourse 
compared with her more usual brief style responses. She seems to be engaging in an 
elaborate story about suicide, speaking about the emotional impact o f a client’s 
suicide on her as a human being. It is almost as if she is seeking out someone to hear 
how painful it is to experience the loss of a patient as a result o f suicide. While her 
discourse suggests that she is trying to speak about what it is to face failure, she does 
not get back to my question of failure and her practice in relation to treating self­
injury.
Discourse of disengagement in relation to failure. The subject of 
disengagement as an indicator o f failure emerges in Ciara, Sinead, Jack, David and
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Niam h’s discourses. They all agree that disengagement from treatment is a measure 
o f failure, yet their articulations of this discourse marker differ considerably from 
each other. Ciara’s response is a one word “disengagement” (line 14, part 2) with no 
further elaboration.
In contrast, Sinead, Jack, David and Niam h’s discourses about disengagement 
in relation to treatment failure demonstrate a little more elaboration than Ciara’s.
What is striking about their discourses is that they appear to be exploring and 
considering different constructions o f disengagement as a marker o f treatment failure. 
However, they do not develop and elaborate their discourses beyond making a point 
of argument,
Sinead says, “these are the ones where they may not come back and you’re not 
sure what the not coming back is about” (lines 1423-1425, part 1). She offers a few 
brief insights about “what the not coming back is about” (lines 1425, part 1). She 
suggests:
It might be where I have not been able to offer them any alternatives to the 
self-harm in terms o f resources or strategies but also I think where maybe I 
haven’t really got a good sense of what’s driving it (lines 1427-1430, part 1) 
Or we we don’t agree (line 1432, part 1)
She explains, “like I might offer ideas about what I think and I would rely on 
the client on letting me know whether that or that doesn’t even interest them” (lines 
1439-1441, part 1). Sinead considers another alternative; “Um or it may not be the 
main reason they’re here” (lines 1445-1446, part 1). She elaborated, “That’s ju st part 
o f the picture but what they really want is you to write a letter ((Laughter)) to uh get
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an essay extension or uh you know not do their exams or you know” (lines 1449­
1452, part 1).
Jack’s discourse suggests that he is teasing out the reasons for self-injuring 
clients’ disengagement from treatment. He explains,
Yeah well I mean failure is where someone simply doesn’t you know if they 
they continue they their uh work hasn’t progressed enough so I’ve failed 
somehow to uh engage them or you know to allow some kind o f a space so 
that something can be spoken about um and they don’t turn up again they they 
stop coming I uh nothing I can do nothing about that (lines 1568-1574)
Thus, he considers the possibility that he may be a contributing factor to the 
patient not returning. He proposes:
Um I have no way of knowing you know in even in like in terms o f 
percentages you know how many am I successful with how many am I there’s 
no way o f knowing often the um yeah I mean it it’s rare enough for someone 
to come and say start speaking speaking about cutting themselves and um and 
then not continue for for a a reasonable period and and and make some sort o f 
progress even if not everything is achieved (lines 1575-1583)
Having acknowledged this, he shifts his discourse, as he wonders, “Um but 
then it may very well be that people come don’t just don’t say it and then those don’t 
come back again” (lines 1585-1587). Here, Jack is referring to the possibility that 
clients may come for treatment and not disclose their self-injury. He informes me:
Oh I think that that that can happen I mean I’ve no way o f how would I know 
that (lines 1591-1592) And in that I and I suspect that that must happen in a
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way it it there there must be element just as there are when someone comes 
and they they they want to speak about something whatever it might be uh and 
they come once or twice or three times and simply can’t find the the the words 
to say that or or haven’t been able to bring themselves to speak about to 
introduce whatever it is and they they go (lines 1594-1601)
In this instance, Jack is drawing on his familiar and repeating discourse of “the 
failure o f language”, what is “unspeakable” and “what can’t be spoken” as an 
explanation for self-injuring patients’ disengagement from treatment. He constructs 
these clients as individuals who “want to speak about something” (lines 1596-1597) 
“and simply can’t find” (lines 1598-1599) “the words”(linel599) “or haven’t been 
able to bring themselves to speak about to introduce whatever it is and” (lines 1599­
1601) “they go” (line 1601).
Speaking of disengagement as a discourse marker o f failure, David constructs 
it as “much less dramatic” (line 1184, part 3) than “suicide” (line 1166, part 3). He 
describes this failure as “where a person has um for whatever reason uh either fails to 
engage or having engaged then falls out with you and uh either refuses to return or um 
just simply vanishes” (lines 1185-1188, part 3). His discourse on this issue is 
interesting in that he takes up one discursive position and then shifts to another. He 
initially begins by telling me: -
Well clearly it’ll depend 1 mean if  a person um if a person uh disengages um 
but you obviously are notified that the same cycle is continuing (lines 1252­
1254, part 3) Um perhaps you’re being asked for information from another 
setting (lines 1256-1257, part 3) Um well then it’s fairly obvious that uh there 
hasn’t really been a successful intervention (lines 1260-1261, part 3)
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He then moves his position to consider the possibility that disengagement 
from one clinician may not be a failure if the patient shows up in another clinical 
setting. He points out:
Um if  someone you saw but Ireland is a relatively small place so you may 
have been seeing somebody for quite some time uh and then come across them 
in another setting and it becomes apparent that nothing really has changed uh 
then I suppose there’s been a a therapeutic failure but it depends on how how 
how one looks at it um maybe you could perceive it as being a failure but then 
the person is still there so maybe that’s successful (lines 1260-1270, part 3)
Niam h’s discourse differs from Jack’s and David’s in that she speaks o f clients 
who are unable to engage in a therapeutic relationship, or as she puts it, “I suppose 
somebody who’s so lost that they don’t respond to you know they don’t respond to 
relationship” (lines 1807-1809). She reveals, “And I suppose I’m thinking o f clients 
who have been caught up in the psychiatric you know services and have become they 
no longer believe in the possibility of you know o f of really living” (lines 1812-1816). 
However, she admits that this discourse o f  hers is general and does not specifically 
refer to self-injuring patients. Her discourse here suggests that she was working out 
her position on this as she replies:
But then I’m thinking o f clients generally again I’m not just thinking o f self­
injury (lines 1818-1819) And I’m thinking o f you know I mean it’s not even I 
believe in a way that people who self-injure are not people who are lost in you 
know sort o f the people I would see as lost and have haven’t the capacity to 
get something out of counselling are people who have been fairly long term 
involved in psychiatric services either because early on you know they needed
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help that they didn’t get (lines 1852-1859) and that they now are dissociated 
you know they have that structured dissociation inside themselves but they 
have the dissociation because of the level of medication as well (lines 1861­
1864) A dual thing going on (line 1867)
Niamh claims:
And I have met people who just can’t access counselling (lines 1869-1870) 
They don’t tend to be people who you know I’d never have said this in my 
mind before because I don’t think you know (lines 1872-1874) about who 
passes through the system and you know (line 1876) But now that you say it 
they don’t tend to be people who self-harm (lines 1879-1880)
Here, she draws on a contrasting discourse about “those people who have been 
fairly long term involved in psychiatric services” (lines 1657-1658) to articulate her 
construction o f self-injuring patients whom she views as being able to “access 
counselling” (lines 1669-1670) and have “the capacity to get something out of 
counselling” (lines 1655-1656) and they don’t “have that structured dissociation 
inside themselves” (lines 1662-1663).
D iscourse of rem ain the same or worse. The discursive marker o f remain 
the same or worse emerges in five o f the eight (David, Sinead, Jack, Niamh and 
Mark) clinicians’ narratives. What is striking about most o f  their discourses in this 
regard is the absence o f an elaboration beyond naming the marker itself. For 
example, David responds, “if you are seeing a person and if there’s no um discemable 
benefit in any way any o f the spheres whether it be social or personal or whatever” 
(lines 1277-1280). Sinead’s reply is also brief, “what they came in with is still 
present” (lines 1489-1490, part 1). She does not elaborate on this discourse o f “what
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they came in with” (lines 1489-1490, part 1) beyond articulating, “You know be it the 
bulimia or the um self-harm or whatever” (lines 1493-1494, part 1) “the range of 
issues are because 1 find there’s rarely one single issue” (lines 1496-1497).
Referring to clients, Jack constructs failure as “their work hasn’t progressed 
enough” (line 1570). However, he does qualify this remark by making the point that:
Often the um yeah I mean it it’s rare enough for someone to come and say 
start speaking speaking about cutting themselves and um and then not 
continue for for a a reasonable period and and and make some sort of progress 
even if  not everything is achieved (lines 1578-1583)
Thus, he seems to be acknowledging that his self-injuring patients do make 
progress.
Niamh makes an attempt to elaborate on her discourse o f remain the same or 
worse. She proposes:
if  you continue to self-harm at the same level obviously that’s something is 
going wrong (lines 1820-1821) Nothing is happening they’re not finding new 
resource they’re not finding you know a way to to process all the experience 
that have led to that type of behaviour (lines 1824-1827) But I’m thinking o f 
okay something is going wrong if  somebody still can’t access (lines 1847­
1848) you know another route out o f  this pain (line 1850)
She identifies how they get “worse than they came in” (lines 2050-2051) as a 
discourse marker of treatment failure. However, Niamh qualifies this latter indicator 
as she informs me that this appearing worse can sometimes be a sign that the client is 
actually working on their issues and that this is usually only a temporary state. She
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explains, “cause there are times when people appear worse” (line 2060) “when they’re 
actually allowing themselves to face the other histories” (lines 2064-2065) “Well yeah 
that’s only a temporary” (line 2071) “thing” (line 2073). Surprisingly, Niamh is the 
only clinician who makes this point, when articulating her discourse in relation to 
remain the same or worse as a marker of treatment failure.
Mark is the only clinician who develops and elaborates a logical discourse 
about, “An amplification” (line 1998, part 2) o f  “symptoms” (line 2001, part 2) as a 
possible marker of treatment failure as Extract 22 on the following page demonstrates. 
He posits, “A failure would be things get worse” (lines 2016-2017, part 2). He 
elaborates on this remark, explaining, “you’re tracking for other” (line 2026, part 2) 
“the intensity o f  symptoms” (line 2024, part 2) “you know nightmares uh panic 
attacks other other indicators that the somatic symptoms are uh are amping up” (lines 
2028-2030, part 2). Referring to indicators o f failure, Mark argues, “if your marker 
was an increase in simply an increase in self-injurious behaviour it’s a very high bar” 
(lines 2041-2041, part 2). He cautions that as the clinician “you want to keep an eye 
on the other things” (lines 2045-2046, part 2) in addition to the patient’s level o f self­
injury “Because the strong habit o f self-injuries can be one o f the last things to go” 
(lines 2055-2057, part 2) “because it’s so strong” (line 2060, part 2). Continuing with 
his reference to self-injury, he maintains that:
if someone’s harming themselves the same amount o f times but other things 
are decreasing then that would be (lines 2046-2048, part 2) you could actually 
see that as a therapeutic success (lines 2050-2051, part 2) if there’s less panic 
attacks there’s beginning to be more o f a handle on different things w e’re 
moving in the right direction (lines 2053-2055, part 2)
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Extract 22
Lines 1997-2030, part 2 I: 
C 
I: 
C 
I: 
C
I:
C
I:
C
I:
C
I:
C
I:
C
C:
I:
C:
And what would constitute a therapeutic failure
An amplification
An amplification of
Symptoms
Okay
So uh you know I I wouldn’t say there’s failure if 
there’s still the same frequency actually uh at this 
[stage] you know 
[Okay]
I would say just that you know w e’re kind o f we’re 
w e’re on a level playing field we haven’t we haven’t 
succeeded but we haven’t failed 
Okay
You know because nothing worse is happening 
Okay
I would see a failure as being I know it’s ((Laughs)) like 
wriggle room but that’s just how I see it cause you 
know you’re trying to make a difference that would be a 
success a failure would be things get worse 
Okay
Yeah so I don’t uh
How worse would they have to get before you consider 
it
Oh just worse if if  if  uh if  the markers because I would 
see it going up so frequency uh and even prior 
frequency the intensity o f symptoms 
Uh because .hh you’re you’re tracking for other 
Mm-hmm
You know nightmares uh panic attacks other other 
indicators that the somatic symptoms are uh are amping 
up
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Thus, in his discourse, Mark proposes that “An amplification” (line 1998, part 
2) o f “Symptoms” (line 2001, part 2) is an indicator o f failure. He elaborates on this 
marker explaining that this would mean “your engagement with this person is 
increasing their distress” (lines 2037-2038, part 2) “the intensity o f symptoms” (lines 
2024, part 2) such as “nightmares” (line 2028, part 2) “panic attacks” (line 2028, part 
2) and “other indicators that the somatic symptoms are uh are amping up” (lines 2029­
2030, part 2).
Discourse of partial failure. Surprisingly, Sinead is the only clinician who 
engages in a discourse about partial treatment failure, o f which she gives two 
examples. The first she details as, “Um I think if  I felt I wasn’t able to connect with 
them and understand the meaning the uh the self-injury had” (lines 365-367, part 2) 
“Um so that even if  they I mean if they were still continuing to do it but I was 
beginning to get some sense o f what what all that was about” (lines 369-371, part 2)
“ I would consider that more a partial failure I that we were beginning both client and 
therapist together to understand it” (lines 373-375, part 2) “Even if  we couldn’t the 
client couldn’t stop” (line 377, part 2). The second partial failure she explains, “Um 
partial failure sometimes because I think if  you can even offer them an experience o f 
therapy in a sense of sitting down and having a conversation with somebody like me 
was actually okay enough” (lines 1510-1513, part 1) “for them to it was like dipping 
their toe in the water maybe the first time they’ve talked to anybody about what they 
tell you” (lines 1516-1518, part 1) “and what they’re feeling and while they may not 
have got better in the sense o f the symptoms changing or going away um I would 
hope that the experience was good enough that they will come back at another date” 
(lines 1520-1523, part 1).
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Discourse of narrative experience of failure. Mark is the only clinician who 
shares an experience o f a treatment failure with a self-injuring client. He is open and 
honest in his disclosure about an experience o f failure where his misconception about 
trauma and addiction led to a failure in therapy. He acknowledges that he failed to 
ask a patient “addiction questions” (line 1801, part 2) because “I don’t always check 
for addiction” (line 1748, part 2). He confesses, “so that blindsided me from the start” 
(line 1807, part 2). He admits:
And so I missed when I look back on it I missed quite a few cues or clues 
around what was going on but I was just uh taking my lead more from what I 
already knew (lines 1809-1812, part 2)
Here, Mark is referring to the fact that he “already knew” (lines 1794, part 2) 
“there were trauma symptoms” (lines 1794, part 2). However, he reveals the 
following misconception:
I was seeing the symptoms one-way and and really I could have seen them 
another way if I had known they were actively I was seeing it oh it’s just 
straight trauma symptoms (lines 1814-1817, part 2) But actually they were 
also withdrawal symptoms (line 1819, part 2) the shaking was the was only a 
physiological discharge and actually they were actively uh having some detox 
symptoms (lines 1823-1825, part 2)
Eimear’s discourse about failure is striking because o f her disclosure half way
through her narrative, which could be constructed as a brief reference to a partial
failure with self-injuring clients. She admits, “Certainly when I was starting out I
made mistakes o f maybe not putting in enough things in place when I was taking
annual leave” (lines 1146-1148). She elaborates on the impact o f this mistake:
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And then the fallout would have been they would have had the kind o f feeling 
o f being abandoned that they might have had earlier on in their own lives and 
(lines 1150-1152) would have there would have been an escalation in self- 
injurious behaviour (lines 1154-1155)
She reveals, “As in fact just happened to me once on my first holiday when I 
was working with this group o f people” (lines 1157-1159) “I didn’t really realise the 
impact” (line 1161) “it might have on them” (line 1163). She acknowledged that she 
should have been aware of this. She confesses, “I mean on hindsight it was 
completely obvious” (line 1172). It is interesting to note that Eimear does not seem to 
equate her admitted mistake with that of a partial failure or rupture in the therapeutic 
relationship. This emerges in her responses to my questions in which she seems to be 
engaging in a closing down discourse about treatment failure and partial failure. She 
replies, “I don’t” (line 1578), meaning that she has no experience o f this. Thus, she 
makes no reference to her earlier declaration o f having made a “mistake” with self- 
injuring patients. Instead, she enters a wider discourse about failure and government 
funding as she states, “Uh I mean if if there was a failure it was in terms o f convincing 
the government that it was worth funding this kind o f intervention on a large scale” 
(lines 1580-1582). She appears to be unaware o f an earlier disclosure with respect to 
self-injuring clients in her narrative in which she admits that she made mistakes when 
she first began working with this group.
Discourse of Responsibility for Outcome of Treatment
The clinicians engage in a number o f different discursive patterns in response 
to this question. They occupy various discursive positions in relation to this question 
o f who is responsible for the treatment outcome. These include “it depends”
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discourse, shifted to the therapist discourse, shifted to the patient discourse, shifting 
discourse o f responsibility, and a “mixture” of responsibility in both client and 
therapist discourse.
Jack’s narrative suggests that he is grappling with my question o f who is 
responsible for the treatment outcome, as he contemplates how he as the analyst can 
fail and then shifts his discourse to include how patients can struggle with the issues 
they bring to analysis, as illustrated in the following extract:
Extract 23
Lines 1648-1674 I: And who do you see as as responsible for success or
failure or partial failures um (1) in analysis (1) the 
analyst (1) the individual that comes for analysis 
C: Well it 11 guess the the you’d always (1) it depends on
which point o f  view you want to take .hh (1) uh there’s 
in one way I can say that from the point of view o f the 
individual the individual doesn’t really fail they just 
attempt to to uh (1) to speak and find that that they can’t 
then (1) and maybe they will again at some other point
(1) .hh whereas uh how could you look at that as that as 
a failure it’s you know (1) they’re they’re struggling 
with whatever it is they’re in whatever difficulty or pain 
they’re in and that’s what they .hh (2) do um now as an 
analyst I can fail in lots o f wavs I mean I can just be 
simply distracted or tired or .hh uh (1) you know worn 
out from too too much work and I’m I’m not available 
not listening and 1 fail to pick up on something and 
that’s a failure .hh (2) uh so that that can be just that’s 
my failure uh if someone comes and they they can’t 
they somehow can’t find the words to express to to 
begin (.1) um then there’s probably not a lot I can do 
about that I can do (3) 1 mean I can be as available as
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possible urn but if it doesn’t work I’m not so sure (1) in
that case is that a failure on either part .hh (2) uh so (2)
that’s all I can say about that
It appears that Jack is unable to come to a decisive conclusion as to who is
responsible for the outcome o f the analysis, the analysand or the analyst. This is
based on his “it depends” discursive position that he explains as “it depends on which 
point o f view you want to take” (lines 1651-1652). Thus, he considers both subject 
positions in his discourse, that of the “individual” or client and the analyst.
In contrast to Jack, Mike is very clear in his reply, “ I think the, the therapist” 
(line 2144). He seems to be positioning him self within a shifted to the therapist 
discourse. Speaking of patients, he elaborates, “In that how we engage with people 
reflects you know sort o f the space we offer them” (lines 2146-2147). Mike then 
shifts his discourse as he critiques clinicians who blame their clients when the 
treatment is not effective. He argues:
And I think far too often I’ve heard it being switched back on the client you 
know that that person isn’t psychologically minded enough for therapy and I 
think it’s really interesting how when it doesn’t work out sometimes that we 
blame the client and I think we need to be looking more at ourselves the 
spotlight needs to be on our practice and what we do um rather than sort of 
saying well it didn’t work because the client you know they weren’t ready 
(lines 2149-2157) Or they weren’t this or they weren’t that you know are we 
the only profession it’s like uh that where it doesn’t work out that we blame 
them ((Laughter)) (lines 2159-2162)
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This discourse of critique is surprising in light o f M ike’s earlier responses to 
my questions about treatment failure. He appears to be revising his discourse here. In 
his previous discourse, he constructs patients as exercising a choice if they leave after 
one session and does not consider this as a failure in treatment.
Mark holds an opposing view to Mike, locating him self with a shifted to the 
client discourse. He states, “Oh the client” (line 2069, part 2) is responsible for the 
outcome o f the therapy. He is very definite on his opinion and reinforces this with the 
following comment, “Yeah I mean that’s that’s my view I’m just yeah absolutely” 
(lines 2071-2072, part 2). He argues:
It’s uh and that’s the double edge um with with um with this because there’s 
more intensity and because the stakes are higher in the sense o f just what’s 
happening that (lines 2074-2077, part 2) you’d be much more inclined to go 
into rescuer mode (lines 2079-2080, part 2) Um but uh you know if you’re 
really going to subscribe to the wisdom in in what’s happening it’s it’s really 
not to do with me (lines 2082-2084, part 2) And my job is to try and help them 
do what they can for themselves but it’s not me (lines 2086-2087, part 2)
It is interesting to note that it does not seem to occur to M ark that his 
particular body centred approach may not suit every patient and that this may be a 
contributing factor to therapeutic failure. In addition, he also appears to be unaware 
o f his earlier admission o f how his misconception o f  addiction and trauma led to a 
failure in treatment for which he holds him self accountable.
Sinead, Ciara and David all seem to engage in a shifting discourse with regard
to the question o f who is responsible for the treatment outcome. They shift between
holding the client responsible and then moving to a discourse about therapy being a
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collaborative process. Despite this shifting discourse, all three clinicians as their 
extracts reveal, hold to their belief that the patient is responsible. Sinead begins by 
declaring that she sees “therapy as a collaborative effort” (lines 392-393, part 2).
Then, she moves to a discourse in which she views the client as being responsible for 
the cessation o f self-injury. At the end of her narrative on this subject, she returns to 
her collaborative argument as illustrated in the following extract:
Extract 24
Lines 388-413, part 2 I: Mm-hmm and who do you think is primarily
responsible for the treatment outcome or the therapeutic 
outcome whether it’s positive or negative with a self- 
injuring client
C: .hh Um well I like to see therapy as a collaborative
effort you know [that it’s both]
I: [Mm-hmm]
C: Client and therapist working together towards a
common goal um but I suppose at the end o f the day (2) 
it’s only the client that can stop the self-injury 
I; Mm-hmm
C: (5) Um so I think you know they are responsible for
stopping 
I: Mm-hmm
C: I can’t do that
I: Mm-hmm.
C: (3) Um so it might be the responsibility is more
weighted towards them in that sense 
I: Mm-hmm.
C: But um (2) in terms o f the actual work o f therapy and
you know (2) striking a an alliance (2) I see that as
collaborative (2) and setting (1) goals that are (1) very 
much um (3) agreed upon and not imposed by the 
therapist on the client
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Ciara’s discourse of contradiction centres around her responses to my question 
about who is responsible for the treatment outcome. Initially, she states, “I think the 
person primarily responsible for any treatment outcome is the individual rather than 
the clinician” (lines 121-123, part 2). Then, she appears to contradict herself by 
saying, “I kind of try and work from from a collaborative point” (lines 124-125, part 
2). Surprisingly, she seems to construct working from a “collaborative point” (lines 
124-125, part 2) as “whereby the individual is at the centre and everybody else is just 
an assistant” (lines 125-126, part 2). She appears to be unaware o f  this constructive 
contradiction. In clinical work, it is generally accepted that if  the clinician and the 
client work in a collaborative way then, this means that they work together and that 
both have responsibilities. Ciara’s narrative as illustrated in Extract 25, suggests that 
she does not subscribe to this view.
Extract 25
Lines 117-141, part2  I: And I’m just wondering who do you think is primarily
responsible for the treatment outcome whether it’s 
positive or negative 
C: .hh hhhh (2) Well I think the person primarily
responsible for any treatment outcome is the individual 
rather than the clinician um one that was kind o f the .hh
(2) my starting point ((cough)) I kind o f try and work 
from from a collaborative point where whereby the 
individual is at the centre and everybody else is just an 
assistant .hh (1) so I think the individual is primarily 
responsible (1) and unless they take responsibility um 
despite the best efforts o f everyone else it’s not going to 
work 
I: Mm-hmm
C: .hh So hhhh um I think at times people aren’t able to
assume that responsibility and then at those times
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somebody else has to take greater steer but by and large 
I think .hh (2) the overriding responsibility is with the 
individual 
I: Mm-hmm
C: And that’s with any condition it’s not necessarily with a
psychological condition where .hh ((cough)) self-harm 
but it’s with medical conditions or whatever else you 
might have hh um but I don’t see the clinician as being 
ultimately responsible
David also seems to engage in a shifting discourse with respect to the question 
about responsibility for treatment outcome. Extract 26 illustrates his discursive shift 
in this regard. He initially holds “the individual” (line 1555, part 3) or patient 
responsible for the outcome of treatment. When I enquire if he would like to 
elaborate, he revises his original stance and replies, “I think it’s a collaborative” (line 
1558, part 3) “process” (line 1560, part 3). Then, he returns to his earlier position and 
informs me that, “everything is going to hinge on the individual” (line 1563, part 3). 
Extract 26 demonstrates David’s discursive shifting position on this subject matter.
Extract 26
Lines 1552-1574, part 3 1:
C:
I :
C:
I :
C:
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.hh Um who do you think is primarily responsible for
the treatment outcome whether it’s positive or negative
with self-injuring clients
(2) Uh (1) the individual really I think
Mm-hmm mm-hmm is there anything else you want to
say about that
I think it’s a colla[borative] process 
[Mm-hmm]
Um (3) I think what when I say the individual (2) uh 1 
mean everything is going to hinge on the individual 
[um]
I: [Mm-hmm]
C: They do a huge amount o f work (2) um (2) one
certainly can’t (T) impose an outcome on a person
I: Mm-hmm
C: Um (2) sure they may have a lot o f input (2) um they
have a lot o f guidance etc etc but nonetheless it is their
engagement (2) that’s going to be and their uh working 
with them that, that’s going to be (2) uh the ultimate
turnaround so um (1) so I say the the the individual
really
Niamh views both the clinician and the client as responsible for the outcome 
o f the therapeutic process. She claims, “ It’s a it’s a mixture isn’t it it’s a dance” (line 
2110) “ it’s a cooperative venture” (lines 2122-2123). She proposes that as the 
therapist, “Sometimes you follow sometimes you lead” (line 2113). She also 
acknowledges that as the clinician “there might be ways in m yself that I just don’t 
have the openness for some people” (lines 2112-2116) and she begs the question,
“how you measure it” (lines 2116-2117). Equally speaking o f patients, she suggests 
that, “A person’s life might not even allow you know there might not be enough 
safety or space in a person’s life a client’s life to engage with therapy” (lines 2119­
2121). She concludes her argument, “So two people in it” (line 2126) and repeats a 
variation o f her earlier question, “How you measure out portion out I don’t know I’m 
not trying to do that” (lines 2126-2127).
What is striking about Eimear’s discourse is the effort I have to engage in to 
eventually evoke a clear response from her about her thoughts on who is responsible 
for the outcome o f treatment. Her narrative suggests that she positions herself within 
a “mixture” o f responsibility in both client and therapist discourse. She begins her
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discourse by telling me what rather than who is responsible for the treatment outcome 
as she replies, “the quality o f the therapeutic relationship” (lines 2150-2151). Then, 
she shifts her discourse and tells me, “a bit o f both” (lines 2153-2154). I attempt to 
evoke a further more specific response from her with my utterance, “Okay” (line 
2155) to which she responds, “Um” (line 2156). Seeking clarification o f  what she 
means by the phrase, “A bit o f both” (lines 2153-2154), I have to explicitly ask her, 
“In terms o f ’ (line 2159). She informs me, “The individual and the therapist” (line 
2160). Extract 27 illustrates how I have to work at getting a direct and clear response 
from Eimear to my question about who is responsible for the treatment outcome with 
self-injuring patients.
Extract 27 
Lines 2147-2162 I: Mm-hmm okay (2) and who do you think is primarily
responsible for the treatment outcome 
C: .hh I think the quality o f the therapeutic relationship
I: Okay
C: So that’s probably just sitting on the fence a bit o f  both
I: Okay
C: .hh Um
I: A bit o f both
C: .hhUm
1: In [terms of]
C: [The individual and the therapist
I: Okay to see both as being
C: .hh Um mm-hmm
C h ap te r Sum m ary
In this chapter, I examined the clinicians’ discourses in relation to the ways in 
which they gauge or measure their clinical effectiveness in their current treatment
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practice with self-injuring patients. An interesting pattern emerges in their narratives, 
in that the clinicians engage in various styles o f response to my questions about their 
experiences and criteria for measuring treatment success, failure and partial failure 
with self-injuring clients. These multiple patterns of responses in the clinicians’ 
discourses suggest that they are taken aback by my questions, which also seems to 
cause them problems.
There is a striking absence o f a systematic way o f thinking or conceptualising 
“success” with regard to self-injury in the clinicians’ discourses, in relation to the 
ways they gauge their clinical effectiveness. Instead, they seem to map out markers 
of progress beyond self-injury. Collectively, the eight clinicians in this research study 
do not adhere to a shared set of specific criteria for measuring successful treatment 
outcomes with self-injuring patients. The clinicians’ discourses about their criteria for 
gauging failure and partial failure with self-injuring clients are in marked contrast to 
their discourses about treatment success. Indeed, their discourses appear to be all over 
the map and unelaborated in terms of not engaging in a dialogue beyond naming a few 
markers o f failure.
There is also variation among the clinicians’ discourses about who is 
responsible for the treatment outcome. Indeed, they occupy a number o f different 
discursive positions in relation to this question o f responsibility. These include “it 
depends” discourse, shifting to the therapist discourse, shifting to the patient 
discourse, shifting discourse o f responsibility and a “mixture” of responsibility in both 
client and therapist.
In conclusion, these findings highlight the complexities and difficulties that 
the clinicians encounter with regard to the evaluation o f their clinical practice with
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self-injuring patients. I believe these findings suggest an absence of a systematic way 
o f thinking or conceptualising “progress” with regard to self-injury among Irish 
clinicians. This is particularly surprising, considering the large body o f research, and 
current debates on the topic of evidence-based treatments and measuring outcomes. I 
discuss this point further in the next chapter.
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Chapter Eight 
Reflections, Conclusions and Implications
In this study, I marked out the discourses of a small group o f Irish clinicians’ 
that pertain to their conceptualisation and treatment o f self-injury. In particular, my 
study explored clinicians’ understanding of self-injury, their discourses about their 
treatment models and their perceptions o f their clinical effectiveness and failures in 
their work with self-injuring clients. I also examined the sources o f knowledge that 
contribute to the clinicians’ understanding of self-injury and of those who engage in 
this behaviour.
My research study is unique in terms o f its specific focus on clinicians’ 
discourses, which have not received attention in previous studies. Indeed, to a large 
extent researchers have neglected to focus on exploring clinicians’ understanding and 
treatment o f self-injury, with the exception of three unpublished scholarly 
dissertations, Huerta (2006), Keane (1997), and Williams (2005). In an attempt to 
address this obvious lacuna in the literature, my study has begun to fill in perspectives 
and voices not previously articulated.
While this study is a close analysis o f  a small number o f Irish clinicians it still 
has a contribution to make to the international literature on self-injury. I specifically 
designed my study to select a group of clinicians that would represent a range o f 
different clinical views on conceptualising and treating self-injury in an Irish context. 
Indeed, the participating clinicians did not disappoint me with their rich discourses 
demonstrating a variation across and among their narratives.
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Despite the diversity and richness among the clinicians’ discourses, I must 
admit that I was a little disappointed with the findings o f  my research study. This 
feeling relates to an expectation I had at the outset o f  this doctoral research that I 
stated in Chapter One. I wanted to discover new and innovative ways of 
understanding and treating self-injury that was unknown to me as a clinician or was 
not to date articulated in the literature. O f course M ark’s unique and novel approach 
to working with the gesture o f cutting was an exception.
Nevertheless, this study’s research findings have produced a few surprises. For 
instance, the level o f difficulty that the clinicians experienced in relation to discourse 
on outcomes surprised me. I was also amazed by the missing discourses across all of 
the clinicians considering the proliferation o f publications on self-injury. Finally, the 
clinicians’ tendency to create discourse communities rather than speaking in terms o f 
their theoretical or conceptual models of understanding and treating self-injury was an 
unexpected and interesting finding.
In response to my study’s four research questions, five principle findings 
emerged in this study across two core areas, namely clinicians’ conceptualisation and 
treatment o f self-injury and clinicians’ treatment success, failure and partial failure 
with self-injuring patients. The findings o f my research study suggest: 1) the majority 
o f the clinicians did not have a distinct model for considering self-injury and 
treatment approaches for working with self-injuring clients; 2) in place o f theoretical 
or conceptual models they created discourse communities o f “an other” to formulate 
their beliefs about self-injury and its treatment; 3) it appeared that the clinicians relied 
predominantly on their clinical practice with self-injuring patients for comprehending 
and treating self-injury; 4) in speaking o f their current treatment practice effectiveness
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and failures with self-injuring clients, the clinicians drew on two distinct discourses, 
an “expert discourse” and an “inquirer discourse”; and 5) the clinicians had little or no 
systematic way of thinking or conceptualising “progress” with regard to self-injury, 
yet they created “markers” of progress more generally.
In the remainder of this chapter, I consider the multiple explanations for the 
findings of my research study. Ireland as a social context and its influence on this 
study is also examined. In addition, the limitations and potential implications of this 
research study are discussed. I conclude by offering proposals for future research in 
the area o f self-injury and other clinical phenomena.
Based on the results o f this research study and the various interpretations I 
propose in this chapter, it is impossible to reach a conclusion as to the most likely 
explanation for the findings with respect to the clinicians’discourses in relation to 
understanding and treating self-injury. The impossibility o f settling on a specific 
explanation or conclusion highlights the need for more research to be conducted in 
this area as my study signifies several unanswered questions and puzzles in relation to 
the clinicians’ conceptualisation and treatment o f  self-injury. Indeed, A. G. Rogers 
(2003) suggested that, “Qualitative researchers typically raise questions that cannot be 
answered definitely or with a single strong interpretation— and good qualitative 
research commonly proposes multiple interpretations and raises new questions” (p. 
58).
Clinicians’ Conceptualisation and Treatment o f Self-Injury
Traditionally, self-injury was conceptualised within a psychoanalytic 
discursive modality. However, contemporary discourses in the literature have shifted 
towards locating an understanding o f self-injury within several models. S. N. Shaw
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(2002) suggested that, “ ...many authors understand self-injury in terms o f more than 
one model” (p. 199). In contrast, the clinicians’ discourses in my study did not 
suggest that they draw on multiple frameworks to understand self-injury beyond their 
clinical training or practice. Indeed, the findings o f my research study suggest that the 
majority o f the clinicians did not have a distinct model for considering self-injury and 
treatment approaches for working with self-injuring patients. It seems that their 
conceptual orientations to treatment and their understanding o f self-injury merged 
with their primary training model/orientation to treatment. Thus, they appeared to 
understand self-injury through the lens o f either their particular theoretical training or 
a belief system, or their practical/clinical training rather than any specific models or 
frameworks in the literature on conceptualising and treating self-injury. Indeed, Jack 
the psychoanalyst, captured the essence o f this merging discourse as he explained, 
“I’m making sense o f it in with uh through the lens o f uh kind o f psychoanalytic 
theory” (lines 756-758).
In contrast, two clinicians, Mark and Eimear, had distinct models for 
conceptualising and working with self-injuring clients. Yet, despite having these 
marked frameworks their discourses also showed a merging pattern that is similar to 
the other clinicians. It is striking how M ark’s and Eimear’s discursive style o f 
merging differs. Mark began with a humanistic body centred model o f treatment and 
invented an innovative way of mapping it onto self-injury. Eim ear’s pattern was the 
complete antithesis. Her discourse suggests that she clearly began with the specific 
treatment model o f dialectical behaviour therapy that is used to treat BPD patients 
who engage in self-injury.
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In articulating how they understand self-injury and their current treatment 
practice with self-injuring clients, the clinicians did not speak in terms o f theoretical 
or conceptual models. Jack’s discourse may shed some light on the reason for this 
finding. He acknowledged that he is “not particularly conscious” (Jack, line 609) of 
theories in his practice. He explained, “I find that the whole thing gets mixed up 
together so much in my mind the the the practice and the theory are so kind o f 
interlinked that I find it difficult to separate it” (lines 870-873). Is it possible that this 
experience o f not being “particularly conscious” o f theories and the interlinking or 
merging o f  theory and practice in the participating clinicians’ minds is the reason why 
they didn’t refer to theoretical or conceptual models in their narratives? Indeed, it is 
possible that only those writing about understanding and treating self-injury in the 
literature draw on theoretical or conceptual frameworks in their discourses.
Curiously, the participating clinicians seemed to create discourse communities 
o f “an other” to formulate their beliefs about self-injury and its treatment rather than 
speaking in terms of theoretical or conceptual frameworks. As I stated in Chapter 
Five, I used the term “discourse communities” to refer to the imaginary communities 
that the clinicians constructed and appeared to address through me as the interviewer 
and an imaginary “other” that may have included me, but also was beyond me.
All of the clinicians created discourse communities o f opposition, or discourse 
communities o f verification, to articulate their understanding and treatment o f self­
injury. As I discussed in Chapter Five, clinicians who constructed discourse 
communities o f opposition positioned themselves as having particular styles o f 
treatment that were different, in converse or in some instances, antithetical to the 
imaginary “other” community. In contrast, discourse communities o f verification
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were used by the clinicians to verify, authorise and legitimatise their particular 
approach. What is striking about this pattern is the discursive differences that 
emerged among and between the clinicians. For half o f the group o f clinicians, this 
pattern o f referring to discourse communities only surfaced as a temporary or brief 
mention. A contrasting style emerged in the other half o f the group in which the 
clinicians created narratives that were rich with discourse communities that were 
recurring, persistent and pervasive. Although, these clinicians produced discourse 
communities they did not do the same thing with their discourses. For instance,
David, a psychiatrist used his momentary style o f creating a discourse community of 
opposition to emphasise how his particular treatment approach differed from that of 
traditional psychiatry. In contrast, Ciara, another psychiatrist utilised her discursive 
clinical language to locate herself within the profession o f psychiatry. Niamh and 
Mark, both employed a humanistic-body centred approach to the treatment o f  self­
injury. Yet, they both drew on different discourse communities. Niamh created 
discourse communities of opposition, while Mark referred to discourse communities 
o f verification. These discursive differences demonstrate the diversity among and 
between the clinicians in relation to conceptualising and treating self-injury.
Curiously, none o f the clinicians drew on any discourses from the self-injury literature 
such as feminist, multi-modal, relational, pathological, competition, and others (which 
I discussed in my review o f the relevant literature in Chapter Two) in their discourses 
o f verification or opposition.
T reatm en t modalities. Discourses in the literature on the application of 
models o f treatment to self-injury have evolved from early publications on single 
model psychoanalytically oriented treatment approaches. Over time discourses have 
shifted to include a multitude o f diverse theoretical treatment models ranging from
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single to multi-modal approaches. These various discourses were reflected in the 
clinicians’ narratives in my research study. What emerged was a pattern o f variation 
across and among the clinicians whereby some showed a preference for using a single 
model, while others opted for either a bi-modal, or multi treatment approach to self­
injury. This variability pattern among the clinicians in my study was consistent with 
other studies that have explored clinicians’ treatment approaches to working with self- 
injuring clients. In two studies, one Irish (Keane, 1997) and one American (Williams, 
2005), the therapists revealed that they used single modal approaches. In contrast, 
Huerta (2006) reported that the clinicians in her American study acknowledged that 
they used a combination o f treatment approaches. The design of my study to select a 
group o f clinicians who would reflect a variety o f mental health disciplines and 
treatment approaches to working with self-injuring patients may account for the 
variability across and among the participating clinicians in my research study in 
comparison to the lack o f variability reported within Huerta’s (2006), Keane’s (1997) 
and W illiams’ (2005) studies.
The findings o f my study are in contrast to two American studies on 
clinicians’ use o f cognitive behavioural interventions in their treatment approach with 
self-injuring clients. Both Williams (2005) and Huerta (2006) reported that the 
majority o f the clinicians in their studies acknowledged that they used some form of 
CBT intervention. Only the two psychiatrists in my study made any reference to 
using aspects o f a CBT model in conjunction with other modalities that they 
employed. One could argue that Eimear also utilised CBT interventions since these 
types o f interventions form part o f a DBT treatment approach which she employs in 
her work with self-injuring patients. However, the majority o f  the clinicians in my 
study did not make any reference to using CBT interventions in their narratives.
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This difference to the American studies may reflect the contrasting diversity 
between clinicians working in an Irish context and those treating self-injuring patients 
in the USA. Indeed, it may mirror the different discourses that these clinicians are 
exposed to in their clinical training, the settings they work in, and the availability of 
continual professional development opportunities to further their knowledge on 
conceptualising and treating self-injury. It is also possible that some Irish clinicians 
may contest the use of CBT interventions, as it may be incompatible with their 
treatment orientation to self-injury. Niamh was the only clinician who voiced this in 
her discourse as she clearly and strongly stated that she would not use a CBT model. 
Indeed, her discourse suggests that she was actually opposed to such a treatment 
approach to self-injury. She argued, “So it’s not about the behaviours in itse lf’ (line 
678) “I mean that’s much more cognitive behavioural approach” (lines 683-684) and 
“I wouldn’t be really going for that” (line 687).
A surprising finding surfaced in my study; some o f the clinicians’ particular 
singular and combination models are not articulated in the literature. For instance, the 
application o f the singular models o f constructivist and narrative psychotherapy to the 
treatment o f self-injury is a missing discourse in the literature. Similarly, the 
amalgamation and application o f a humanistic and body-centred approach to working 
with self-injuring clients is also absent from the literature. Likewise, the particular 
multiple combinations that the participating psychiatrists use are also not featured in 
the self-injury literature. Interestingly, both o f  the psychiatrists in my study use 
almost the same combination o f modalities with the exception of David’s 
psychodynamic model. Specifically, David uses a synthesis o f pharmacological, 
psychodynamic, cognitive behaviour and dialectical behaviour modalities. Similarly, 
Ciara the other psychiatrist employs a composite treatment approach that includes
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pharmacological, cognitive-behaviour and dialectical behaviour models. Despite 
these shared similarities, their narratives suggest divergent discourses in relation to 
their conceptualisation and treatment of self-injury.
Discourse of competition. In an attempt to identify the most effective 
psychotherapy modality, a discourse of competition has emerged in the evidence- 
based treatment literature. It is interesting to note, that no discourse o f competition 
surfaced in the clinicians’ narratives in which they pitted their particular model 
against another approach when they spoke o f their experiences o f  treatment success, 
failure and partial failure with self-injuring clients. This is surprising considering the 
variety o f  treatment modalities that the clinicians use to treat self-injury. Even 
Eimear, who expounded the virtues o f dialectical behaviour therapy as a very 
effective treatment for self-injury in her discourse, did not set it against another 
modality so as to demonstrate the superiority o f its effectiveness.
Treatment emphasis. S. N. Shaw (2002) noted that the early treatment 
literature on self-injury recommended that clinicians work “in a holistic and engaged 
fashion with a focus on intrapsychic dynamics, interpersonal and environmental 
relations, the clinician-patient relationship, and meaning making” (p. 199). However, 
she argued that the contemporary discourse on treatment has shifted toward an 
emphasis on symptom removal, cognitive-behavioural techniques, medications and 
contracts. Interestingly, at least some among the participating clinicians considered 
their clinical practice in line with a holistic way o f working in keeping with the earlier 
discourses identified in the literature. This extract from Jack’s narrative was just one 
such example that was reflected across all of the clinicians’ discourses. Jack 
explained his practice with self-injuring patients, “I want to hear them out what they
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have to say” (lines 1500-1501) “it has to be it has to be through practice working with 
individuals who speak in this way about their experiences and we attempt or at least I 
attempt in that process to make some kind of sense o f it from the facts you know from 
what’s being said or what the person is describing” (lines 536-541).
Relational discourse. Many authors in both the general psychotherapy and 
the self-injuiy literature have written about the importance o f the therapeutic 
relationship as a key component in facilitating change and healing in clients. Despite 
this emphasis in the literature, one could almost miss the relational discourse in the 
clinicians’ narratives in my research study because it appeared more in implicit rather 
than in explicit forms. It is as if the clinicians took a relationally oriented focus to 
working with self-injuring patients as a given, regardless o f their particular theoretical 
training practice model. Therefore, they did not need to articulate it explicitly in their 
narratives. Even Eimear’s discourse suggests a relationally oriented approach, which 
is not particularly synonymous with a DBT modality. Curiously, Niamh was the only 
clinician who made an explicit comment about the role o f the relationship in her 
treatment approach. She constructed her role as, “And I’m there to be an agent of 
change in some way to offer other ways and the relationship is the main way I 
suppose” (lines 645-647).
Distress discourse. There are many references in the self-injury literature 
about the distress that self-injury evokes in clinicians treating individuals who engage 
in this behaviour. Surprisingly, this discourse did not emerge in the clinicians’ 
narratives with the exception of Ciara, who referred to a discourse o f distress in 
relation to the suicide and the emotional impact on the clinician. I will discuss this
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discourse further in the next section of this chapter entitled “Clinicians’ Treatment 
Success, Failure and Partial Failure with Self-Injuring Patients”.
A possible explanation for the absence of this discourse of distress in the 
clinicians’ narratives is the fact that all of the participants had been practising for over 
10 years and had significant experience working with self-injuring patients.
Therefore, it may be that for these clinicians, their clients’ self-injury may no longer 
cause them any distress. Indeed, the historic discussions o f Ciara and M ark’s early 
encounters with self-injuring patients, would suggest that initially this was a 
distressing experience for both o f them. After years o f exposure to self-injury, Mark 
remarked, “I’d like to think that the blessing o f having seen an extreme is it then looks 
normal to me normal uh it I have a normalised reaction (lines 1464-1466, part 2) “to 
it” (line 1468, part 2). Ciara echoed Mark’s discourse o f distress as she remembered 
an early exposure to a self-injuring client. She recalled a time early in her 
professional career when she was shocked. Ciara told me, “Um I remember very 
shortly after starting psychiatry in an inpatient setting a girl who had inflicted I would 
say 100 fairly significant scars to herself in a hospital setting (inaudible) and um in 
my naivety I sutured them all rather than sending her to A&E and I was shocked at 
that because it was really really significant and really really serious” (lines 987-993, 
part 1). She admitted that her response has changed over time as she explained, “I see 
so much o f it really that 11 it it it’s not shocking to me any longer um” (lines 983-984, 
part 1) “ I suppose the emotional response has become quite neutralised to it really” 
(lines 995-996, part 1). However, she acknowledged that her reaction can change if 
the self-injuring individual does not fit the typical profile for this behaviour. For 
instance, she confessed, “if  you see it in an older person and if  it’s new that kind o f 
does jo lt me from time to time” (lines 997-998, part 1) “ in an atypical setting
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somebody who’s never done it before” (lines 999-1000, part 1) “that can actually 
really jo lt me into into concern” (lines 1002-1003, part 1).
In conclusion, a discourse o f clinicians’ distress in relation to self-injury was 
generally not spoken among these very experienced clinicians’ in their narratives 
despite its articulation in the literature. However, Ciara’s discourse suggests that the 
evocation o f a discourse of distress in experienced clinicians may be dependent on 
whether or not the self-injury is atypical behaviour for the client.
Sources of Knowledge
The third significant finding relates to the sources o f knowledge, including 
both personal experience and professional training, that influenced/shaped the 
development o f clinicians’ explanation(s) or working model(s) o f treating self- 
injuring clients. Surprisingly, the clinicians made sparse references to conferences, 
readings and workshops on the topic of self-injury in their narratives. Indeed, there 
were surprisingly few references among the clinicians’ discourses in which they made 
deliberate attempts to leam or seek information about self-injury and how to treat it.
It appeared that they relied predominantly on their clinical practice with self-injuring 
patients for comprehending and treating self-injury. Thus, on the whole, they did not 
tend to draw on external and specialist discourses on understanding and treating self- 
injuring clients outside of their clinical practice and their primary treatment 
orientation. They did not seem to actively seek or search for external modes o f 
information on self-injury. This suggests that despite the range and numerous texts on 
conceptualising and treating self-injury, these clinicians in practice did not seem to be 
reading them. Is this the case more generally in Ireland? I will return to this question 
later in this chapter.
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This finding is in sharp contrast to the individual clinicians who write about 
their particular treatment approaches to self-injury in the literature and the clinicians 
in both my previous Irish study (Keane, 1997) and Williams’ (2005) study. In their 
published books and journal articles, clinicians and researchers predominately refer to 
the literature on conceptualising and treating self-injury. The clinicians in Williams’ 
study reported that “reading” (2005, p. 190) was their primary source o f knowledge 
on the subject o f self-injury. The majority of therapists in my study (Keane, 1997) 
indicated that they accessed information on self-injury from various sources including 
workshops, books, journals, personal experience and supervision. This finding differs 
from that o f my current study, which suggests that these clinicians working in the 
Irish context do not tend to access the literature on self-inj ury. One may ask why is 
this the case, considering the proliferation of current publications on conceptualising 
and treating self-injury in contrast to the relatively small amount that were available in 
1997. The reason for this may be related to methodological differences. In my 
previous study (Keane, 1997), I conducted a postal survey o f therapists and therefore, 
the participants may have been more inclined to tick boxes on the questionnaire that 
would reflect the type of clinicians they would like to be in the categories offered by 
the researcher. Thus, the social desirability effect may have been in operation or 
perhaps, these clinicians did actually consult the literature. In comparison, 
participants who are interviewed cannot simply tick a box to indicate that they draw 
on the literature; instead they have to rely on the discourses that they use in their 
narratives to demonstrate their knowledge.
This absence o f deliberate attempts to leam or seek information about self- 
inj ury and how to treat it in the participating clinicians’ discourses may account for 
the missing discourses of explanation in relation to self-injury and some issues in
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relation to treating self-injuring patients. The clinicians did not really make any 
inferences as to why individuals may or may not engage in self-injury. Indeed, their 
discourses did not go beyond naming a few functional reasons for self-injury. Most 
o f the clinicians did not speak o f self-injury in terms o f causation or the histories of 
clients who engage in self-injury with the exception o f Niamh, Mark and Eimear who 
mentioned trauma and abuse. However, their discourses were unelaborated and did 
not go any farther than naming these as contributing factors.
These three findings collectively raise a conundrum as to why the clinicians in 
my study did not turn to the literature on self-injury in their discourses about 
conceptualising and treating self-injury. While it is not possible to answer this 
question from the findings of this research study, it is however conceivable to explore 
a range o f  potential explanations for this by returning to the clinicians’ narratives for 
clues. Do they feel there is no need to go beyond what they already know from their 
clinical training and practice? Perhaps they also think like Sinead, who seemed to 
hold the view that she can understand her patients’ symptoms through the window of 
her theoretical training. Referring to self-injury, she informed me, “I would 
understand it in the context that I would understand a lot o f symptoms” (lines 69-70, 
part 2) via my constructivist “psychotherapy training” (lines 83-84, part 2). Indeed, 
this belief that the clinicians’ primary training orientation to treatment is applicable to 
all clients regardless o f their presenting issues may reflect the discourses that 
clinicians are exposed to in their training in the Irish context. Indeed, Allen (1995) 
articulated this notion when she declared that self-injury “ ...has much in common 
with many o f the other difficulties with which our clients struggle, and many o f our 
everyday helping skills are relevant to it” (p. 249).
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Another interpretation is the possibility that the clinicians find it satisfying to 
work with self-injuring patients in their particular way and do not perceive a need to 
seek alternatives in the literature. This notion o f being happy and content with his 
work emerged in David’s narrative as he enthusiastically declared, “I love I love my 
um I love my work” (line 966, part 2). Maybe these clinicians do not want to be 
exposed to views in the literature that contradict or oppose their own ideas and beliefs, 
Alternatively, clinicians working in an Irish context may not get opportunities to 
question their discourses due to the lack o f availability o f workshops and conferences 
on the subject o f  understanding and treating self-injury. I will discuss this point later 
in this chapter.
O f course, another explanation could relate to a design limitation o f my 
research study. It is quite possible that the interview schedule may not have allowed 
opportunities for the clinicians to open up their discourses beyond their clinical 
training/practice. Therefore, they didn’t draw on discourses from the literature 
because I didn’t ask for specific comparisons in this regard. Indeed, my interview 
schedule invited particular parameters to the clinicians’ discourses in that I brought 
the same questions to all o f the participants in my interviews with them. This had the 
impact o f shaping the discourse between each participant and myself. Thus, I am 
acknowledging that knowledge is socially constructed between the 
researcher/interviewer and the participant/interviewee, as we socially interacted with 
each other in the interview context via the medium of language. This is in keeping 
with a social constructionism perspective that underpined my research study, and it is 
also a limitation o f my study.
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A final elucidation on the reason why the clinicians did not access information 
from the literature may be found in studies that have explored practitioners’ utilisation 
o f research in their clinical practice. For instance, a number o f studies (e.g., Cohen, 
Sargent, & Sechrest, 1986; Cooper, Benton, Benton, & Philips, 2008; Morrow- 
Bradley, & Elliott, 1986; Orlinsky, Botermans, Ronnestad, & SPR Collaborative 
Research Network, 2001; Skovholt & Ronnestad, 1992) have consistently reported 
that the majority o f clinicians do not read the research literature. Indeed, Ogilvie et al. 
(2005) noted a similar finding among clinical researcher-practitioners. They found, 
“ ...irrespective o f psychotherapy research, what psychotherapy researchers 
themselves have found most useful within their clinical practice is both their ongoing 
experience with clients and their supervision and consultation with others” (Ogilvie et 
ah, 2005, p. 31). Thus, it seems that interpersonal experiences with patients, 
discussions with colleagues, supervisors and personal therapy are valued more highly 
as information sources and influences on clinicians’ development than research 
articles and books. Therefore, it would seem that the finding o f my study in this 
regard is consistent with the general literature on clinicians’ lack o f utilisation of the 
research literature. Since clinicians appear to be drawn more toward interpersonal 
sources of knowledge, perhaps researchers need to look at alternative sources of 
disseminating their research findings. Such alternative forms might include 
continuing professional development workshops and conferences, and in-service 
training. I will return to this point.
Some authors such as Barlow et al. (1984, as cited in McLeod, 2004), have 
called upon clinicians “ ...to  adopt the role o f ‘scientist-practitioner’ and to use 
research routinely to help them to reflect on their work with clients” (p. 461). As I 
discussed in the preceding paragraph, studies suggest that the majority o f clinicians do
252
not read the research literature. One explanation proffered in the psychotherapy 
literature to account for this, has centred on a discourse about the perceived lack of 
relevance o f research for clinicians and their practice. This discourse has been 
labelled the “researcher-practitioner gap”. It seems that this gap between 
psychotherapy research and practice has been noted by both clinical researchers and 
practitioners (Ogilvie et al., 2005). While this may be the view o f some practitioners, 
it is interesting that none of the clinicians in this research study drew on this 
researcher-practitioner gap discourse in their narratives to explain or offer a reason 
why they did not access the literature for sources o f knowledge on conceptualising 
and treating self-injury.
Clinicians’ Treatment Success, Failure and Partial Failure with Self-Injuring 
Patients
Two findings emerged in my research study with respect to the clinicians’ 
discourses about their treatment success, failure and partial failure. The literature 
contains a range o f treatment options for clinicians working with self-injuring clients. 
However, there is a lack o f research exploring which approaches are the most 
effective for treating self-injury. Therefore, the research literature offers the clinician 
little guidance in this regard. Taking this into account, how do clinicians in practice 
speak about their current treatment practice effectiveness with self-injuring patients? 
In response to this question, the findings o f my research study suggest that the 
clinicians seemed to draw on two distinct discourses: expert and inquirer, about their 
current treatment practice effectiveness and failures with clients who engage in self­
injury. In addition, the clinicians did not appear to have a systematic way o f thinking 
about “progress” with regard to self-injury.
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Expert and inquirer discourse. In speaking o f their current treatment 
practice effectiveness and failures with self-injuring patients, the clinicians selected 
two clear and separate discourses, namely an expert discourse and an inquiry 
discourse. The clinicians seemed to use these two distinct discourses to construct the 
concepts o f success, failure and partial failure in the face of questions about their 
treatment effectiveness with self-injuring clients. It is striking how the clinicians’ 
discourses differed. Eimear, Sinead, Mike and Ciara all drew on an expert discourse 
in which they engaged in a style in which their discourse emerged as a repeating, 
clear, narrow and unquestioned stance. For instance, Eimear employed an expert 
discourse to endorse and expound the benefits o f using a dialectical behaviour therapy 
approach with self-injuring patients. She never questioned or criticised this approach 
for its location o f self-injury within a pathological framework. Neither, did she 
consider that this modality may be unsuitable for clients who do not have a BPD 
diagnosis. Eimear repeated words, phrases and ideas associated with DBT in her 
narrative. She further maintained this expert discourse by engaging in a pattern of 
predominantly brief responses to my questions. She never drew on a discourse of 
elaboration or inquiry in her narrative. In addition, Eimear did not consider the 
concept o f failure or partial failure in her treatment o f self-injuring patients. In fact, 
she considered herself to be a clinician who “was particularly successful with a 
limited number o f people” (lines 1451-1452).
In contrast, the “inquirer” discourses o f Jack, Niamh, Mark and David 
appeared to think out loud, mused, wondered, questioned and revised their discourses 
in response to my interview questions. For example, in response to my question about 
his experience o f treatment success, Jack engaged in such a discourse. He 
acknowledged the difficulty o f this question o f success and then opened up a
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discourse o f inquiry in which he began to think aloud, mused, wondered and 
questioned, “what does it mean to have success to be successful with a a particular 
client” (lines 1501-1502).
Why did the clinicians’ discourses tend to divide along the lines o f an expert 
and an inquirer style? Are some o f the clinicians more reflective about their practice 
and more open to various viewpoints that may be in contrast to their own in relation to 
working with self-injuring clients? Perhaps the clinicians’ pattern o f drawing on 
opposing discourses, in the face o f questions about their treatment effectiveness with 
self-injuring patients, reflects the variations in training that the clinicians received in 
the Irish context, both within and across their disciplines. For instance, those 
clinicians who positioned themselves within an expert discourse may have been 
trained in a style that constructed their particular approach as the only effective way to 
work with self-injury. Alternatively, they may have received instruction during their 
training that the specific model they trained in is applicable to all problems, issues or 
symptoms that clients present with and therefore, can be applied to self-injury. In 
contrast, perhaps the clinicians who engaged in an inquirer’s discourse were exposed 
to this style o f reflective practice in their training as clinicians and therefore, were 
more open to this discourse.
Another interpretation for the clinicians’ contrasting expert and inquirer 
discourses may be related to a difficulty selecting and speaking about their 
experiences o f success with self-injuring patients. Indeed, Kottler and Carlson (2005) 
noted that the eminent clinicians they interviewed about their best (Kottler & Carlson, 
2005) and worst (Kottler & Carlson, 2003) cases experienced greater difficulty 
choosing a case that illustrated their greatest work but could easily recall numerous
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examples o f their worst cases. So why was it difficult for the clinicians to talk about 
their successful cases with self-injuring clients? Scharff (2005, as cited in Kottler & 
Carlson, 2005) proposed that clinicians’ difficulty in speaking o f their successful 
cases may be due to doubt and uncertainty because a lot o f the time clinicians “are 
just grinding through therapy wondering whether you are doing anything useful” (p. 
269). So is it possible that the clinicians were unpractised about what success looks 
like when it came to speaking about their work with self-injuring patients? Indeed, 
David acknowledged that clinicians generally do not speak about their successful 
cases. He told me, “Goodness um 1 suppose that is an area that we probably don’t 
focus a huge amount on” (lines 893-894, part 3). Is it possible that mental health 
clinicians do not discuss their successful cases with their peers in a similar vein to 
their medical colleagues? Could it be that clinicians working in the field o f mental 
health do not have spaces or time to reflect on their current treatment practices with 
self-injuring clients because they are so caught up with the demands o f their day-to- 
day practice? Or are the clinicians’ difficulties in speaking about their experiences of 
success related to the fact that I only asked them about self-injuring patients and 
therefore, closed off the option of engaging in a wider discourse about all o f their 
successful cases? It seems that from the literature on treatment success and the 
findings o f my research study, we know very little about why clinicians have trouble 
engaging in a discourse about their experiences o f success with their clients generally 
and also, specifically with self-injuring patients.
An alternative explanation is the possibility that the clinicians may concur 
with Jack that the concept o f success is a difficult question. Indeed, Kottler and 
Carlson (2005) remarked on the complexity o f this construct in clinical practice. 
Bugental (1988) sheds some light on this difficulty by proposing “ ...that almost every
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course o f therapy has some elements of success and some of failure” (p. 532). He 
argued that, “Success or failure in psychotherapy is a matter difficult to assess 
reliably, depending on the time frame within which the judgment is made, and heavily 
influenced by the perspective o f the person making the evaluation” (Bugental, 1988) 
p. 532). This notion of time frame may have heavily influenced the clinicians’ 
discourses. For instance, I had no idea how recently or how far into the past the 
various clinicians had to go to recollect memories of their experiences of treatment 
success, failure and partial failure with self-injuring clients. Is it possible that those 
who engaged in an inquirer’s discourse may have been referring to recent cases while 
those who drew on an expert discourse may have been speaking o f patients they had 
worked with a long time ago? Keeney (2005, as cited in Kottler & Carlson, 2005) 
offered memory recall as an explanation for clinicians experiencing difficulty 
speaking about their successes with their clients. He argued that clinicians tend to 
remember their worst cases and “let the memory o f doing the job well fade” (Keeney, 
2005, as cited in Kottler & Carlson, 2005, p. 269).
In the face of this challenging question about their treatment effectiveness with 
self-injuring patients, some o f the clinicians engaged in an expert discourse in which 
they shut down any exploration o f other possible conceptual frameworks for treating 
self-injuring clients. A possible explanation for this may be due to their perceived 
view o f the language o f my questions as challenging the effectiveness o f their 
particular treatment approaches. If  so, perhaps they felt they had to engage in a 
defensive response. Or perhaps they just responded in a similar way to the therapists 
Kottler and Carlson (2005) interviewed, who in speaking o f their “greatest success 
stories” demonstrated “ .. .their commitment to their theoretical frameworks and 
emphasize how these are applied successfully” (p. 273).
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No systematic way of thinking about progress. The clinicians experienced 
difficulty with my question inviting them to speak about their experiences o f  and 
criteria for gauging treatment success, failure and partial failure with self-injuring 
patients. This is hardly surprising considering the varied but limited discourses about 
markers o f success, failure and partial failure in the general treatment literature and 
the missing discourse in relation to self-injury. It appears that beyond the use o f 
formal markers o f progress or failure such as outcome measures, there is very little 
guidance in the literature to support clinicians to gauge or measure their treatment 
effectiveness with not only self-injuring clients but with all of their patients. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the clinicians engaged in various styles o f response 
to this question which included a surprised response, a floundering response and 
difficulty relating to the question. Thus, they seemed to have little or no systematic 
way o f thinking or conceptualising “progress” in relation to self-injury. Indeed, their 
discourses about their criteria for gauging or measuring success and failure with 
regard to treating self-injuring clients appeared to vary among the clinicians.
Why did these clinicians seem perplexed by my question as for example, Jack 
did, floundering as he conceded, “Um well now that’s that’s again another difficult 
question” (lines 1498-1499). Mike admitted, “Oh Jesus I’ve no idea” (line 2073) 
what would constitute a treatment success with a self-injuring patient. Niamh 
confessed, “I can’t relate to the question Aida to be honest” (lines 1935-1936) “I 
really can’t relate to the question” (line 1938). It strikes me that perhaps they have 
never posed this question to themselves, or have not been asked by another prior to 
my interaction with them. David’s surprised response suggests that this is a plausible 
explanation. For instance, David spoke in a collective voice on behalf o f himself and
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other clinicians as he acknowledged that treatment success “is an area that we 
probably don’t focus a huge amount on” (lines 893-894, part 3).
O f course, another explanation may be related to the fact that the clinicians 
had no idea from my initial contact letter (see Appendix C) inviting them to 
participate in my research study, that I was going to ask them questions about their 
experiences o f treatment effectiveness and how they gauge this in their work with 
self-injuring clients. Perhaps if they had had this knowledge prior to the interviews, 
they may have had different responses to my questions and drawn on other discourses 
in their narratives.
An alternative interpretation may be that the clinicians had difficulty relating 
to the discursive language I used to phrase my questions about their experiences of 
and criteria for gauging treatment success, failure and partial failure with self-injuring 
patients. For example, Niamh’s discourse exemplified some dismay as she informed 
me, “I mean the word success the word failure doesn’t actually mean it’s like you say 
to me is my life a success” (lines 1642-1645) “I don’t know that my life’s a success 
I ’m doing my best to get by” (lines 1645-1646) “and to enjoy and fully live” (line 
1648). It is also possible that the fact that I asked the clinicians specific questions 
about measuring their treatment effectiveness with self-injuring clients, may have 
closed off other discourses that they may have drawn on when speaking more 
generally about what criteria they use in their clinical practice to decide when 
treatment is a success, failure or partial failure.
The clinicians’ discourses suggest that although they do have some markers of 
success, they did not appear to have a systematic way o f thinking about progress with 
regard to self-injury. All of the clinicians agreed that the reduction or cessation of
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self-injury is an indicator o f progress except Mike, who did not raise this in his 
narrative. What is interesting is that these clinicians seemed to develop parameters of 
success by looking elsewhere beyond self-injury itself. These markers o f progress 
included improved coping skills, more enriching relationships, changes in discourse 
and knowledge o f themselves, increased functioning and active participation in their 
lives. As a group, the clinicians did not adhere to a shared set o f criteria for 
measuring or gauging successful treatment outcomes with self-injuring patients. 
Indeed, the majority o f the clinicians (Mark, Mike, Eimear, Ciara and Sinead) 
engaged in a discourse o f non-elaboration in which they did not go beyond merely 
listing a number o f indicators o f success in relation to their treatment o f self-injury.
In contrast, three o f the clinicians (Jack, Niamh and David) drew on a discourse of 
elaboration in which they not only spoke of markers o f success but they also 
developed their discourses to include an articulation o f the changes they observed in 
their practice with self-injuring clients.
A possible explanation as to why the clinicians did not have a systematic way 
of thinking about and marking out progress, with respect to treatment effectiveness 
with self-injuring patients, may lie in the narrow discourses in the treatment literature. 
It seems that the research literature has little else to offer the clinician in the way of 
thinking about and measuring treatment effectiveness beyond the narrow discourses 
o f the use of outcome measures, evidence-based treatment and evidence-based 
practice. These discourses may be incongruent or incompatible with some o f the 
clinicians’ particular theoretical orientations. For example, Jack acknowledged that 
he had no formal systematic way of evaluating his treatment success with self-injuring 
clients. He admitted, “I don’t do a six month-month follow-up” (lines 1522-1523). 
Indeed, he questions the notion of doing a six-month follow-up and whom it benefits.
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Jack’s discourse suggests that he was not in favour o f this method o f evaluation. He 
argued, “You know and the difficulty with that is o f course if  you start if  you go back 
and you say to someone well listen I’d like to maybe you could come back in six 
months they might or might not come back and if they do you know so so what how 
they’ll come back and give you a report but then for whom would they do that for me 
or or for them ” (lines 1533-1537). Therefore, it is no wonder that there was an 
absence o f a systematic way o f thinking about “progress” among the clinicians and 
that they floundered about in their discourses in the face o f questions about criteria for 
measuring success and failure with regard to treating self-injuring patients.
Another interpretation could relate to the clinicians’ beliefs that the use of 
outcome measures may not actually be helpful in their practice. Indeed, Kazdin 
(2008) put forward this very argument, noting that outcome measures “may not 
necessarily tell us how a patient is doing in the world” (p. 148). He contended that, 
“Changes on the rating scales, even well-established ones such as the Beck 
Depression Inventory or the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality and its derivates, are 
difficult to translate into changes in everyday life” (Kazdin, 2008, p. 148). In fact, 
Kazdin concluded that in most cases applying the metrics o f evaluation such as 
statistical significance, effect size and clinical significance, “ .. .it is difficult to tell the 
extent to which patients have been helped in their daily lives” (p. 148) because “A 
change o f one standard deviation on a measure from pre- to post treatment does not 
clearly portray (or map onto) how the client is functioning in everyday life” (p. 148). 
However, none o f the clinicians drew on this discourse to critique the use o f outcome 
measures in their practice; therefore it is not possible to say whether they concur with 
this argument.
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O f all o f  the clinicians, Eimear’s discourse was the most striking in its lack of 
elaboration, considering that she was the only one who declared, “I ’m a great believer 
in evidenced interventions and” (lines 1380-1381) “certainly dialectical behaviour 
therapy is one intervention for which there is a good scientific evidence base in terms 
of effect” (lines 1383-1385). She made no reference to the research that supports 
DBT. Surprisingly, she did not refer to the use o f outcome measures that one 
traditionally associates with research studies in DBT and CBT, and clinical practice 
with clinicians who adhere to such modalities. Indeed, markers of success appear to 
be a missing discourse in the treatment literature as a whole and not just in relation to 
self-injury. Therefore, it is not surprising that the clinicians’ discourses suggest that 
they have some markers o f success but not along the lines o f self injury per se. 
Futhermore, there seems to be no criteria articulated in the literature that crosses the 
mental health disciplines o f psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis and counselling 
in relation to treatment success beyond the use o f outcome measures.
There is yet another explanation for an absence o f discourse markers o f 
success. Garland, Kruse, and Aarons (2003) reported that the majority of the 
clinicians in their study “ ...d id  not experience increased pressure to demonstrate their 
effectiveness as a psychotherapist...” (p. 399). Perhaps, this is the experience of 
clinicians in my research study and therefore, the whole notion o f treatment 
effectiveness may not be a discourse to which they need to subscribe. Thus, they do 
not have to reflect on or develop a systematic way to think about markers o f  progress 
in their clinical practice with self-injuring clients. Similarly, Andrews and Page 
(2005) noted that, “Private psychiatrists and psychologists rarely find it necessary to 
measure their patients’ outcomes. They presume they know” (p. 650). This is also 
another possible reason for the clinicians’ lack o f a systematic way o f thinking about
262
and marking out progress with respect to treatment effectiveness with self-injuring 
clients.
Discourse of failure. The clinicians’ discourses about their criteria for 
gauging or measuring failure and partial failure, is in sharp contrast to their discourses 
about treatment success. Unlike their discourses o f treatment success, for the most 
part, they did not develop their discourses to include articulations around their views 
o f failure and partial failure. Indeed, their discourses appeared unelaborated in terms 
o f not engaging in a dialogue beyond naming a few markers o f failure. A lack of 
clarity as to what exactly constitutes a treatment failure may explain the clinicians’ 
difficulty in constructing failure and the absence o f a clear singular discourse with 
respect to markers o f failure among their narratives. In fact, this seems to be the case 
in M ike’s narrative where he appeared to be uncertain about this concept as he 
admitted, “I’m not sure about failure” (line 1803). Indeed, this uncertainty is also 
reflected in the literature on treatment failure. Mash and Hunsley (1993) have 
commented that, “ ...clear definitions and precise estimates of the nature and extent of 
failure in psychotherapy remain elusive and a matter of debate (Bugental, 1988; 
Lambert, Shapiro, & Bergin, 1986; Mays & Franks, 1985a)” (p. 292). Therefore, it 
should come as no surprise that the clinicians struggled with this concept o f failure 
and seemed to have unelaborated discourses on this subject matter in their narratives 
in relation to self-injury.
Another possible explanation for the clinicians’ uncertainty and unelaborated 
discourse in relation to treatment failure in their narratives may reflect the lack or 
absence o f opportunities for clinicians working in the Irish context to engage in 
discourses about the concept o f failure, what it looks like, their experiences o f  it and
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how they measure or gauge it in their clinical practice with self-injuring patients. 
Supervision with a colleague and/or peer groups are usually the media through which 
clinicians engage in case discussions. Perhaps, there is no space to discuss success or 
failure in these fora because they are usually time limited and most often clinicians 
bring their most pressing case(s) to these meetings. This is essentially David’s point, 
“Urn one tends to be very much caught up with those who are uh acutely presenting” 
(lines 894-896, part 3).
While no singular clear discourse emerged with respect to markers o f failure 
among the clinicians’ narratives, five discursive patterns emerged across the group of 
clinicians’ narratives. These included a discourse o f failure in relation to a narrative 
experience o f failure, discourse o f remain the same or worse, discourse of 
disengagement in relation to failure, discourse o f partial failure, and discourse of 
failure in relation to suicide.
Mark was the only clinician who engaged in a discourse o f  narrative 
experience o f failure. None o f the other clinicians shared an experience o f treatment 
failure with a self-injuring client despite my invitation to do so. One explanation may 
be related to their uncertainty about what constitutes failure, which I discussed in a 
preceding paragraph. Another interpretation may be located in a discourse articulated 
in the literature by Strieker (1995), C. R. Rogers (1954), Persons and Mikami (2002) 
who contended that the issue o f treatment failure is rarely discussed in the literature. 
This may be due to a bias toward only publishing successful outcomes in journals.
Strieker (1995) proposed that clinicians do not tend to proclaim their lack o f 
treatment success. Therefore, an alternative explanation may be as a result of 
clinicians’ disinclination to put forward unsuccessful cases for publication. The
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clinicians’ unelaborated discourse about failure may be due to a reluctance to speak o f 
their experiences o f treatment failure with self-injuring patients with me. Perhaps, 
they were concerned that if they opened up a dialogue with me, as a fellow clinician 
about their experiences of failure that they might lose face, as the sharing of 
experiences was not reciprocated by me as the interviewee/researcher. Therefore, 
they may have been avoiding the possibility o f constructing themselves as clinicians 
whose competency may be called into question by such disclosures.
A discourse o f no change or symptoms worsening appeared as a marker of 
failure in five o f the eight clinicians’ narratives. Curiously, the majority o f the 
clinicians did not elaborate on this indicator beyond naming it. Perhaps, they rarely if 
ever experienced self-injuring clients as remaining the same or getting worse. Indeed, 
this was Jack’s argument. He contended, “its rare enough for someone to come and 
say start speaking about cutting themselves and um and then not continue for for a a 
reasonable period and and and make some sort o f progress even if  not everything is 
achieved” (lines 1578-1883).
The subject o f disengagement as an indicator o f failure emerged in five o f the 
eight clinicians’ discourses. What is striking about their discourses in relation to this 
marker are the different ways that they constructed disengagement as a marker of 
treatment failure that reflects the diversity among the clinicians. For instance, Sinead 
proposed, “these are the ones where they may not come back and you’re not sure what 
the not coming back is about” (lines 1423-1425, part 1). Jack offered, “Yeah well I 
mean failure is where someone simply doesn’t you know if  they they continue they 
their uh work hasn’t progressed enough so I’ve failed somehow to uh engage them or 
you know to allow some kind of a space so that something can be spoken about um
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and they don’t turn up again they they stop coming I uh nothing I can do nothing 
about that” (lines 1568-1574). David described disengagement as a discourse marker 
“where a person has um for whatever reason uh either fails to engage or having 
engaged then falls out with you and uh either refuses to return or um just simply 
vanishes” (lines 1185-1188, part 3). Indeed, the variation in their discourses may 
reflect their different clinical experiences o f disengagement with self-injuring 
patients. Curiously, none of the clinicians drew on a discourse about how some 
clients may be difficult to engage in the treatment process and that this may be a 
contributing factor to treatment failure.
Perhaps, another difficulty for clinicians gauging treatment effectiveness may 
be related to the multiple and diverse foci o f treatment. Indeed, patients have 
different needs and expectations o f the treatment process. For instance, some seek 
treatment for forms of mental illness, others the amelioration of life’s difficulties and 
challenges, and other clients are seeking to enhance their quality o f  life and move 
towards self-fulfilment. Surprisingly, none o f the clinicians drew on this discourse 
about the diverse needs and expectations o f self-injuring patients and how difficult it 
may be to engage some self-injuring clients in the treatment process, and that this 
difficulty may be a contributing factor to treatment failure. In fact, Barker (2001) 
noted that De Shazer (1988, 1991) constructed and described three types of 
psychotherapy patient, the “complainant”, the “visitor” and the “consumer” . De 
Shazer (1988, 1991) proposed that, “The complainant [sic] recognises that a problem 
exists, but views this as residing somewhere else, or in someone else. The visitor [sic] 
is referred for therapy by someone else, who recognises that a problem exists. The 
visitor, on the other hand, does not and may be wholly opposed to therapeutic 
engagement. The consumer [sic], however, is the classic psychotherapy client, and
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actively seeks help for a problem which is she or he recognises as their own (Hawkes 
et al. [sic] 1998)” (Barker, 2001, p. 16). Indeed, Barker (2001) argued that, “ ...the 
denomination of the client-as customer, visitor or complainant-is critical for the 
outcome o f therapy” (p. 19).
Remarkably, only one of the eight clinicians Sinead made any reference to 
partial failure. Otherwise, this was completely absent from the clinicians’ narratives. 
This absence also reflects the treatment literature in which there seems to be no direct 
reference to partial treatment failure. However, discourses about the impact of 
empathic failures or ruptures in the therapeutic alliance are well documented in the 
literature (e.g., Mordecai, 1991; Safran, Muran, Samstag, & Stevens, 2002). For 
instance, Safran et al. (2002) defined a rupture in the therapeutic alliance “ .. .as a 
tension or breakdown in the collaborative relationship between patient and therapist” 
(p. 236). They further added that, “These ruptures vary in intensity from relatively 
minor tensions, o f which both of the participants may be only vaguely aware, to major 
breakdowns in understanding and communication” (Safran et al., 2002, p. 236). 
Indeed, Safran et al. cautioned that if major ruptures are not addressed they “ ...m ay 
lead to premature termination or treatment failure” (p. 236). Mordecai (1991) also 
noted that empathic failures occur regularly in psychotherapy and if  not addressed 
they can cause significant disruption in the treatment process and may eventually lead 
to failure. Likewise, many authors (e.g., Connors, 2000; Deiter & Pearlman, 1998) 
have referred to the countertransference difficulties that emerge for clinicians working 
with self-injuring clients. In fact, Connors (2000) and Deiter and Pearlman (1998) 
have argued that if the strong feelings and reactions of clinicians are not managed, 
they can severely hinder the treatment effectiveness. Therefore, these concepts of 
empathic failures or ruptures in the therapeutic alliance and countertransference
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difficulties could be constructed as partial failures, due to the fact that if clinicians 
address these issues, then treatment failure may be avoided. Surprisingly, none o f the 
clinicians spoke about the impact of ruptures in the therapeutic relationship or 
countertransference difficulties in their narratives, considering their impact on the 
outcome o f treatment is a documented discourse in the psychotherapy literature.
So what might explain the clinicians’ missing discourses in relation to partial 
failure in treating self-injuring patients? Perhaps, the clinicians do not recognise or 
identify with the concept of partial failure. For instance, Eimear made a brief 
reference to an experience with a self-injuring client that could be constructed as a 
partial failure. Yet, she did not use this term but referred to this incident as a mistake. 
Eimear acknowledged, “Certainly when I was starting out I made mistakes o f maybe 
not putting in enough things in place when I was taking annual leave” (lines 1146­
1148). She elaborated on the impact of this mistake, “And then the fallout would 
have been they would have had the kind o f feeling o f being abandoned that they might 
have had earlier on in their own lives and” (lines 1150-1152) “would have there 
would have been an escalation in self-injurious behaviour” (lines 1154-1155). 
Curiously, Eimear did not seem to equate her admitted mistake with that of a partial 
failure or disruption in the therapeutic relationship. Maybe, if I had asked the 
clinicians specific questions about lapses in empathy and ruptures in the therapeutic 
alliance with self-injuring patients rather than possibly using the unfamiliar term o f 
partial failure, they might have engaged in such a discourse. Likewise, if I had invited 
the clinicians to speak about their mistakes in their clinical practice with self-injuring 
clients rather than using the language of failure, this might have opened up an 
opportunity for them to speak about such experiences without the possibility of 
constructing themselves in a negative way. Indeed, the clinicians may agree with
Casement (2002) who argued that making mistakes is part o f the analytic process and 
that they are unavoidable in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. However, he 
proposed that in addressing these mistakes, . .it is important that there is always 
room for a patient to correct the analyst, and for the analyst not only to be able to 
tolerate being corrected but to be able to make positive use o f these corrective efforts 
by the patient” (Casement, 2002, p. 18). Therefore, making mistakes, if corrected in 
the treatment process, could be constructed as partial failures, or as successes.
Another interpretation for the absence o f a discourse o f partial failure may be 
related to the possibility that the clinicians did not experience counterference 
difficulties with self-injuring patients. This absence may be due to the fact that they 
are experienced clinicians and most o f  them have worked with large numbers of 
individuals who engage in this behaviour. Indeed, when I asked them about their 
reactions to those clients who engage in self-injury, they did not appear to have strong 
reactions to a disclosure o f self-injury. For instance, Niamh informed me, “I’m not 
freaked by scars” (Niamh, line 767) and Ciara told me, “I don’t really I see so much 
o f it” (line 983, part 1) “that” (line 983, part 1) “it’s not shocking to me any longer” 
(line 984, part 1) (for full extract o f Niamh’s and Ciara’s transcript, see Appendix J).
Four o f  the eight clinicians mentioned suicide as a marker o f treatment failure 
with self-injuring patients in their narratives. Curiously, Ciara was the only clinician 
who engaged in an elaborated discourse, addressing an invisible audience whom she 
constructed as not understanding the impact o f client suicide on psychiatrists. A 
possible reason for this focus may lie in the fact that Ciara is a psychiatrist and the 
research literature suggests that her profession has a high rate o f  encounters with 
patient suicides (e.g., Alexander, Klein, Gray, Dewar, & Eagles, 2002; Cryan, Kelly
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and McCaffrey, 1995; Ruskin, Sakinofsky, Bagby, Dickens, & Sous, 2004). Indeed, 
Cryan et al. (1995) reported that 82% of Irish psychiatrists in their study had 
experienced patient suicide. A more recent Irish study by Landers, O ’Brien and 
Phelan (2010) reveals a similar finding of 80%. This figure for Irish psychiatrists is 
much higher than those reported in North American (57% -  O ’Reilly, Truant, & 
Donaldson, 1990) and British (68% -  Alexander, et al., 2002) studies. Cryan et al. 
proposed that the “ ...higher known to unknown ratio o f suicides in Irish practice, 
since the population is small and less mobile” (p. 6) may account for this differential. 
This “know to unknown ratio o f suicides” is referring to the psychiatrists’ knowledge 
of their patients’ suicides. In contrast, North American studies exploring therapists’ 
(23% -  Adams & Foster, 2000) and psychologists’ (22% -  Chemtob, Hamada, Bauer, 
Kinney, & Torigoe, 1988) experience o f client suicide reported much lower rates than 
those for psychiatrists.
Additional missing discourses in relation to success, failure and partial 
failure. It is a little surprising to see the level o f difficulty that emerged in the 
clinicians’ discourses in relation to markers o f progress, considering it is a 
professional requirement for most, if  not all clinicians to keep progress notes o f their 
treatment o f patients. Indeed, Chenail, Sommers, and Benjamin (2009) remark that 
clinicians “ ...typically record progress notes by articulating client symptoms, 
diagnoses, functional status, progress, and adherence to treatment plans” (p. 87). 
Therefore, one would expect clinicians to be familiar with indicators o f  progress in 
relation to their treatment effectiveness with self-injuring clients and experience less 
difficulty and exhibit more clarity in their discourses about success, failure and partial 
failure. Perhaps, if  I had used the term “progress” in place o f words like “success, 
failure and partial failure” in the questions 1 posed to the clinicians, they might have
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engaged in more elaborate and certain discourses about markers o f treatment success 
and failure. However, it is also possible that if  I had spoken of “progress”, they might 
not have engaged in discourses of failure.
Curiously, none o f the clinicians drew on a discourse about reflecting on the 
effectiveness o f various interventions and whether they contribute to success, failure 
and partial failure with self-injuring patients, considering these types o f discussions 
typically occur during supervision sessions and case conferences with other 
colleagues.
It is also interesting that the majority o f the clinicians did not draw on their 
discourse markers of success on the opposite end o f the spectrum as indicators of 
failure. For instance, they named improved coping skills, decrease or cessation of 
self-injury, more enriching relationships, changes in discourse and knowledge of 
themselves, increased functioning and active participation in their lives. Surely, if 
these are markers o f success, no change in these areas or a deterioration in the clients’ 
functioning is perhaps related to treatment failure.
Responsibility for Treatment Outcome
There was a variation among the clinicians’ discourses about who is 
responsible for the treatment outcome with self-injuring patients. These included “it 
depends” discourse, shifted to the therapist discourse, shifted to the client discourse, 
shifting discourse o f responsibility, and a “mixture” o f  responsibility in both client 
and therapist discourse. The varied discursive positions that the clinicians occupied in 
relation to this question of assigning responsibility for treatment outcome reflects 
those articulated in the treatment literature. For instance, Mike firmly located the 
responsibility for treatment outcome with the clinician. Indeed, he argued that
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clinicians tend to blame clients when the treatment is not effective. He contended, 
“And I think far too often I’ve heard it being switched back on the client you know 
that that person isn’t psychologically minded enough for therapy and I think it’s really 
interesting how when it doesn’t work out sometimes that we blame the client and I 
think we need to be looking more at ourselves” (lines 2149-2154). This discourse of 
M ike’s, where the clinician appears to blame the patient for a negative treatment 
outcome, concurs with that of Whiston and Sexton (1993) and Kottler and Carlson
(2003).
Likewise Mark’s opposing view suggests that he was positioning himself 
within a shifted to the client discourse, a discourse also uttered in the treatment 
literature. For example, Bergin and Garfield (1994) and Bohart (1995) placed the 
responsibility for the treatment outcome with the patient. Indeed, this discursive 
position is consistent with that articulated in the research findings on outcome and 
common factors research. The research on psychotherapy common factors argued 
that, . .outcome is determined to a great degree by the client and outside events— not 
the therapist” (Asay & Lambert 2001, as cited in Hubble, Duncan, & Miller, 2001, p. 
30). It is interesting that none o f the clinicians drew on the common factors discourse 
to support their discursive position in their narratives on assigning responsibility with 
regard to treatment outcome. Curiously, Niamh and Eimear, two psychologists were 
the only clinicians who engaged in a “mixture” o f responsibility in both client and 
therapist discourse. Despite the discourse about psychotherapy as a collaborative 
relationship in the treatment literature, there seems to be an absence o f an explicit 
discourse about patients and their therapists sharing responsibility for the outcome of 
treatment.
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Some o f the clinicians’ discourses suggest that they were experiencing 
difficulty with this question of who is responsible for the treatment outcome with self- 
injuring clients. Indeed, their discourses suggest that they were unclear or not sure 
about to whom to assign the responsibility. Sinead, Ciara and David all appeared to 
engage in a shifting discourse with regard to the question o f who is responsible for the 
treatment outcome. For instance, Sinead began by declaring that she saw “therapy as 
a collaborative effort” (lines 393-393, part 2) and then, she moved to a discourse in 
which she viewed the client as being responsible for the cessation o f self-injury.
Upon reaching the end of her narrative on this subject, she returned to the 
collaborative argument with which she started.
Jack’s “it depends” discourse provides a possible explanation for the 
clinicians’ apparent struggle with assigning responsibility for treatment outcome. He 
proposed, “it depends on which point of view you want to take” (lines 1651-1652). 
Here, he was referring to whether one locates oneself in the position o f the patient or 
the clinician. He elaborated on this discourse explaining, “from the point o f view of 
the individual the individual doesn’t really fail” (lines 1653-1655) and “as an analyst I 
can fail in lots o f way” (lines 1662-1663). However, he also acknowledged that there 
are times when a client comes for therapy and “they somehow can’t find the words to 
express to to begin um then there’s probably not a lot I can do about that” (lines 1668­
1670). Thus, Jack’s narrative was illustrating that the clinicians’ discourse is 
dependent upon the position she/he locates herself/himself with regard to this question 
o f responsibility.
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C onsiderations of Ireland as a Social Context
The discourses of the clinicians in this research study were co-constructed in 
the wider context o f Irish society. Consequently, there are a number o f particular 
influences that have shaped my interpretations o f the clinicians’ discourses that are 
connected to considering Ireland as a social context. Being Irish and having lived in 
Ireland, I share a sense of humour or Irish “wit” and a pattern o f speech with these 
clinicians that is evident in the extracts from the clinicians’ narratives that I have 
displayed throughout the four findings chapters. In addition, my training within the 
discipline o f psychology as a counselling psychologist has impacted my 
interpretations, since I have been exposed to particular discourses (e.g., humanistic, 
psychodynamic, cognitive-behavioural, sensorimotor, systemic, relational and 
wholistic) in my training and clinical practice within the wider Irish context.
The disciplines of psychiatry, counselling and clinical psychology, 
psychoanalysis, and psychotherapy are all located within a social context in Ireland. 
For instance, within Irish society, psychiatrists have a higher professional status than 
other mental health clinicians. They have higher salaries; they also have a different 
knowledge because o f their medical training, and a different sense o f authority 
because they usually hold more professional responsibility as the head o f a multi­
disciplinary team with the psychologist, psychotherapist, psychoanalyst and other 
team members reporting to them.
Counselling psychology is a relatively new profession in Ireland having only 
been established in 1989, with the first training programme at Trinity College, Dublin 
(Orlans & Van Scoyoc, 2009). Counselling psychologists tend to receive therapeutic 
theoretical/training in the major psychotherapeutic traditions of psychoanalytic-
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psychodynamic, cognitive behavioural and humanistic-existential modalities of 
treatment. In contrast, clinical psychology is the older and more established 
psychology profession and clinical psychologists in the Irish context are 
predominantly trained as cognitive behavioural therapists. Clinical psychologists tend 
to work as part of multi-disciplinary teams in mental health settings, while 
counselling psychologists are more likely to work in educational settings (37%), 
private practice (26%), voluntary bodies (19%) and the Health Service Executive 
(15%) (Broderick, 1999). This may account for the dominant and popular discourse 
o f CBT in medical settings. Indeed, one medical professional, Dr. Harry Barry, in his 
book Flagging the Therapy: Pathways Out o f  Depression & Anxiety has gone as far as 
declaring:
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy: In my opinion, no other form o f therapy has 
such potential to ‘revolutionise’ mental health in Ireland. As part o f a holistic 
package to treat depression, all forms o f anxiety, eating disorders and 
addiction, CBT is unparalleled. (2009, p. 44)
Perhaps, this is the type of comment that Niamh, a counselling psychologist, 
was reacting to in her discourse community o f opposition to a CBT approach which I 
discussed in Chapter Five.
The psychotherapy profession is a longer established community them 
psychology in Ireland. The psychological Society o f Ireland was formed in 1970, 
while the Irish Psycho-Analytic Association was founded in 1942 (Carr, 2007). 
Cognitive behavioural, humanistic, constructivist and family therapy emerged in the 
1960s and 1970s. Since then, additional models o f psychotherapy have appeared. For 
instance, Boyne’s (1993) edited book Psychotherapy in Ireland  contains chapters on
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different approaches to psychotherapy written by various Irish psychotherapists.
These approaches included psychoanalysis, Jungian analysis, psychosynthesis, 
constructivist psychotherapy, family therapy, cognitive behaviour therapy, Gestalt 
therapy, client-centred therapy, humanistic therapy and integrative psychotherapy. In 
the last decade, other therapeutic modalities have emerged such as process oriented 
psychotherapy, sensorimotory psychotherapy, mindful cognitive behaviour therapy, 
dialectical behaviour therapy and eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing 
therapy.
The clinicians’ discourses in this study suggest a lack of access to resources 
and limited opportunities to learn about self-injury and explore other treatment 
possibilities in the Irish context. Clinicians who work in psychiatric settings 
mentioned DBT as a treatment programme in Ireland. One clinician, Eimear had 
received training in this modality. Thus, it seems that only clinicians who work in the 
psychiatric services in Ireland are given the opportunity to avail o f training in DBT. 
This exclusivity in regard to DBT training within these services has the potential to 
establish and maintain an “expert” discourse within the psychiatric services, in 
relation to the conceptualisation and treatment o f self-injury. This concentration on a 
single kind o f training may exclude discourses o f inquiry among clinicians in these 
services, where they can engage in a dialogue about other discursive frameworks, and 
models for understanding and treating self-injuring patients. Thus, there is a great 
need to create venues, providing opportunities for training and encouraging open 
discourses o f inquiry among all clinicians working in the Irish context in relation to 
self-injury.
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Lim itations of this Research
There are a number of limitations to my research study. First, the use of 
snowball sampling means that only inferences about this small group o f clinicians can 
be made from the results o f this research. Therefore, these results cannot be 
generalised to individual groups o f clinicians represented in this study such as 
psychiatrists, clinical and counselling psychologists, psychotherapists and 
psychoanalysts. Neither can the results be generalised to the population of Irish 
clinicians as a whole. However, the discursive patterns o f this small group may be 
situated in the wider context, and in the clinical and research literature, as I have done 
in this chapter.
The second limitation relates to interviewer bias. There is no objective 
position from which to interview. Therefore, no research interview is completely free 
o f bias. Having trained as a psychologist, I bring my own assumptions to each 
interview regarding the field of knowledge about self-injury and working 
therapeutically with self-injuring clients. This means that I may have missed 
something crucial in an interview by not hearing or indeed mishearing what an 
interviewee said. In addition to the issue o f researcher bias, there is also the question 
relating to the validity and accuracy of the interpretations I made in relation to my 
analysis o f the research data. Taylor (2003) argued, “...a ll [sic] knowledge is 
considered to be situated, contingent and partial” (p. 319). Therefore, it is not 
possible to attain truth because reality is not single or static and it is “ ...influenced 
and altered by any process through which a researcher attempts to investigate and 
represent it” (Taylor, 2003, p. 319). Thus, it is not possible to capture completely 
another individual’s reality. However, in my analysis and interpretation of the data, I
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have sought to approximate as fully as possible clinicians’ discourses of 
conceptualisation of self-injury and treatment o f self-injuring patients. To reduce 
researcher bias and address this issue o f validity, I have also sought readers who 
challenged my interpretation o f my analysis o f the research data. These readers were 
my primary supervisor, my auxiliary supervisor and my research review committee.
A final limitation o f my research study pertains to the design or framing of my 
interview schedule. The way I constructed my interview questions and the language I 
used shaped the clinicians’ discourses profoundly. Indeed, my questions invited 
particular parameters to the clinicians’ discourses, in that I brought the same questions 
to all o f  the participants in my interviews with them. This may have had the effect of 
narrowing the clinicians’ discourses and possibly closing down an opportunity to hear 
a wider range o f discourses from them.
Implications o f this Study
The findings o f my research study have significant potential implications for 
the education and training o f clinicians in Ireland within the professional disciplines 
o f clinical and counselling psychology, psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, and 
psychiatry. They suggest a need to open up new opportunities for clinicians to use an 
inquirer’s discursive approach to learning about understanding and treating self­
injury. Applying a discursive model o f inquiry to training, clinicians can engage in a 
dialogue with their peers and trainers in which they can think, wonder, question and 
revise their discourses in response to self-injury. Such a training model would 
provide an opportunity for clinicians to engage in an open and critical dialogue about 
the many debates and controversies that surround self-injury and its treatment. It 
would also challenge clinicians to engage in a discourse o f interrogation, in which
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they could think about and critically reflect on their specific frameworks for 
understanding self-injury and their particular models o f treatment with self-injuring 
clients and also ask questions about their compatibility and suitability for working 
with self-injury.
These findings also draw attention to the complexities and difficulties that 
clinicians encounter with regard to the evaluation o f their clinical practice with self- 
injuring patients. They suggest an absence of a systematic way o f thinking or 
conceptualising progress with regard to self-injury among Irish clinicians. Although, 
there is an absence o f discourse markers o f progress in relation to self-injury in the 
literature, this should not deter clinicians from developing some systematic indicators 
or markers o f progress with respect to self-injury. Therefore, there is a need to create 
fora that open new opportunities for reflection, discussion and training about these 
issues among clinicians in the disciplines o f counselling, psychoanalysis, psychology 
and psychiatry. These spaces could facilitate clinicians to come together to engage in 
dialogue and reflect on their practice with particular reference to developing criteria 
for marking out progress, considering and naming partial failures, alliance ruptures, 
empathic failures and mistakes in their treatment o f self-injuring clients. There is also 
a need for clinicians to speak about and reflect on their clinical effectiveness and 
failures in their work with self-injuring patients, and to consider their own, as well as 
client variables, in relation to the impact on treatment outcome, with other colleagues 
who have contrasting views and different orientations to practice.
Future Research and Directions
The findings o f  my research study highlight the need for additional research to 
be conducted on the phenomenon and treatment o f self-injury within and beyond
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Ireland. The number of studies in Ireland is relatively small and discourses on self­
injury in the Irish context are limited to a few unpublished scholarly dissertations.
Certain puzzling features have emerged for me in relation to the findings and 
point to three areas that warrant further exploration. For instance, a future study is 
required to further our knowledge about clinicians’ difficulty in speaking about 
success in their clinical practice, as it is not clear why they have trouble engaging in a 
discourse about their experiences of success with clients in general and also, 
specifically with self-injuring patients.
In addition, an exploration into the use o f theoretical or conceptual 
frameworks with regard to understanding and treating self-injury by clinicians who 
write about self-injury and those who don’t is also required. It is not known whether 
those who write about self-injury would actually draw on theoretical or conceptual 
models in their narratives about their understanding and treatment o f self-injuring 
clients in an interview situation, in constrast to their articulations in the literature in 
which they write about using frameworks.
Another puzzle to resolve in relation to the findings is the question o f the 
clinicians’ training with respect to those who drew on either an inquirer or expert 
discourse in response to questions about their treatment effectiveness with self- 
injuring patients. A further study in this area might focus on exploring whether 
clinicians are open to other discourses o f practice that oppose their own with regard to 
self-injury. Indeed, this could be extended to incorporate other studies investigating 
this question with respect to other clinical phenomena beyond self-injury.
I would also like to recommend a number o f other studies that would go a long
way to increasing our clinical knowledge about self-injury and other areas. It would
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be useful to extend this study to include the narratives o f clients who engage in self­
injury, and examine their discourses about the various treatment modalities they have 
experienced via clinicians working in the Irish context and their relative effectiveness.
This current study could be replicated in other countries such as Canada, the 
USA and the UK that have long established discourses in self-injury. Indeed, it would 
be interesting to note whether similar findings emerge. The research questions and 
methodology employed in my research study could also be used to explore clinicians’ 
conceptualisation and treatment of other clinical phenomena that clients present with, 
such as anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, depression, anxiety etc. Such studies 
would help to further our knowledge about whether clinicians have models for 
considering these clinical phenomena and treatment approaches that are distinct from 
their primary theoretical orientations to practice.
It would be interesting to replicate this current study with a group o f clinicians 
who began at the same starting as myself, which is with a conceptual framework for 
understanding and treating self-injury before having worked with their first self- 
injuring patient. I would be curious to discover if  such clinicians engage in similar 
discursive patterns to the clinicians in my doctoral research study.
There is a lack o f established criterion for gauging treatment success and 
failure in the literature from which clinicians can draw in their clinical practice with 
self-injuring clients. Indeed, it appears that our discourses o f knowledge in this area 
are limited to the application o f outcome measures. The findings o f this study point to 
the need for further research to identify assessment criterion and to develop a 
systematic, robust, adaptive and clinically useful set o f criteria that clinicians could
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use in evaluating their current treatment practice effectiveness with their self-injuring 
patients.
Finally, the interview schedule I developed and used in this study could be 
adapted and employed as a clinical tool o f  self-reflection for clinicians with regard to 
their conceptualisation and treatment of self-injury and other clinical phenomena that 
they encounter in their clients. This clinical tool could be used by individual or small 
groups o f clinicians to teach and inform each other across the disciplines of 
psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, psychology and psychiatry.
Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I considered the five major findings o f my research study in 
light o f the literature. I highlighted the clinicians’ discourses that concur, contrast or 
are newly articulated discourses that have not been previously reported in the 
literature. I also named the discourses in the literature that are absent from the 
clinicians’ narratives. I offered various interpretations and possible explanations for 
the findings in relation to the clinicians’ discourses that pertain to their understanding 
o f self-injury, their discourses about their treatment models, their perceptions of their 
clinical effectiveness and failures in their work with self-injuring patients and the 
sources o f knowledge that contribute to their understanding of self-injury.
I concluded with a discussion of the clinicians’ discourses within the wider 
context o f Irish society, the limitations of my research study and the potential 
implications o f this study for the education and training o f clinicians in Ireland, within 
the professional disciplines of psychoanalysis, psychology, psychiatry and 
psychotherapy. I also highlighted areas for future research on the phenomenon and 
treatment of self-injury.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Self-Injury Illustrative Terms (Ross &  McKay, 1979)
1. A little suicide
2. Attempted suicide
3. Attenuated suicide
4. Autoaggression
5. Deliberated disability
6. Deliberated self-harm
7. Deliberated self-injury
8. Demonstrative self-injury
9. Focal suicide
10. Intentional injury
11. Local self-destruction
12. Malingering
13. Masochism
14. Munchausen syndrome
15. Self-abusive behaviour (or conduct
16. Self-aggressive behaviour
17. Self-assaultive behaviour
18. Self-attacking
19. Self-damaging behaviour
20. Self-destructive behaviour
21. Self-harming behaviour
22. Self-hurting behaviour
23. Self injurious behaviour
24. Self-poisoning behaviour
25. Self-punitive behaviour
26. Self-stimulatory behaviour
27. Self-wounding behaviour
28. Self-directed aggression
29. Self-mutilation
30. Small suicide
31. Symbolic wounding
32. Parasuicide
33. Purposive accidents
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Appendix B: Selection C riteria  for Inclusion in the R esearch Study
1. Participants must have a professional qualification in at least one o f the following 
that allows them to practice in the Republic o f Ireland as a psychiatrist; or a 
clinical psychologist; or a counselling psychology; or a psychotherapist or a 
counsellor; or a psychoanalyst.
2. Participants must be full members o f the Royal College o f Psychiatrists; or a 
registered member o f the Psychological Society o f Ireland; or an accredited 
member o f one of the following professional bodies: the Irish Council of 
Psychotherapy; the Irish Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy; or the 
Irish Association for Humanistic and Integrative Psychotherapy; or the Irish 
College o f Psychoanalysts.
3. Participants must have a minimum of 2 years clinical experience post qualification 
in one o f the following professions: psychiatry; clinical or counselling 
psychology; psychotherapy; or counselling; or psychoanalysis.
4. Participants must have worked with at least 3-4 self-injuring clients in the 
Republic o f Ireland for a minimum period o f 3-6 months, meeting regularly 
weekly sessions.
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A ppendix C: Initial C ontact L etter
St, Patrick’s College,
Drumcondra,
Dublin 9.
01/08/07
Dear ,
I am a doctoral research student at St. Patrick’s College (a College o f Dublin City 
University). My research supervisors are Prof. Annie G. Rogers (Hampshire College, 
U.S.A.) and Dr. Catherine Maunsell (St. Patrick’s College). The focus of my 
dissertation is on the topic of self-injury. The purpose o f this research study is to 
explore mental health clinicians’ understanding o f self-injury and how they work with 
self-injuring clients/patients in the Irish context. This current research is an extension 
and continuation o f my Master’s dissertation on self-injury which 1 completed a 
number o f years ago.
You are one o f a small number of mental health clinicians that have been selected by 
m yself or by one o f your colleagues as a result o f  your experience o f working with 
self-injuring clients/patients. Therefore, I would like to invite you to participate in my 
study.
Your participation would involve one interview o f one and a half to two hours 
duration with me. The interview will consist o f  opened ended questions about self­
injury and your work with self-injuring clients/patients. You will be asked to 
complete a biographical data sheet at some point during the interview. You may be 
asked to participate in a follow-up interview should 1 need to seek clarification, and/or 
to follow-up on something you said that I did not fully understand in the initial 
interview. The follow-up interview if required should take about 30 minutes to one 
hour with me.
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All interviews will be audio recorded. Each audio file and transcript will be given a 
pseudonym in order to protect your identity. Therefore, your real name and any 
identifying information will not be used in any documents related to this research 
study. In the event that some of the data recorded from your interview contains 
sensitive clinical information that may be too revealing for you and your 
clients/patients, I will contact you, ask you to review your transcript and request a 
follow-up interview to address this issue. Protecting the identity and confidentiality 
o f you and your clients’/ patients’ is a primary concern notwithstanding the limits to 
confidentiality.
Participation in this research study is on a voluntary basis. You can withdraw your 
consent at any time. You can refuse to answer particular questions should you wish 
to.
There is no anticipated perceived risk to you as a result o f your participation in this 
research study. It is hoped that participating in this study will provide you with an 
opportunity to share your knowledge and reflect on your clinical practice.
1 will phone you within one week o f receiving this letter to enquire about your level o f  
interest in my research study and to answer any questions or queries that you may 
have in relation to this study.
Thank you for taking the time to read this letter.
Yours sincerely,
Aida Keane
M.Sc., Reg. Psychol., Ps.S.I.
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A ppendix D: P artic ipan t Consent Form
I agree to participate in a research study on self-injury conducted by Aida Keane. 
This study will become Aida Keane’s Ph D dissertation at St. Patrick’s College, 
Dublin City University. The purpose o f this study is to explore mental health 
clinicians’ understanding of self-injury and how they work with self-injuring 
clients/patients in the Irish context.
I understand that my participation involves one interview o f one and a half to two 
hours duration with Aida. The interview will consist o f opened ended questions about 
self-injury and about my work with self-injuring clients/patients. I understand that I 
will be asked to complete a biographical data sheet at some point during the interview. 
I am aware I may be asked to participate in a follow-up interview should Aida need to 
seek clarification, and/or to follow-up on something I said that Aida did not fully 
understand in the initial interview. A follow-up interview if  required should take 
about 30 minutes to one hour with Aida.
All interviews will be audio recorded. A transcriber employed by A ida who has 
agreed to protect the confidentiality o f research participants will transcribe the audio 
files. Each audio file and transcript will be given a pseudonym in order to protect the 
identity o f participants. Therefore my real name and any identifying information will 
not be used in any documents related to this research study. In the event that some of 
the data recorded from your interview contains sensitive clinical information that may 
be too revealing for you and your clients/patients, Aida will contact me, ask me to 
review my transcript and request a follow-up interview to address this issue. 
Protecting my clients’/patients’ identity and confidentiality and my own is a primary 
concern. I am aware o f the limits to confidentiality and accept that this research study 
is bound by such limits.
All audio files, transcripts and biographical sheets will be stored in a locked filing 
cabinet in my office at St. Patrick’s College. The time frame for the period o f data 
retention will be three to five years or six months after the final submission date of 
A ida’s PhD dissertation, which ever is the shorter period o f time. Aida will destroy
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the transcripts, biographical data sheets, and the informed consent forms by 
confidential shredding. Aida will also erase the audio files of the interviews.
There is no anticipated perceived risk to you as a result o f your participation in this 
research study. It is hoped that participating in this study will provide you with an 
opportunity to share your knowledge and reflect on your clinical practice.
I understand that I am consenting voluntarily to participate in this research study. I 
am aware that I can withdraw my consent at any time. I am also aware that I can 
refuse to answer particular questions should I wish to.
I acknowledge receiving a copy of this participant consent form.
Participant’s Name Date
Participant’s Signature Researcher’s Signature
I would like you to send me a summary copy o f the results to:
Participant’s N am e:__________________________
Address: ________________________
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A ppendix E: P artic ipan t B ackground Inform ation Sheet
Q. 1 Please indicate your gender: Male
Q. 2 Please indicate your age range:
20-29
□ Female □
30-39 Q 40-49 50-59 60-69
Q. 3 Please indicate your profession:
Psychiatrist 
Clinical Psychologist 
Counsellor
Q. 4 Please list your professional qualifications?
Psychoanalyst 
Psychotherapist 
Counselling Psychologist
□
□
□
Q. 5 How long have you been practising as a counsellor/ psychoanalyst/ psychiatrist/ 
psychologist?
Q. 6 How many self-injuring clients/patients have you worked with?
Males j j Females |
Q, 7 What is the age range o f the self-injuring clients/patients you have worked with?
0-12 □  13-19 □  20-24 □  25-29 □  30-34 □  35+ □
Q. 8 Please name the types of setting(s) in which you have worked with self-injuring 
clients/patients?
Q. 9 What was the main therapeutic orientation of your training programme in 
psychiatry/counselling/psychotherapy/psychology?
Q. 10 How would you describe your current therapeutic approach/orientation?
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A ppendix F: Interview  Schedule
Introductory Questions
Q. I Can you tell me about your work generally (your role, setting, clientele, supervision)?
Q. 2 What settings have you worked with self-injuring clients?
Q. 3 What severity o f physical damage have your self-injuring clients/patients inflicted on 
themselves?
Probes
• Level o f severity -  Mild, Moderate, Severe
• What do these terms mean to you in relation to clients’/patients’ level of severity of their self­
injury (mostly superficial/more extensive than superficial)?
Q, 4 Can you tell me the level o f frequency of self-injury that you clients/patients engage in?
Probes
•  In relation to frequency would you say 20-30 episodes per year (Walsh and Rosen, 1988)?
•  In relation to frequency would you say 20-100 over a multiple year period (Walsh and Rosen, 
1988)?
■ •  Less than once a month/several times a month/weekly/daily 
Confidentiality R em inder to Interviewees
If  you are going to introduce particular clients/patients when answering the following questions could 
you please use their first name initial or make up a pseudonym rather than using their real name as this 
interview is being audio recorded as agreed.
Main Interview Questions
Q. 1 Can you tell me how you think about self-injury -  what it is?
Probes
• What type(s) o f behaviour do you categorise as self-injury?
• How do you distinguish between self-injury and suicide?
•  What purpose/function does self-injury serve for clients/patients who engage in this 
behaviour?
• What meaning does self-injury have for clients/patients?
• Why do clients/patients engage in self-injury?
Q. 2 What models/theoretical frameworks help you to understand your self-injuring clients’/patients’?
Q. 3 How do these models/ theoretical frameworks help you understand self-injuring clients/patients?
Q. 4 Where did you get your ideas about self-injury (training, reading, workshops, personal
experience, clients/patients, supervisor, peers)?
Q. 5 Can you tell me how you work with clients/patients who self-injure?
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Probes
» How do you assess clients’/patients’ motivation to stop self-injuring?
•  Is this important in your work (i.e. clients’/patients’ level o f motivation to stop self-injuring) 
with self-injuring clients/ patients?
•  To what extend is your approach directive with self-injuring clients’/patients’?
• How do you assess your clients’/patients’ level o f self-injury? Are there specific questions you
ask? What are they? Do you use self-injury assessment scales? What ones do you use?
• Do you ask to see clients’ injuries/scars?
•  Do you make contracts with clients about their self-injury?
•  Can you tell me how you respond to self-injuring clients/patients in times o f  crisis?
•  Are there any particular strategies/interventions you find helpful when working with self- 
injuring clients/patients?
•  Do you work with self-injuring clients/patients who have a psychiatric history/ diagnosis 
(relevant for psychologists/ psychotherapists only)?
• How do you deal with holiday periods with self-injuring clients/patients?
• How frequently do you see your self-injuring clients/patients (once per week, twice per week, 
once every two weeks, once a month?
• What is the trend o f your work with self-injuring clients/patients in terms of duration of 
treatment (short term or long term, average number o f sessions over what time frame)?
• How does the issue of self-injury emerge initially? Who raises it? How does that happen or 
come about?
• Does the setting you work in (either past or present) pose any barriers, restrictions or
limitations to your work with self-injuring clients/patients?
•  Are there any particular strategies/interventions you find unhelpful when working with self- 
injuring clients/patients?
Q. 6 What models/ideas guide you in your work with (/treatment of) self-injuring clients/patients?
Probes
• What guides you through risk assessment with self-injuring clients/patients?
•  What resources help, support, and sustain you in your work with self-injuring clients/patients?
Q. 7 How do these models/ideas help you in your work with self-injuring clients/patients?
Q. 8 Where did you get your ideas about how to work with self-injuring clients/patients (training,
reading, workshops, personal experience, clients/ patients, supervisor, peers)?
Q. 9 Are you aware o f any treatment programmes in Ireland for individuals who engage in self­
injury? (information question)
Q. 10 What would constitute a treatment success with self-injuring clients/patients?
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Q. 11 Can you tell me about your experiences of treatment success with self-injuring clients/patients? 
Probes
•  What contributed to treatment success?
Q. 12 What led you to conclude treatment was a success?
Q. 13 What would constitute a treatment failure/partial failure?
Q, 14 Can you tell me about your experiences of failures/ partial failures in working with self-injuring 
clients/patients?
Probes
•  What contributed to treatment failures/partial failures?
Q. 15 What led you to conclude treatment was a failure/partial failure?
Q. 16 Who is primarily responsible for the treatment outcome in your view, whether it is positive or 
negative?
Q. 17 What do you find difficult/challenging about working with clients/patients who engage in self­
injury?
Q. 18 What treatment issues do you think are important for clinicians to be mindful of when working 
with clients/patients who engage in self-injury?
Q. 19 Is there any thing you would like to add that I didn’t ask you about?
*Ask interviewee if  he/she would like to suggest a  colleague(s) whom I should contact with a view to 
participating in this study who meet the selection criteria for inclusion.
* Thank interviewee.
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A ppendix G: Jefferson’s (1984) T ranscrip tion  Notation System
(.5) The number in brackets indicates a time gap in tenths of a second.
.hh A dot before an ‘h’ indicates speaker in-breath; the more ‘h’s, the longer the out-breath.
hh An ‘h’ indicates an out-breath; the more ‘h’s, the longer the out-breath.
(()) A description enclosed in a double bracket indicates a non-verbal activity, for example
((banging sound)).
( ) Empty parentheses indicate the presence o f an unclear fragment on the tape.
Under Underlined fragments indicate speaker emphasis.
[ ] Square brackets between adjacent lines o f concurrent speech indicate the onset and end of
a spate of overlapping talk.
Source: Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, (2003)
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A ppendix H: Sum m ary Table o f  P artic ip an t’s D em ographic D ata
In te rv iew C lin ic ian
P s e u d o n y m
G e n d e r Age  R ange Profess ion C lin ical
E x p e r i e n c e
T r a i n i n g  O r ie n ta t io n
Pilot Interview Niamh Female 50-59 Counselling Psychologist 17 years Developmental Psychology
Interview 1 Eimear Female 50-59 Clinical Psychologist 15 years DBT
Interview 2 Mike Male 40-49 Registered Psychologist 14 years Systemic Family Therapy 
Narrative Therapy
Interview 3 Jack Male 50-59 Psychoanalyst 16 years Freudian/Lacanian Psychoanalysis
Interview 4 Mark Male 40-49 Psychotherapist 10 years Psychiatry -  2 year Adult psychiatry
Psychotherapy -  Body Centred 
Psychotherapy
Interview 5 David Male 40-49 Consultant Psychiatrist 11 years as a 
consultant
Broad based -  Pharmacological, 
Psychodynamic
Interview 6 Sinead Female 50-59 Psychotherapist 18 years Constructivist & Systemic
Interview 7 Ciara Female 30-39 Consultant Psychiatrist 11 years Biological Psychological Social 
focus Multidisciplinary Care Approach
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A ppendix I: M odulation C harts (Odgen & M inton, 2000)
Hgh Arousal
Arousal 
C apacity: 
"window 
of
tolerance"
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A ppendix J :  E xtracts from the C linicians’ T ranscrip ts
(Referred to in the Discussion Chapter Eight and not included in the Findings
Chapters Four, Five, Six, and Seven)
Extract from  Niamh's transcript
Lines 748-768 I: Okay and I guess I was wondering how you broach this
subject with clients but you, you’re saying you don’t but 
they they raise it with you (3) em (2) when they show 
you their, their scars or their injuries can you me what 
your internal response is to them when you first see 
them, their injury or their scar 
C: Well just sadness you know
I: Mm-hmm
C: .hh (4) for the inner scar really
I: Okay
C (2) You know 
I: And what’s [your]
C: [And] the amount o f pain that that
represents you know 
I: Mm-hmm
C: Externally that’s inside
I: Mm-hmm
C: (3) Fm not freaked by scars you know if  that’s the
baseline of the question I d ’you know
Extract from  Ciara's transcript
Lines 979-984, part 1 I: Okay and when they disclose that they engage in, in
self-injury or self-harm .hh do you actually what are 
your internal responses what’s your own reaction when 
they they say it to you 
C: .hh hhhh I don’t really I see so much o f it really that I I
it it it’s not shocking to me any longer um
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